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m si b a g i
Cognitive Science attempts to study entities which in some sense possess beliefs, 
intentions, desires etc. The preferred term in this thesis for such entities is agents. An 
attempt at a scientific analysis of agents however throws up a number of questions.
* What are the right concepts to describe agents ?
What kinds of formal notations permit perspicuous reasoning about agents ?
* What can be said about the architecture and construction of agents ?
The introductory section of this thesis discusses these questions in some detail, using 
Dennett’s ideas about intentional systems [Den87J as a point of departure. I then 
examine a number of studies from Artificial Intelligence, Logic, Natural Language 
semantics and Philosophy which give shape to the current state of the art in agent 
theory.
This leads to the development of a mathematical model of multi-object/agent interaction, 
which I call the SRS-model (SRS - Synchronous Reactive Systems). I demonstrate the 
adequacy of the model by using it to formalise learning and games scenarios.
Next, various logics are introduced which capture input-output and then belief-desire 
level descriptions of agents. These logics are given an SRS-model semantics, and 
adequacy is shown by modelling a psychological experiment (an agent in a Skinner Box).
It is shown how the example can be formally analysed in terms of mechanisms and 
architecture at the SRS-level (including a computer simulation); at the level of 
behaviourism (using a temporal logic - APTL); and at an intentional level (using an 
epistemic-conative temporal logic ECTL).
Some remarks are made about extending the analysis to multi-agent situations involving 
co-operation, competition and dialogue.
Finally, a detailed survey is made of the main mathematical and logical resources 
available to the style of formal cognitive science advocated in this thesis. I include modal 
logic, including its epistemic and doxastic variants; the extension of modal logic to 
dynamic logic; and the various approaches recently developed in the logic of time.
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Agent Theories and Architectures lntroduction/1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
There is a distinction we commonly make between those entities which appear to be the 
subjects of beliefs, desires etc, such as ourselves and other animals; and entities which 
do not appear to be the subjects of such cognitive attitudes, such as naturally occurring 
inanimate objects, (most of) our artifacts etc.
Everyday natural language does not have an entirely suitable adjective to capture this 
distinction: the animate/inanimate distinction for example differentiates on biological 
rather than cognitive grounds. I propose to use the term popularised by the philosopher 
Daniel Dennett for systems we find it appropriate to describe in terms of their beliefs, 
goals etc [Den78, 87], and call them intentional systems. In the scope of this thesis, 
the term agent should be taken as synonymous with intentional system1.
There are three main questions to do with the scientific analysis of intentional systems.
1 . What is the right technical vocabulary to describe them, (a lexical- 
syntactic question) ?
2 . What are the expressions in such a technical vocabulary intended to mean 
(a semantic question) ?
3. What is particular to the design and construction of intentional systems 
(a pragmatic/operational question) ?
Historically logicians and philosophers of mind have addressed questions 1 and 2, whilst 
the Al community has tended to concentrate upon question 3. I hope in this thesis 
however to develop a unified treatment of all three questions.
1. Intentional systems and intentional expressions
Is intentionaiity a special kind of mechanistic property of agents, such that by a careful 
analysis of the physical structure of a system one could solve the decision problem, "is 
this an intentional system or not" ?
Dennett argues that this is the wrong way to iook at the problem. Take the analogy of the 
centre of gravity of an object ([Den 87 pp. 52-53j). Is there something special about 
the point where the centre of gravity is which a physical examination of that point would 
make plain ? Clearly not: the centre of gravity becomes an important attribute of an 
object only in the context of a suitable mechanical theory. What is important is that the 
object should be conformant to the theory, so that its predictions are realised in the 
object's behaviour.
In a similar fashion, we establish a variety of levels of description of systems, 
especially when we design them. When we describe systems by means of non­
1 But see the discussion in section 3.7, where educability is brought in as the hallmark of 
cognitively interesting agents. Compare [Ben76 p. 84], where educability is identified with 
intelligence.
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constructive specifications, logical architectures, executable code or plans for physical 
realisation, we are in every case describing uniformities with which the described 
system Is required to be conformant.
The same will hold for intentional descriptions if we can formalise them in a logical 
language, and show by rules of interpretation what it is for a system to be conformant. 
Such a conforming system is then entitled to be called intentional, and it is a category 
mistake to wonder which of its internal structures correspond to particular beliefs, 
desires etc. This point will become more apparent later on, when I exhibit systems 
which are highly susceptible to intentional analysis, yet which have architectures which 
are suitably resistant to any such correspondences (see sections 3.5 and 3.6).
2. Formalising intentional descriptions
Most workers have accepted the correctness of our "folk psychological” intuitions that 
beliefs (or knowledge) and desires are the foundational concepts for describing 
intentional systems (see for example [Cla87]), and have been happy to describe the 
concepts in logical notation.
A straightforward attempt at formalisation would go like this: suppose that:
1. John believes it's Sunday.
2. On Sundays (and only then), the pubs are shut.
The standard approach would be to formalise this as follows
1'. Believes(John, its-Sunday).
2 '. its-Sunday «-> pubs-shut.
"Believes"appears to be a relation between John and the fact of it being Sunday, exactly 
paralleling the way one might formalise
•John weighs 80 kg"
as:
Weighs(John, 80)2.
Unfortunately, from 1' and 2 ', by substitution of logical equivalences, one can deduce:
3*. Believes(John, pubs-shut)
Usually we are reluctant to draw this conclusion, since it seems not impossible that John 
might have the false belief that there is at least some chance the pubs might be open. 
Clearly beliefs, and other attitude operators such as hopes, doubts, intends do not 
describe attributes of an agent in the same way that weight and height might do.
2 Not that the apparent relationship between John and the real number 80 is unproblematic, 
see [Sta84].
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The fact that operators such as Believes create "opaque contexts" in which ordinary 
substitutivity is blocked has been known since at least the time of Frege. His "solution" 
was to distinguish between the "sense" and "reference" of terms and formulae. In 
ordinary contexts the reference of a term or formula was meant, but in opaque contexts, 
the sense was somehow involved. Senses would have to be finer-grained than references, 
since as we have seen, substitution of co-referring expressions within opaque contexts 
causes problems.
in the case of attitude operators such as Believes, Hopes, Wants etc, the sense needed is 
the sense of a formula rather than a term, it is usual to say that such a formula describes 
a proposition, so the question reduces to: "what is a proposition" ?
There is of course a major literature on this subject. I do not propose to review it here, 
merely to observe that in Al, two main approaches have been adopted:
(a ) to adopt a sentential semantics, in which a proposition is a sentence-like 
object, perhaps resident in the believer's (hoper's, wanter’s, ..) 
database, or head;
(b )  to adopt a possible-worlds semantics, in which a proposition is a set of 
possible worlds (or equivalently the characteristic function of such a 
set), to which the believer (or hoper etc) stands in some kind of 
"accessibility relation".
Since a great deal of Al technology consists of architectures for symbolic processing:- 
theorem-provers, knowledge-based systems etc, it is perhaps not surprising that 
approach (a) has proved most popular. Especially since the ontology of possible worlds 
and accessibility relations implied by approach (b) is frankly mysterious to most 
practically-minded people, and in particular seems to say nothing useful about agent 
architecture.
Since approach (a) in some sense represents the "orthodox position" it is useful to 
briefly review the position in a little more detail. I will then indicate why this thesis in 
fact argues for approach (b), and how the problems with that approach can be addressed.
3. Sentential Semantics
Recall that for standard first-order logic, models are pairs (D, V) where D is a non­
empty set, and V is a valuation function which assigns various set-theoretic 
constructions over D (+ {0 ,1}) to the terms and formula of the logical language.
in a sentential semantics3 for an intentional first-order predicate logic, models are 
extended to include deduction structures, where a deduction structure is a pair (B, R) of 
basic beliefs B and deduction rules R representing an idealised cognitive architecture of 
an agent.
The great merit of Konolige's work, from which this account is taken, is that he shows 
how such special models can support a reasonable interpretation of many of our
3 See [Kon86], [GN87 chapter 9] and section 2.4 below.
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intuitions about how belief works, including those captured by standard axiomatisations 
of belief (eg KD45) and the intricacies of "quantifying-in". The latter case is one in 
which we might wish to report of an agent that (for example), there is some individual x 
such that the agent believes P of x. We could write this symbolically as
3x.Believes(agent, P(x)).
The implication is that the agent can identify the individual denoted by x even though we, 
as observers, may not be able to.
This kind of situation has always appeared problematic for a sentential semantics, since 
it is not clear how we should characterise the sentence presumed to be in the agent's 
database. Konolige introduces the technical device of the "bullet operator" to handle this 
problem, in a fashion described in section 2.4.
Konolige's approach is technically very impressive, providing a clear account of how 
logics of beliefs can be satisfied by a class of models which include agents representing 
beliefs deciaratively. It is not logically necessary however that the only agents capable of 
satisfying a logic of belief should internalise belief databases. Nor is it too clear how the 
observers of such an agent can make practical use of such an interpretation of their 
belief logic if the agent's internal belief state is observationaliy inaccessible.
If the observer's interaction with an agent is through behavioural observation, or at best 
some kind of linguistic discourse, then it is far from clear that the best way to proceed is 
for the observer to impute to the agent an internal deduction structure. In particular it 
is not overwhelmingly compelling that this is what && do, as human beings in our daily
discourse4.
Attractive as Konolige's semantics are to symbolic processing engineers, it seems to 
make too many architectural presumptions on the one hand, and to be too agnostic about 
the practical use of intentional description in agent-agent interaction on the other. It 
therefore seems a sensible idea to see what possible-worlds semantics might offer.
4. Possible Worlds Semantics
Coming back to the example of John's beliefs about the pubs being open mentioned above, 
one way of paraphrasing the fact that John believes one thing, but may be unsure about 
another is to attribute to John points of view. Thus in the example above, we could say:
"John would entertain a point of view according to which the pubs were closed on 
Sundays, but he would also entertain a point of view according to which they were open, 
and the latter point of view would be more acceptable".
The mathematical formalisations of these intuitions go by names such as "possible 
worlds semantics", or "situation semantics" [BP83]. They all explain the meaning of
4 Nor is it a ridiculous assertion: it seems perfectly possib le  that we might be running 
simulation models of each other "subconciously". Supporters of this view however need to 
demonstrate that it can support the formal predictive modelling of agent perception-cognition- 
action by an observer, in a similar fashion to the possible-worlds based scenario of section 3.6.
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phrases such as:
Believes(John, $) and NotSureAbout(John.y)
by saying that we can associate a number of alternative points of view with John, and in 
all of them $ holds, in some of them holds and in others y  doesn't.
The standard possible-worids treatment of belief, and other attitudes uses the semantics 
developed by Kripke [Kri63] for modal logics using operators Q (necessarily) and 0 
(possibly). The necessity operator is interpreted as a belief operator, and various 
axioms are discussed with reference to how adequately they capture our "folk- 
psychological" notions of belief etc. See the detailed discussion in sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.3. 
Section 2.6 discusses an alternative style of "possible-worlds" semantics for the 
attitudes in the context of situation theory.
This style of treatment for the attitudes has the merit of separating out the "what" of 
intentional descriptions (what is conveyed by an attitude report), from the "how" of 
agent realisation (by virtue of what construction is an agent an appropriate vehicle for 
the ascription of intentional descriptions). On this reading, logics of the attitudes are 
special kinds of specification languages (a point made by Dennett in [Den87] p. 255).
Such a division of labour is only useful however if one has a notion of how to connect the 
"possible-worlds" level of description to an architectural level. The standard semantics 
merely imports a set of worlds and an accessibility relation as parameters to any 
particular model. There are no satisfactory rules of interpretation which map these 
postulated entities into real-world situations (see for instance the brave attempts of 
[Sta84] chapter 3). This leaves the agent designer in something of a quandary.
The main contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a solution to this problem, by 
introducing a special kind of semantic domain in which it is possible to interpret in a 
"realistic" fashion logics of knowledge and goals. Before saying something about how this 
is done, it is useful to consider the current approaches to agent design in Al.
5. The architectures of intentional systems
A conceptually straightforward engineering solution to the problem of agent-design is to 
design the agent as an inference-engine for a suitable logic. The agent will also need a 
perceptual system, to return descriptions of the current-state of the world in the chosen 
logic, and an action subsystem, which will take action descriptions in the logic, and make 
them happen.
it is then necessary to encode an initial theory of the world in the logic, and load it into 
the agent's knowledge base. As the system perceives certain facts to hold, it should 
combine these with the information in its knowledge-base to update it, and draw 
conclusion as to what actions it should carry out5.
This approach, familiar from the experience of many knowledge-based systems, has the 
engineering advantages of separating the knowledge of the system from its performance 
architecture. Since knowledge is held declaratively, changing it is in principle easy, and
5 A description of this kind of system can be found in ([GN87] pages 313-327).
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the transformations of the knowledge of the system can be derived in a fairly 
straightforward way from logical analyses of belief-revision, learning etc.
A number of interesting problems are thrown up by such architectures. Problems of 
temporal reasoning, default-reasoning, non-monotonicity of the logics, fuzzy or 
probabilistic reasoning, planning etc etc.
It is probably fair to say that the constellation of problems around this kind of 
"knowledge-processing architecture" constitutes the bedrock of mainstream Al research 
today.
If the agent is required to reason about other "intelligent agents" in its environments, 
the approach can be extended by giving the architecture a suitable logic of the attitudes. 
Given the difficulties of modal theorem-proving, a significant amount of effort has been 
invested either in first-order encoding of epistemic logics, or in extending efficient 
first-order provers to handle modal logics (see sections 2.2, 2.4 for more about these 
two approaches).
Productive and interesting as this tradition continues to be, it holds a very serious 
theoretical danger, that of blurring the distinction between the description of an agent (a 
theory), and the realisation of an agent (an artifact). This distinction is made very 
carefully in related disciplines such as software engineering, linguistics (the 
"competence" vs. "performance1 distinction), and indeed in Al itself (recall Marr’s 
distinction between computational and algorithmic levels [Mar82], valid in spite of 
criticisms such as ([Den87] p.75)).
While it may be necessary to describe a system using a very sophisticated logic (of 
defaults, time, attitudes or whatever), it does not follow that the system need be 
implemented as an interpreter for that logic. The designer often has such a choice of 
course (in software engineering this is called an executable specification), but in 
practice concerns of efficiency often orient the designer to other forms of 
implementation.
We could even sum this up with an aphorism, the "fallacy of gratuitous representation": 
"the agent is only obligated to behave correctly in the world, it does not follow that it 
needs to reason correctly about the world too".
This could be taken to be a manifesto for specifying agents in a declarative fashion, using 
sophisticated logics, but implementing them using whatever (procedural) techniques 
seem most appropriate. This doesn't seem too difficult a concept to understand, so where 
might confusion come from ? I think there are three situations where such a simple 
specification-implementation model has problems which "muddy the water".
a  If an "intelligent artifact" needs to be customisable at the knowledge-level 
(cf [New82]), then it makes design sense to encode the system's 
knowledge as an independent subsystem in a syntactic form close to the 
way the user would express the customising knowledge. This might be the 
case for knowledge-based systems where the end-user could alter or 
extend the knowledge base; it's also true for most expert systems at 
initial build-time.
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b. If the agent is a learning agent, then in some sense it must both "use" its 
internal structures procedurally, and "mention" its internal structures 
as it changes them deciaratively in accordance with new knowledge. While 
it does not follow that the knowledge of such a learning agent must be held 
architecturally in a language of logic (see chapter 3 for many counter­
examples), It is plausible that there should be a clean mapping‘between 
the logical transformations describing the learning, and the structural 
transformations which implement the learning inside the agent. In some 
cases this may coerce such internal structures to be "linguistic", with a 
compositional semantics. This may in any case be the most convenient 
design-option.
c. If the agent is capable of linguistic communication (implying a public 
language), then it has to handle input-output entities which are carriers 
of "non-natural meaning". At least part of the internal structures of such 
an agent will therefore have to be devoted to handling sentences in such a 
public language in an appropriate way, and the system will have to have 
ways of encoding its own cognitive situation in terms of such a language if 
it wishes to talk about it.
For the kinds of artifacts developed in Al, these kinds of concerns frequently loom large. 
It is not surprising therefore that, everything considered, the appropriate architecture 
for "intelligent agents" is taken to be that of a symbolic processing architecture.
However, from a theoretical point of view such an assumption is disastrous, it makes it 
impossible to decide what aspects of the agent architecture are there by virtue of the 
objective task the agent has to perform (examples such as (a)-(c) just mentioned), and 
which aspects are essentially gratuitous choices made by the free choice of the designer.
The result is an inability to come up with a principled basis for a theory of intentional 
descriptions on the one hand, and cognitive architectures on the other.
Hence in this thesis I make no such assumption.
6. The approach of this thesis
Constructing symbolic-processing architectures may be the dominant concern in much 
of Al, yet there are significant areas of work which do not make this architectural 
assumption. Rodney Brooks' Mobile Robot Group at the MIT Al Lab is working on a 
generation of reactive, insect-like robot systems based upon a layered "subsumption 
architecture" ([McL88], [Kae86], see also [Con87]). See [CM89] for similar 
architectural ideas applied to a robot manipulator arm coupled with a vision system at 
Cambridge University in the U.K. Similar remarks could be made about the much-hyped 
resurgence of connectionist architectures.
The emergence of such architectures does not in the least absolve the Al researcher from 
the responsibility of coming up with adequate specification languages. The challenge is to 
find a way of connecting the descriptions provided by such languages with the 
architectures which might provide conforming behaviours.
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This thesis then has essentially two tasks. Firstly to present a view, or paradigm for 
analysing "cognitive agents” considered to be intentional systems. Secondly to produce 
results within the proposed paradigm which support its claim to be a viable and 
productive approach within cognitive science.
6.1 The paradigm
i believe that a paradigm for research into agent theory ought to exhibit the following 
features.
a  Mathematical Modelling of ArcMfifilufg
it should provide for the identification of a class of real-world agent- 
environment situations which is proposed to be studied - the problem.
The problem should be susceptible to mathematical modelling at the mechanism/ 
architecture level, using suitable techniques such as automata theory, 
specification by recursive function definitions etc. Ideally, the mathematical 
model should be In a form suitable for computer simulation, or hardware 
realisation.
b. Formal Specification of Behaviour
It should provide for the introduction of formal SpecificationJanquaqeS Which
permit agent and environment behaviour and characteristics to be perspicuously 
described and reasoned about, in a mechanism-free way.
Such languages (which may be analogous to languages such as CCS, CSP, 
temporal logics, introduced to describe concurrency and processes), should be 
given proof rules, and a formal semantics in terms of the mathematical models 
introduced in (i) above6.
c. Research Method
The paradigm should make some statement about how a research programme could 
be developed. I have in mind something like this. Identify a naturally occurring 
situation which exhibits a perspicuous and theoretically tractable complex of 
cognitive phenomena; analyse the situation to produce an idealised mathematical 
model; determine whether there are significant concepts emerging from the 
analysis, which capture and coordinate the core cognitive features of the 
situation; design an agent specification language which captures these concepts, 
and give it proof rules and semantics; and finally, put the results into a more 
general context, using the improved understanding to repeat the process, 
choosing a more ambitious problem.
Naturally this is not an algorithm describing some linear process, but an 
Idealised summary of the main steps leading to a successful treatment.
The following diagram summarises the agent theory paradigm I am advocating.
6 Recall that it is usually possible to give many different semantic treatments for any 
particular notation. It is essential for agent theoretic purposes however that the agent 
specification language be ”about" the mathematical model.
8
Agent Theories and Architectures lntroduction/9
6.2. The Results
I have attempted to follow this approach In this thesis as follows. The class of naturally 
occurring phenomena I have chosen to analyse is that in which a non-linguistic agent 
interacts to some effect with an environment. I have broken this general case into three 
subcases:
1. An agent observing a non-intentional environment (section 3.2).
2. An agent interacting with another agent (sections 3.3, 3.4).
3. An agent interacting with a complex non-intentional environment (sections 3.5-3.7).
Finally I make some remarks about the analysis of agents which interact with other 
agents linguistically, in section 3.8.
In order to analyse these scenarios within a common intellectual framework, I needed to 
develop a general purpose mathematical model for agents as mechanisms. This task is 
addressed in in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5, where I introduce the Synchronous Reactive 
Systems (SRS) model based on automata theory.
Next it is necessary to design agent specification languages and theories which are 
capable of describing the key properties of such objects. After an initial study in section
3.4 which exercises traditional techniques, in section 3.5 i carefully introduce a 
temporal logic APTL capable of capturing a behaviourist style of agent analysis, and 
interpret this logic over the SRS-model. To show the representational adequacy of the
9
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formal systems, I treat in some detail a case study showing how to apply the SRS-model 
and the logic to a psychological experiment using a Skinner Box.
A temporal logic lacks operators capturing epistemic or conative (goal) states, hence the 
mistakes, learning and progression of competence of an agent cannot be described. It is 
one thing of course to syntactically add such operators to the temporal logic, another 
entirely to give an adequate semantic account.
In section 3.6 I attempt the latter by considering carefully where the "possible-worlds" 
come from., I conclude that they express the meaning of observer or designer 
descriptions of the agent, but descriptions which take account of ignorance on the part of 
the agent as to what is the case in particular situations; ignorance which may be modified 
by experience provided that the agent is attuned to conditional constraints which hold in 
the world.
On this basis it is possible to generate theories attributable to the agent by virtue of its 
basic design, and the evidence it has accumulated via perception "so far". From the 
"theory of the agent", a space of possible-worlds can be induced which satisfy this 
theory, worlds connected to the actual world via an accessibility relation. This semantic 
structure can be compactly described by a modal operator KNOWABLE, extending the 
APTL logic.
A similar approach can factor in the objectives of the agent, and can be used to introduce 
a modal operator ACCEPTABLE, leading to a new logic, ECTL. It is then shown how 
these two operators, interpreted as characterising the agent's cognitive state, can be 
used to predict its actions, and also to indicate where it is not sure what it should do.
A particular feature of the treatment of epistemic and conative operators here is that we 
start from the axioms which describe (from the designer's or observer's point of view) 
the properties and relationships assumed to hold in the agent's environment, and the 
agent's own objectives. On the assumption that these are conditional constraints, all the 
rest (the possible worlds, the accessibility relations, the modal operators) follows 
logically from the analysis. Recall that in a conventional treatment, possible-worlds 
and accessibility relations are (mysteriously) posited as parameters in the models for 
attitude operators.
While it is useful to be able to describe agents formally in an intentional language, and 
then describe their architecture in mechanistic terms, connecting the two levels of 
description by a satisfaction relation, this is only a beginning. Such an approach 
characterises what Dennett calls a "first-order intentional system" ([Den87j p.243), 
one which we describe in terms of knowledge and objectives, but which does not need to 
be described as if it were describing its environment or itself in these terms.
The next step of a research programme in agent theory would appear to be to use the 
insights gained so far to model higher-order intentional systems (Den ibid.), especially 
if we wish to model linguistic interaction. Grice has argued convincingly (in [Gri57, 
69]) that meaningful dialogue necessarily involves third-order intentionality on the 
part of participants. Some remarks bearing on this are made in section 3.8; see also a 
paper by a colleague, Hamid Lesan, and myself reporting on some practical work in this
10
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area, in [LS89].
7. A brief overview of the thesis
immediately following this introduction, chapter 2 is a detailed review of existing work
in Al and in related areas of relevance to the concerns of this thesis. Chapter 3, which
has already been extensively discussed above, is the main theoretical contribution which
the thesis makes. It includes in addition some remarks about future work.
Chapters 4 and 5 are to be read as appendices. Chapter 4 covers the main technical areas 
used, including an overview of a number of different logics. Finally, in chapter 5 I 
include the Common Lisp code of several implementations of systems used as case studies 
in chapter 3. The thesis closes with the references.
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CHAPTER 2: A Critical Review of Existing Work 
2.1: introduction
The scientific study of agent behaviour and design predates Artificial Intelligence, going 
back to the early days of Cybernetics in the 1940's. Given the relatively primitive state 
of automatic control equipment then, initial studies were strongly influenced by the task 
of giving an account of biological systems, which were conceptualised as physical 
systems which engaged in physical self-production and homeostatic regulation in the face 
of environmental perturbation (this class of systems was later called autopoietic - see 
(Var79J).
Norbert Wiener publicised the view that such regulatory processes could be abstracted 
from biology in his book "Cybernetics" [Wie48], bringing the word into general 
circulation. Wiener argued that feedback and control were ubiquitous phenomena, and 
proposed the mathematical framework of statistics, Shannon's information theory and 
control theory to formalise them.
As an interdisciplinary subject, Cybernetics generated a broad research program 
stretching from Stafford Beer's cybernetic management science [Bee72], the neural-net 
modelling stemming from McCulloch and Pitts' work in the early 1940's [Arb64]1, 
and theoretical attempts to define the behaviour and structure of abstract machines 
which had properties corresponding to biological, cognitive systems. Since the latter is 
essentially the endeavour of this thesis, I will examine that tradition in Cybernetics in 
more detail - it is essentially due to Ross Ashby.
Ashby developed his ideas about biological and cognitive systems in two complementary 
books, "An Introduction to Cybernetics" [Ash56] and "Design for a Brain" [Ash52]. 
Despite their antiquity, both books have something relevant to say today.
To summarise briefly, Ashby argued that cognition is an evolved control mechanism for 
maintaining the homeostasis of a biological system in an uncertain world. If existing 
patterns of behaviour do not work in a new situation, then it is characteristic of 
intelligent systems that they develop new forms of behaviour (possibly on a trial and 
error basis) until they have found patterns of behaviour which permit homeostasis to be 
maintained in the new situation. Ashby termed this kind of adaptive behaviour 
"ultrastability" (the system stably navigates in the space of its stable behaviours: in 
today's jargon, we might call this "metastability").
Ashby formalised his abstract agent as a vector of (real-valued) variables, which he 
called the essential variables. The essential variables were each to be kept stabilised 
within some defined interval. The history of an agent in its environment could be 
registered as a trajectory of the time-dependent values of its essential variables in a 
suitable phase space.
In standard control theory, such trajectories are the solutions of differential equations
1 This research programme was progressed by the Perceptrons group at Cornell in the 
1960's, and brought to an abrupt end following a devastating critique by Minsky and Papert in 
[MP69]. It has only recently re-emerged on somewhat more secure theoretical foundations.
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which correlate the values of state variables with their rates of change, system-inputs, 
and time. Ashby's differential equations included step-functions to model the 
discontinuities introduced by trial and error behaviour2. Corresponding to this 
mathematical model, Ashby built a physical device, the homeostat ([Ash52] p.100) 
which exhibited ultrastable behaviour after a fashion.
Minsky made two interesting criticisms of Ashby's work: in [Min63] he said that the 
model of adaptibility in "Design for a Brain" [Ash52] just came down to a blind search in 
the space of real-valued piecewise continuous functions. In [Min84], the critique is 
rather different. Here Minsky states that the homeostat doesn’t do anything. The 
implication is that the foundational idea of stability is useless because it doesn't capture 
the enormous diversity of biological (and in particular human) behaviour.
My own feeling is that Minsky is correct in his first critique: the apparatus of control 
theory is just the wrong sort of technical apparatus to bring to bear on the higher levels 
of cognition, no matter how suitable it may be for analysing servo-level control in 
robotics, and biological sub-systems like the heart. The second criticism I believe 
slightly misses the point. Ashby's theory of ultrastability was a theory of regulation, 
which remains a valid concern in the analysis both of biological systems and of many of 
our artifacts.
The theory of regulation is a very weak one however, since it makes no very specific 
assertions about the partitioning of the environment into states which are conducive to 
system-functioning, and those which are violently antipathetic to the ability of a system 
to continue functioning. The constrained variability in time and space of the environment 
permits the organism (or intelligent system) aware of such constraints to control its 
actions (set goals, carry out plans) so as to ensure its own survival, plus whatever 
other objectives it has been designed to achieve.
The argument then is that what is needed is an extention of a theory such as 
ultrastability, rather than its abandonment as an inappropriate detour. Unfortunately 
Ashby's technical apparatus is not well-placed to permit that extension, and the 
approach he pioneered became absorbed into control theory.
From the early 60's, the dominant intellectual force in agent theory was to be found in 
Artificial Intelligence, and allied fields such as the philosophy of mind, epistemic logics 
and natural language semantics.
While Al practitioners explored the properties of artifacts which (occasionally) 
performed in a manner termed intelligent when performed by people, workers such as 
Hintikka and Kripke3 were establishing a technical apparatus to permit sound 
reasoning about the most telling aspect of cognitive systems: their ability (apparently) 
to take an attitude to a proposition. For instance in the statement "the cat believes the
2 It is interesting to note that Kleene's theory of Finite State Automata (FSA) was also 
developed around this time (the early 1950's) with the objective of analysing biological 
behaviour. This has long since been forgotten in the current application of FSA as recognisers 
for regular languages [Ray83].
3 The work by Hintikka and Kripke is reviewed in section 4.
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mouse is behind the chair", the embedded phrase "the mouse is behind the chair” 
denotes the proposition the cat has an attitude to, (that of belief).
The emphasis of Ai in this period on working programs as the (only) outcome of a 
successful research programme led to an excessively architectural and theoretically 
impoverished view of agents, in which they were defined by the kinds of data structures 
and manipulation procedures they internalised. To make matters worse, the designs were 
often presented in terms of ad-hoc structures such as semaniic-nets, and frames, which 
obscured the essentials of what was really going on. The problem of unclear semantics 
was addressed within Al by a number of workers from the late 70's onwards.
Nevertheless, the insights of workers such as Hintikka, and more recently Dennett 
([Den78], [Den87]), tended to pass the average (and even excellent) Al researcher 
by4. Dennett for example conceptualises the notion of agency (which he calls 
intentionality) in the context of:
(1  ) the development of formal languages and axiomatisations which capture 
what is conceptually unique to agents as cognitive systems, from the 
stance of an observer, or requirements analyst;
( i i ) the development of constructive specifications, showing how a 
mechanistic system could satisfy the dictates of such behavioural 
axioms, from the stance of a designer, or implementer;
( i i i ) how the different levels of agent description emerging from (i) and (ii) 
are to be reconciled5.
Dennett's work has been at the conceptual and indicative level however, and has not 
resulted in formal theories.
Over the last few years however, the technical level of the debate has been higher, and a 
move towards an "ecologically more valid" approach to agent design has occurred. 
Moore's work, discussed in section 2.2 , took ideas from epistemic and dynamic logic to 
construct a logic of knowledge and action. This was connected to the provision of 
computational agents which deploy these concepts by Appelt, who built a system which 
executed Moore's logic.
In section 2.3, I discuss the work of Cohen and Levesque, which combined belief and 
action, together with a modal notion of goal, to produce a sophisticated logic capable of 
supporting formal definitions of intention, and giving a formal account of (some of) the 
precepts of speech-act theory.
The possible-worlds accounts of knowledge, belief and goals fails to say anything about
4 They still do: what for instance is one to make of the following remark (GN87] p.235): "We 
find sentential semantics for a logic of belief somewhat more appealing than possible-worlds 
semantics. It is consistent with our view that an agent's knowledge actually consists of 
declarative sentences This is a further example of the reification of a relational concept, 
that of knowledge, into an architectural "thing".
5 See Dennett's remarks pp 58-65 in [Den87].
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the architecture of agents which might be the subjects of such attitudes. Konolige took 
the mainstream Al approach, in which a system has beliefs just when it has sentences in 
its internal database which codify the beliefs, and proceeded to develop a sophisticated 
semantics for doxastic logic based upon this approach. The work is described and 
commented upon in section 2.4.
if Konolige is technically sophisticated, Rosenschein is conceptually sophisticated, since 
he realises clearly that there are levels of description involved in the scientific theory 
of cognitive systems, and an important task is to intellectually separate out the levels, 
and then show how they are connected. His view of "situated automata" is discussed in 
section 2.56.
A piece of work which has not yet entered the central orthodoxy of Al is that of Situation 
Semantics. Natural language is the specification/description language used by the most 
sophisticated cognitive systems known, to describe, control and coordinate each other's 
behaviour. Early attempts to give a formal semantics for natural language by Montague 
[DWP85] emphasised the technical goal of ensuring compositionality, while deliberately 
neglecting the issues of "ecological realism". The result was a semantics with a distinctly 
baroque ontology of infinite sets of possible worlds, and a proliferation of higher-order 
functions.
Barwise and Perry's achievement was to develop a radically new variant of the possible- 
worlds paradigm (in terms of situations - partial possible worlds) which 
simultaneously addressed the goals of compositionality and ecological realism. They were 
able to show their approach gave a good account of the use of language in a number of 
realistic situations, and discussed a number of attitude verbs which typically cause 
trouble.
The "concept-exploration" mission of situation semantics so far has meant a lack of a 
standard "formal language/axiomatisation/model theory" package of deliverables. For 
this and associated reasons, the work does not directly address the problem of this 
thesis, determining the connection between theories of agent behaviour, couched in 
intentional terms, and the agent architectures which permit that behaviour to be 
realised. However, the work is such a source of insights that a thorough review here is 
called for, and this is done in section 2 .6 .
Finally, in section 2.7, I consider the tradition which views language not as a static 
syntax with a problematical relation to mathematical structures and to the world, but as 
a means of social action, employed by social agents within a complex of social 
relationships. This tradition, advocated by workers such as Austin [Aus62] and Searle, 
[Sea69j, [SV85] emphasises speech acts and conversation structures as foundational 
concepts in the study of language.
Recent work by computer scientists such as Winograd and Flores [WF86] has attempted 
to integrate the insights of this tradition with modern cybernetic ideas such as 
organisational closure, and autopoiesis, developed by researchers such as Maturana and 
Varela (see for example [Var79]), leading to important advances in areas such as 
Computer-Supported Cooperative Working (CSCW).
6 I consider the work reported in Chapter 13 of [GN87], "Intelligent-Agent Architecture", to 
be preliminary, and subject to the same methodological confusion as was noted in footnote 4.
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The interest from the viewpoint of this thesis is more to use the advances within speech 
act and conversation theory to address the foundational questions of multi-agent 
interaction, within a continuing research programme.
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2.2: MOORE'S LOGIC OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION
Robert Moore was influential in the development of dynamic logic in the early 70's, and 
then became interested in linking it with epistemic logics to construct a coherent logic of 
knowledge and action.
This section reviews the quantificational modal logic for representing knowledge and 
action which was developed by Moore in his PhD work at MIT, and reported in an SRI 
Technical Note [M008O]. Some additional material summarises the work of Appelt, 
reported in [App80], which describes an implemented planner, KAMP, making use of 
Moore's logic.
1. In troduction
Most Al planning work (STRIPS [FN71], NOAH [Sac77]) assumes the planner has 
complete knowledge of the world. Yet in reality, most planning has to be carried out 
without complete knowledge of the situation. This implies a need for an agent to decide 
whether it has the information necessary to carry out a plan (knowledge preconditions), 
and to be able to plan to acquire information (requiring reasoning about knowledge post 
conditions). We therefore need to know how to represent knowledge, how to model the 
connection between knowledge and action, and how to reason in such a representation.
The approach Moore adopted was to use Hintikka's formalisation of knowledge within 
modal logic. Unfortunately, automatic theorem-proving for modal logics is not well 
developed, so Moore proposed instead to formalise the model theory of modal logic within 
a first-order "possible-worlds language".
The following properties, Moore argues, are required by any adequate theory of 
knowledge.
1. What is known is true.
If we operate with the weaker notion of belief, then false beliefs may mean that plans fail 
as a consequence. Moore did not wish to consider this issue.
2. If an agent knows something, then it knows that it knows it.
This is required for reasoning about multi-step plans, in which an agent can know that it 
will know something. It needs to know that it knows other relevant facts that it knows, in 
order to reason in this situation.
3. Moore presents a counterexample to the third property often proposed for knowledge: 
that if an agent doesn't know something, it knows that it doesn't know. Suppose John 
believes P and P is false, then John doesn't know P (because P is false), but John doesn't 
know he doesn't know it (because he believes it).
On these philosophical grounds, Moore opted for the logic KT4 (or S4).
In the possible-worlds language, we formalise the knowledge accessibility relation as K,
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so that:
K(John, Wq. w-j)
means that w-j is a possible world for John from wq. Additionally, Moore introduces a 
relation T, so that T(w,P) means that the formula P is true in world w.
2. Knowledge, equality and quantification
We now move on to a discussion of Moore's quantificationa! logic of knowledge, discussing 
issues such as the treatment of equality, standard names and "quantifying in".
2.1. Equality
Contexts such as knowledge and belief present special problems for the logic of equality, 
in particular there is a failure of the principle of substitutivity of equals for equals (cf 
the well-known "morning-star, evening-star" problem).
As discussed earlier, logicians have made a distinction between sense and reference, 
asserting that in knowledge or belief contexts, it is the sense of the expression 
(capturing aspects of its meaning) which is denoted, rather than its reference.
Possible-worlds semantics provides a formalisation of the notion of sense by assigning 
as the denotation of a term a function from possible worlds to individuals. This function 
is called an intension, and two terms could have the same reference in our actual world, 
yet give different references in non-actual possible worlds. Their intensions would 
thereby differ, and unwanted substitutivity is blocked.
2.2. Q uan tify ing -in
The introduction of quantifiers can also cause problems. Moore uses the example "John 
knows a transistor is burned out". Does the term "transistor" refer to a particular 
transistor or merely some transistor in general ? This distinction can be formalised as 
between:
1. (3x).[transistor(x) a Know(John, burned-out(x))].
2. Know(John, (3x).transistor(x) a  burned-out(x)).
Consider the truth conditions of (1) and (2). To make (1) true we require that some 
transistor (eg transistor4) is burned out; and that in every world compatible with what 
John knows, transistor4 is burned out.
This requires that the same individual (ie transistor4) is considered to exist in several 
possible-worlds. One way of supporting this notion is to have one universal domain of 
possible individuals, with the domains of the various possible worlds being subsets.
None of this complexity is necessary for analysing (2). We merely need to check that in 
every world compatible with what John knows, there is some individual which is a
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transistor and which is burned-out - it need not be the same individual.
2.3. Knowing who somebody, or what something is
Now consider the problem of knowing who, or what something is. Suppose "there is 
someone who John knows to be President", which is naturally represented by
(3x).Knows(John,President=x).
We Interpret this to mean that there is a particular individual who is President in every 
world compatible with what John knows. Because if in some of these worlds the 
President is one individual, and in others is someone else, then for all John knows, 
either could be President - but in this case John precisely does not know who the 
President is.
2.4. Existential generalisation and standard names 
From:
1. Know(John, phone-number(bill)=321-1234) 
we would like to deduce
2 . (3x).Know(John, phone-number(bill)=x) 
by existential generalisation (EG).
But suppose we had
3. Know(John, phone-number(bill)=phone-number(mary)) 
it seems clear that we do not want to deduce (2) from (3).
The problem seems to be that "321-1234" is a standard-name for what it refers to, 
while "phone-number(mary)" is not. Standard-names are assumed to be defined with 
the language, so that everyone knows to what they refer. EG works with standard-names, 
although it doesn't in general.
in a possible-worlds framework, standard-names are just terms that have the same 
denotation in every possible world - they are the rigid designators. (After all, how could 
a standard-name be a canonical identifier for an individual, if on occasions it could 
denote something else ?). So if we have
Know(John,P(B))
and B denotes the same individual in all possible worlds, then it is easy to see that the 
existential generalisation
(3x).Know(John,P(x))
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is valid. The "x" is just that individual named rigidly by B . ;
We extend this idea to rigid functions (more properly, rigid function-designators), 
which have the property that if the argument-terms to the rigid function are rigid 
designators, then the resulting applicative term is also a rigid designator.
In describing standard names, it was observed that everyone knows to what they refer. 
Identifying standard names with rigid designators makes the stronger claim that their 
reference is common knowledge (ie everyone knows that everyone knows them, and ...).
The fact that a rigid designator refers to the same individual in all possible worlds raises 
the question of worlds in which the individual does not exist. A solution is to interpret 
the quantifiers as ranging over possible individuals, while interpreting the extension of 
predicates to be restricted to the individuals actually existing in a given possible world 
(thus predicates referring to non-existent individuals turn out to be false). This idea is 
due to Kripke [Kri63].
3. Representing knowledge and action
Having discussed a quantified modal logic of knowledge, we wish to extend it to deal with 
the standard Al view of planning and action as involving state-transitions between 
"situations" (as in STRIPS [FN71]).
Despite the fact that possible worlds are normally thought of as including the past and 
the future, Moore instead assumes a possible world to be a situation, a "snapshot". One 
can now navigate around possible worlds both via the epistemic operator, and by using 
standard temporal operators such as "eventually", "always" using a temporal 
accessibility relation.
Thus "John knows that P will be true" can be formalised as:
Know(John, Future(P)).
in fact we need to go beyond the use of tense operators such as "Future" to capture the 
notion of a future conditional upon performing an action. We introduce the modal 
operator "Res", taking a description of an event and a formula1.
Res(Ev, P) is true if the event described by Ev occurs, and as a result, P holds (see the 
case of dynamic logic: section 4.5). The corresponding accessibility relation is R, where
:Ev
R(:Ev,w.j ,w2) i f f  w - j  > w2 .
(In general, if X is a symbol in the modal language, then :X will be the corresponding 
symbol in the possible-worlds language).
Note that a given event description may denote different events in different possible
1 This is a syntactic variant of dynamic logic's <Ev>P - see section 4.5.
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worlds, for example Dial(Combinations(Sf1)) will refer to different sequences of 
actions in worlds where the combination of Sf1 differs.
Moore assumes that if it is impossible for an event :Ev to occur in a world w-j, then 
there is no such world w2 I R(:Ev,w1 ,w2). Additionally, R is deterministic, so that if 
R(:Ev,w1 ,w2) and R(:Ev,w.j,w3) then w2=w3. This means events are deterministic.
There is a presumption that it must be possible for Ev to occur in order to make 
Res(Ev,P) true. A less committed version is Res1(Ev,P), which is true both when :Ev 
happens resulting in P holding, and also when :Ev is impossible. The two definitions are:
Res(Ev.P) holds in w-j iff3w 2. R(:Ev,w1 ,w2) a  T(w2 ,P).
By contrast,
Res1(Ev,P) holds in w-j iffV w 2 . R(:Ev,w-j ,w2) -> T(w2 ,P).
Res1 corresponds to a notion of partial correctness (no outcome corresponding to non­
termination).
3.1. Agents performing actions
We write Do(A, Act) to be a description of the particular kind of event In which an agent 
named by A does an action named by Act (we assume that the set of knowers is identical to 
the set of doers).
"Do" is a rigid function-designator, so Do(A, Act) is the standard name of an event if A, 
Act are standard names of agents and acts respectively. An action is modelled as a function 
applied to some objects, thus the action of picking up a stone can be modelled as 
"pickup(stone)”, where "pickup” is a general picking-up procedure.
3.2. Example
”A1 knows that P would result from A2 doing Act” is written formally as: 
"Know(A1, Res[Do(A2 , Act), P ])\
The semantics of this is expressed in the possible-worlds language thus:
Vw-|. [K(:A1, W q , w-j) -» 3w2. R(:Do(:A2, :Act), w-j, w2) a  T(w2, P)J.
Notice that there is no explicit mention of situations (worlds) in the modal language; 
this only occurs in the possible-worlds language.
We have the usual deterministic dynamic logic combinators for actions. Thus if Act1, 
Act2 name actions then so do:
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1. Act1;Act2 sequence
2. lf(P,Act1,Act2) selection
3. While(P,Acti) iteration.
3.3. Competence
We write "Can(A, Act, P)" to mean A can achieve P by performing Act, in the sense that 
A knows how to achieve P via Act. "Can" is defined in terms of "Know" and "Res", 
although things can get complicated if "Act" is a complex action, since Can(A, Act, P) 
may be satisfiable even though A does not initially have the knowledge to execute all the 
actions in Act. This may be the case if earlier actions provide the knowledge needed for 
later actions to be carried out.
3.4. The effects of knowledge upon action
We distinguish between non-knowledge producing actions, and knowledge producing 
actions. We first consider actions which do not bring about new knowledge. Suppose 
situation w j is actual and in w-j A is undecided between doing Ev1 or Ev2. Suppose also
that in w<|, w4 and w5 are also compatible with what A knows. If A decides to do Ev1, the
following diagram describes the situation:
K ‘A  K 'A
w 5 <---------  W1 ..........
|R  :Ev2 I R :Ev1
I i
v v
K 'A
w 6 w 2 --------
(actual)
Having decided to do Ev1, w6 is now known not to be the case; W2 and W3 are still 
compatible however. So doing an action filters out courses of events which are other than 
what the agent actually does.
Actions which produce new knowledge filter out courses of events which are 
incompatible with information provided by the action. In the diagram below, suppose 
that Act describes a knowledge-producing action, where the knowledge A obtains is 
whether P is true or not. In w-j, w5 and w4 are both compatible with what A knows. A
decides to do Ev; as a result, P becomes true. Now, w6 Is not compatible with what A
knows, because A knows that P is true.
w
| R :Ev1
I
v
w 3
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K mA  K A
w 5 <---------  -  > w 4
I I I
| R :Ev | R :Ev | R :Ev
I I I
V V V
K ‘A
W6 W 2  > W 3
( -P )  (P) (P)
(actual)
4. Formalising the possible-worlds semantics
As was mentioned above, Moore uses two languages, a modal language for specifying 
knowledge and action, and a possible-worlds language to express the semantics for the 
modal language. Why not just use the possible-worlds language, and omit the modal 
language entirely ? Moore gives two answers:
1. The modal language is concise and comprehensible.
2 . The modal language can be used to express derived concepts (such as "Can" above) 
which have no natural definition in the possible-worlds language.
Given the use of the two languages, Moore then gives a very detailed semantics for the 
basic constructs of the modal language, and defines additional axioms for case studies in 
the blocks-worid and in a safe-opening scenario.
Various natural deduction proofs are carried out, the general strategy in most cases 
being to set up the initial assumptions of the problem as a modal language formula in the 
possible-worlds language; then unpack it using the semantic rules into its possible- 
worlds equivalent; then do some deduction to solve the problem; and finally to repackage 
the results back into the modal language.
5. Automatic deduction about knowledge and action
Moore describes a procedural deduction system to reason in his logic. This is a natural 
deduction system using both forward and backward chaining, handling quantifiers with 
skolemisation and unification, and with some ability to work with equality.
To prove complex goals built up using prepositional connectives, the deduction system 
uses a problem-reduction strategy which is an elaboration of the standard And/Or tree 
approach [NII80].
Complex assertions are broken down less than complex goals. Disjunctions, implications 
and biconditionals are each given a collection of different syntaxes which are interpreted 
as making a difference procedurally (hence the name).
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For example, the assertion that P implies Q can be written
1.P -> Q : If P is asserted, assert Q
2. Q <- P: To prove Q, try to prove P.
The first is forward chaining, and the second backward. It is up to the user to decide 
which deduction mode is appropriate for such assertions.
The central procedure used to construct the And/Or tree is depth first search, without 
any further control heuristics. It is Moore's contention that by appropriate 
axiomatisations, and with the procedural guidance mentioned, the search is extremely 
well-directed.
The rules for equality rely upon the existence of standard names which are syntactically 
differentiated to obviate the need for inequality axioms between terms intended to denote 
different individuals. Equality assertions have a procedural interpretation to do with 
which terms are to be substituted for co-designative terms (eg standard names are 
preferred, and there is a left-right preference scheme).
The knowledge axioms have a procedural interpretation which replaces modal language 
terms with their semantic equivalents.
Moore then lists a number of proofs carried out by hand simulation of the procedural 
deductive system, the point being to support his contention that the search space is 
tightly controlled by the procedural interpretations and the axiom formulations.
Finally, the axioms connecting knowledge and action are introduced, and reorganised to 
facilitate a useful procedural interpretation. This is a complex business since, as we saw 
above, the information flow between worlds is not simple when action and knowledge are 
combined.
6. Knowledge and modalities planner (KAMP)
Appelt [App80] used Moore's representation for knowledge and action in an automated 
planning system called KAMP (knowledge and modalities planner). Because of the 
difficulties of automatic deduction in Moore's framework (some of Moore's hand proofs 
are very long), compounded in Appelt's case by the requirement to formalise speech acts 
in addition to physical actions, KAMP adopts a generate and test approach to plans, in 
which a "ptausibie-move" module generates possible plans, which a deductive component 
then attempts to verify.
The KAMP system was implemented and tried successfully on examples. The intended 
application was a cooperative planning system capable of generating plans combining 
physical actions with speech acts. Its main problem was that of performance (it was 
exceedingly slow).
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7. Discussion
As a theory of knowledge and action, Moore's work is a first approximation, and 
therefore suffers from many oversimplifications, perhaps the most important being the 
omission of any discussion of the connection between agents per se and the knowledge 
they deploy (this was the central weakness of Hintikka's treatment too). However, the 
model he develops is robust, and I believe, essentially along the right lines. A certain 
amount of further research within this paradigm has been done since Moore completed 
his work, most notably the work on situated automata by Rosenschein et al ([Ros85], 
[RK87]) at SRI, and that of Cohen and Levesque [CL87a], discussed in subsequent 
sections.
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2.3: COHEN AND LEVESQUE’S THEORY OF INTENTION
1. In troduction
The work of Cohen and Levesque (CL) focuses on the concept of intention, as a precursor 
to a formal theory of rational action and communication. In the papers reviewed here, CL 
consider the concept of intention as a composite notion: agents choose goals; a goat is 
persistent if the agent believes it currently not achieved, and will not relinquish it until 
it is either believed achieved, or believed impossible; intention (to do an action) is then 
modelled as a persistent goal to have done an action in the full belief that one was going to 
do it.
This section mainly concentrates upon [CL87a] since [CL87b] is a summary paper 
(correcting some mistakes in the full paper) for AAAI-87. Hence references to "the 
paper", or "CL say" refer to the full paper [CL87a].
CL's paper basically consists of four parts. There is an initial problem statement (or 
"requirements") which outlines the desirable features of a theory of intention. 
Secondly, the formal foundations of the theory are presented. Thirdly, the concepts thus 
introduced are used to formally specify two concepts of intention, and lastly, various 
theorems of the theory are exhibited to show that the specification given is valid with 
respect to the requirements.
2. Formal foundations
The theory which CL wish to develop encompasses reasoning about actions, about time 
and about the attitudes. They have therefore had to develop a logic which composes 
separate logics for these areas. They have based their work upon Harel's Dynamic Logic, 
(see [Har78] and section 4.5), for handling actions and events; a discrete and non 
branching-time temporal logic, and the standard "possible-worlds" based approach to 
the attitudes due to Hintikka [Hin62/69]. CL wish to apply their framework to the 
pragmatic questions of developing a theory of communication acts, which will underpin 
the work of Searle, Grice etc. but that aspect is beyond the scope of this review (see 
section 2.7).
2.1. Syntax
The logic used by CL is a basic many-sorted first-order logic with equality, without 
constants or function symbols. Implicitly there are sorts "AG EN T", "THING ", 
"EVENT". The integers (Z) are used as a representation of time. There is a sort 
"ACTION-EXPRESSION" which contains regular expressions over the primitive 
events in EVENT.
1. All individuals are referenced via existentially quantified expressions, although they 
say that "for readability" they will often use constants in the text.
2. There is a sequence constructor for events. The operators for constructing regular 
expressions (; , |, *) are available for composing events.
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3. The variables a, a-j, b, b - j,... e, e-j range over events (or actions); the variables x. 
x 1>-> y. V i. •• range over agents; the variables i, ij,.., j. j i ... range over regular 
expressions.
4. There is a sort of "sentence letter" which, perhaps more accurately could be described 
as "sentence strings" which refer to a time.
5. The following predicates over events and action expressions are provided:
HAPPENS : ACTION-EXPRESSION =* bool
This means that one of the sequence of events described by the action-expression will 
happen next.
DONE : ACTION-EXPRESSION =» bool
This means that one of the sequence of events described by the action-expression has just 
happened.
AGT : AGENT x ACTION-EXPRESSION => bool
The agent in the first argument is the only agent of the event(s) described by the second 
argument.
6 . The following modal operators are provided:
BEL : A G E N Tx(TxZ=>  bool) =* bool
The proposition mentioned in the second argument follows from the beliefs held by the 
agent named in the first argument. The assignment of the type [T x Z => boolj to 
propositions is in line with the way Montague defines the intension of a formula 
([DWP85] p.145) and the definition of $  below; T is the set of possible worlds 
(discussed below) and Z is the set of possible times.
GOAL : A G E N Tx(TxZ=>  bool) =* bool
The proposition mentioned in the second argument follows from the goals held by the 
agent named in the first argument.
Note that we can define a dual to "GOAL" in the usual way; call it "ACCEPTABLE", so that: 
(ACCEPTABLE x p) <=> -,(GOAL x -^p).
2.2. Semantics
An interpretation M is a tuple <0, P, E, agt, T, B, G, <I».
6 is a set of things (providing an interpretation for the sort THING). P is a set of 
people, providing an interpretation for the sort AGENT. E is a set of primitive event
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types, providing an interpretation for the sort EVENT.
The function a g t: E => P indicates the agent of an event. Note that all events have agents 
(agt is total). The set D is introduced as D « 0 u  P u  E*. (where E* denotes 
sequences of events from E). D is the domain of quantification. T : [Z => E]-set is best 
thought of as a set of possible worlds, each consisting of a two-way infinite sequence of 
events.
B : [ T x P x Z x  TJ-set is the belief accessibility relation over T, and is best thought of 
as a table which given a time point (in Z) and an agent (in P), returns an accessibility 
graph connecting worlds. This graph can then be indexed into from whatever world is 
considered the "current world", and the resulting "accessible worlds" are those which 
the agents considers it could be in, on the basis of its beliefs.
Notice that each agent, at each time, in any world s, always has worlds that are 
accessible from s (technically, (B x n) is serial, for any agent x and time-index n). 
Additionally, for any x,n (B x n) is euclidean and transitive.
Hence, as shown in [HM65], the modal logic of belief being used here is KD45 (weak S5) 
(which includes axioms to the effect that if you believe something, you believe you 
believe it, and that if you don't believe something, you believe you don't believe it: 
additionally, your beliefs are consistent).
G: [T x P x Z x T]-set is the goal accessibility relation. The treatment exactly parallels 
that of belief. For a given agent at a given time-index in a given world, G will return a
set of worlds which the agent would choose as satisfying its goals. (G x n) being serial
for any agent and any time point, the modal logic of goals being used here is KD (weak- 
T).
There is a constraint on G that it is contained in B, more precisely,
Vx:AGENT, n e  Z, s.s’ e T. s[G (v x) n]s' -> s[B (v x) n]s'1.
This is a "realism" constraint, that the worlds the agent chooses as goals are included in 
those it thinks are possible.
: WFF =* T =* Z => <the semantic interpretation of the wff>
This is the standard semantic interpretation function of modal logics, relativised to 
worlds, and times in those worlds. Sentence letters are thus mapped to 1 or 0, predicate
symbols of arity k to subsets of Dk (or characteristic functions of type Dk => {0,1}) etc.
2.3. D efin itions
We can now define the satisfaction relationship |* between an interpretation and a wff.
Assume M is an interpretation, s is a world, n is an integer serving as a time point, and
1 v is a function binding variables to elements of D.
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v is a valuation function binding variables to individuals of the correct sort in D. We
write v(x-»d) for a function which maps x to d, and is otherwise the same as v. Let a, p
be arbitrary wffs, then:
1. M,s,v,n |« P(x1 t...,xk) iff (4> P s n) (v x-j,..., v xk) *  1.
2 . M,s,v,n |« -a iff not (M,s,v,n |= a).
3. M,s,v,n |«= a v p iff M,s,v,n |= a or M,s,v,n |= p.
4. M,s,v,n |« (x-j « X2 ) iff v x-j -  v X£.
5. M,s,v,n |* 3x. a iff M,s,v(x-»d),n |= a for some d in D.
6 . M,s,v,n |« (AGT x e) iff e « e.|..em, and agt (v e^) = ... -  agt(v em) = v x.
That is, x is the only agent of event sequence e.
7. M,s,v,n |-  time-proposition iff v(time-proposition) = n.
8 . M,s,v,n |= (BEL x a) iff Vs' | s (B (v x) n) s', M,s',v,n |= a.
9. M,s,v,n |-  (GOAL x a) iff Vs' | s (G (v x) n) s', M,s',v,n |= a.
We introduce the re la tion :_______ [J
M,s,v,n[a]m means roughly "in world s the world advances from time-point n to time- 
point m via action (or event) a".
10. M,s,v,n j« (HAPPENS a) iff for 3m^n, M,s,v,n[a]m.
That is, a is a sequence of events which happens next after n.
11. M,s,v,n |* (DONE a) iff for 3m < n, M,s,v,m[a]n.
That is, a is a sequence of events which has just happened.
12. M,s,v,n[e]n+m iff v(e) = e-j..em and s(n+i)=ej, i e [1..mj.
13. M,s,v,n[NIL]n.
This is the null action.
14. M,s,v,n[a|b]m iff M,s,v,n[a]m or M,s,v,n[b]m.
15. M,s,v,n[a;b]m iff 3k e [n..mj | M,s,v,n[aj/c and M,s,v,/c[b]m.
16. M ,s,v,n[a?]n iffM.s.v.n |= a.
17. M,s,v,n[a*]m i f f
3n^,n2 ,..,nk , where n-j=n and nk=m, V ie  [1..k-1], M,s,vfnj[a]nj+1.
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2.4. Notes
1. If the action occurs zero times, it is equivalent to NIL.
2. The action a? (where a is a wff) is a test action which is equivalent to action NIL in 
event s(n) just when a is true in s(n).
2.5. Additional defin itions
1. IF a THEN a ELSE b <«> a?;a | -a?;b.
2. WHILE a DO a <=> (a?;a)*;-a?.
3. Oa <«> (Bx).(HAPPENS x;a?) - "eventually a".
4. D a <*> (Vx).(HAPPENS x) -> (HAPPENS x;a?) - "always a".
5. DONE and HAPPENS may sometimes take an extra agent argument, making explicit the 
agent of the event which has just occurred, or is just about to occur. Formally:
(DONE x a) <-> (DONE a) a (AGT x a), and
(HAPPENS x a) <«> (HAPPENS a) a  (AGT x a).
6 . (LATER a) <«> --ia a  Oa.
7. (a BEFORE p) <«> (Vb).(HAPPENS b;p?) (3a <; b).(HAPPENS a;a?).
So a is before, or simultaneous with, p.
These definitions can be illustrated by an example.
2.6. Example
Suppose in world w at time 3 we have Q->p holding. How would we determine the truth 
or falsity of (BEL x Op) where x names agent a0, in world w, at time 3 ?
1. We have:
M,s,v,n |-  (BEL x a) iff Vs' | s (B (v x) n) s', M,s',v,n |= a. 
from definition 8 above.
2. We therefore go to the belief accessibility relation B, and look at the accessibility 
graph (B a0 3), indexing into it at world w. Suppose we find that w is related to two
worlds, u and v.
u - (...,eQi,©o2,e03.... 1 v “ [—.®i 1 ,e^2*ei 3»—•]
3. We now use <x>, the interpretation function, along with the definitions of 0 and 0
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(additional definitions 3 and 4 above).
Since Q -.p is interpreted only with respect to the current world w, its assertion that p 
is always subsequently false is irrelevant.
4. We now look at how $  allocates the truth of p in worlds u and v at time points 3 and 
greater. If there is at least one timepoint in each of u. v (and they could be different) at 
which p is true, then Op will be true in each world, and (BEL x Op) will turn out to be 
true.
This shows how a "possible worlds" treatment of the attitudes permits an agent to 
consistently believe something false.
2.7. Axioms
These axioms define the relationships which CL wish to hold between beliefs and actions.
1. j-  (Vx, a).(AGT x a) -» [(DONE a) <-> (BEL x (DONE a))]
If an agent x does a, it believes it has done a.
2. |« (BEL x (3a).(DONE x a)) (3a).(BEL x (DONE x a)).
If agents believe they have done something, they know what that "something" is.
3. I* (BEL x (HAPPENS x (a-| ;a2))) ->
(BEL x (HAPPENS x a1; (BEL x (HAPPENS x a2))?; a2)).
If an agent "now" believes it is going to do a1 followed by a2, then it believes it is going 
to do a1, then be in a situation in which it will believe it will do a2 , followed by the 
doing of a2 .
4. |-  (BEL x (3e).(HAPPENS x e)) (3e* £ e).(BEL x (HAPPENS x e’)).
If an agent believes it is going to do something, then there is an initial subsequence which 
it believes it is going to do. This (for example) permits an agent to start doing 
something, even if the full action expression contains an alternation which the agent 
cannot yet resolve).
5. |-  (Ve).(AGT x e) -> (BEL x (HAPPENS x e)) v (BEL x -.(HAPPENS x e)).
For any action of which x is the agent, x either believes it will do e next, or that it won't.
6 . l= (Ve).(HAPPENS x e) —> (BEL x (HAPPENS x e)).
If x is implicated in an event e, then x believes it is involved. This is to rule out
accidental or "unknowing" actions on the part of x.
7. |-  <MGOAL x (LATER a)).
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This says that if x has a goal that a should eventually be true (a currently being false), 
then eventually It will not be a goal (the agent will either achieve a, or give up).
3. Persistent goals end intentions
The intuitive notion of intention provides many validation criteria over the adequacy of 
any proposed formalisation. CL identify the eight key criteria shown below (numbers 1 - 
7 being attributed to Bratman in the paper, number 8 being the "Little Nell” problem 
attributed to Drew McDermott).
1. Intentions present problems to user, which they are required to address (unlike, for 
example, desires, which need not be acted upon).
2. Intentions need to be consistent with each other (again, unlike desires).
3. Agents take intentions seriously (for example, a failure to achieve an intention may 
well result in replanning).
4. If an agent intends to achieve P, the agent must believe P is possible.
5. If an agent intends to achieve P, then the agent does not believe it will not bring about 
P.
6 . If an agent intends to achieve P, then under certain assumptions, the agent believes it 
will bring about P.
7. Agents need not intend alt the expected side-effects of their intentions.
8 . Agents should not give up their intentions when they believe they will achieve them, 
but before they actually do so (the "Little Nell” problem).
Having explored somewhat the concept of intention, we now examine how CL formally 
define it. Recall that this is done via the introduction of the concept of persistent goal.
A persistent goal is one which an agent will not give up unless the agent believes it has 
been satisfied, or that it has become impossible (eg the goal might specifically mention a 
time). The definition is this:
(PGOAL x p) <«> (GOAL x (LATER p)) a  (BEL x -np) a
[(BEL x p) v  (BEL x Q-,p)l BEFORE (-.GOAL x (LATER p)).
The definition of PGOAL is auxiliary in the definition of INTEND. CL define two notions of 
"intending", depending whether the intention is to do an action, or to bring about a state 
of affairs (identified by a proposition). Typically, one intends actions, and this is 
modelled thus:
(INTEND1 x a) <«> (PGOAL x [DONE x [(BEL x (HAPPENS a))?; a]]).
This says that for x to intend to do action a, x has a persistent goal to have achieved a
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state in which it believed it was about to do a, and then did it.
The second notion of intention is to deal with cases in which an agent intends a state of 
affairs without having a clear idea about how to bring the state of affairs about. We say:
(INTEND2 x p) <«> (PGOAL x (3e).(DONE x [
(BEL x (3e').(HAPPENS x (e’;p?))) a  -n(GOAL x -,(HAPPENS x (e;p?)))]?;
e; P? ))
To paraphrase: x intend2 p when x has a persistent goal that for some event e, x has 
achieved a state in which
( i ) it believed that some event (e') would happen, following which p would hold,
and x did not have as a goal that the actual event e would not happen,
( i i ) the event e actually occurred, and
( i i i ) then p held in the resulting state.
The rather cumbersome condition (i) above is needed to handle the following example due 
to Chisholme and discussed by Searle, as cited in CL's paper (p. 330).
”An agent intends to kill his uncle. On the way to his uncle's house, this intention makes 
him so agitated that he loses control of his car and runs over a pedestrian, who happens 
to be his uncle. Although the uncle is dead, did the agent do what he intended?
For further details, refer to the paper.
4. Discussion
i have found Cohen and Levesque's logic an important resource for the development of 
models combining action, time and multiple attitudes. Despite a flirtation with 
branching-time logics2, i have also found that separating out temporal sequencing 
from the attitude-alternatives is a more productive approach to take. I find the model of 
worlds as event-sequences a little too impoverished however. To close on a positive note, 
the method of taking the intuitive notion of intention, stating requirements over any 
formal theory of intention, and then showing that their formalisation satisfied these 
requirements is, I think, methodologically a good one, and is of more general 
applicability.
2 See section 4.4/ 7.
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2.4: KONOLIGE'S DEDUCTION MODEL OF BELIEF
in 1986 Kurt Konolige's book "A Deduction Model of Belief [Kon86] was published, in 
which he summarised his work concerned with modelling belief in a computational (ie 
syntactic) way. Konolige's work is noteworthy in its attention to formality and clarity, 
and in its ecological commitment to the existence of agents who are knowers or 
believers, and whose complex state is connected with their ability to bear such epistemic 
categorisation. For these reasons, it is important to understand the arguments he 
advances, and these are summarised in this section.
1. In troduction
Konolige points out that as we begin to design robot agents which can operate successfully 
in multi-agent domains, it becomes essential to model and reason about the cognitive 
states of other agents. The book concentrates, however, upon one important aspect of 
cognition, belief.
it is suggested that the important properties of belief are:
1 . that agents can draw conclusions from an initial set of beliefs;
2 . that they do not necessarily derive all the logically possible conclusions 
(perhaps due to lack of computational resources, or incomplete deduction 
rules).
We imagine an agent which represents the world using an internal language (the 
language of belief). As observers, or designers, we will use another language, the 
external language, to talk about the agent.
Konolige takes as the object of study a belief-system. This is taken to be a data-structure
(typically a knowledge-base) together with its associated inferential procedures. The 
notion of belief-system is an informal one, and only certain aspects are to be formalised, 
in what is termed the deduction model. This is intended to capture phenomena such as 
partial information about the world, incomplete derivation of consequences from stored 
facts and the causal role of particular names, issues such as computational complexity, 
justification for derived facts, belief revision or probabilistic reasoning are not 
addressed.
The formal mathematical model of a belief system is a deduction structure. This consists 
of two sets, written as (B, R), where B is a countable set of (base) belief sentences, and 
R is a set of deduction rules - effectively computable inferences rules of fixed finite
arity. We have a derivation relation |- , so that B |- ^ iff ^ follows from B by
R R
application of the rules in R.
The belief-set of a deduction structure d « (B, R) is the set 
bel (d) -  {* | B |-R *}.
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2. Belief reports
Suppose we say of Ralph "Ralph believes his brother likes Hermione", where Ralph's 
brother is Rudolph. All of the following possible internal sentences in Ralph's belief set 
would seem to be consistent with this belief report.
1. Likes(Brother(me), Hermione).
2. Likes(Brother(Ralph), Hermione).
3. Ukes(Rudolph, Hermione).
However, these sentences have perhaps different causal properties in Ralph's operation, 
depending upon how "me", "Ralph", "Brother" and "Rudolph" are anchored for him. 
Konolige doesn't take a position on how belief reports and the belief sets of agents are 
exactly related, beyond noting that there is much philosophical interest in this problem, 
and also much philosophical disagreement. This seems an important weakness in his 
approach however.
A belief-system which reflects the assumption that other agents also have belief- 
systems is said to have the property of belief-recursion. Concretely, this means we have 
to have a belief operator in the internal language (to express other agent's beliefs), and 
such a belief operator will have to have other belief systems in its domain of 
interpretation.
3. Languages for belief representation
Konoiige begins by defining a standard first-order language Lq as an example of an 
internal language. Lq has constant symbols, predicate symbols of ail arities, variables, 
boolean connectives and quantifiers (but not function symbols). The semantics for Lq are 
as usual.
To represent belief we introduce a modal construct [S]<J>. S denotes an agent, $ denotes a 
sentence in S's belief-set. This allows us to introduce the (external) language LB,
composed of sentences from a language such as L0, possibly prefixed with a belief
operator.
Note that formulae with iterated modalities: [S][S]$, and quantifying-in: (3x).[S]<t>(x), 
are not permitted since in neither case does the belief operator prefix a sentence from
Lo-
To interpret Lg we need to add a set of deduction structures (one per agent) to the first- 
order model structure already defined for Lq .
Recall that LB refers to agent's belief sets, not their base beliefs + deduction rules. We 
therefore introduce a function p, so that p(i) is the set of deduction rules for agent Sj. Lg 
is taken to be parameterised by an arbitrary internal language L and p. We take the
35
Agent Theories and Architectures Section 2.4/3
interpretation of LB to be the collection of B(L,p) models.
3.1. D efin ition
A B(L, p) model is a tuple (4>, v0, U, D, r\).
1. U is a set of individuals, 4 maps constants to elements of U, v0 maps closed U- 
formulae to truthvalues.
2. D *  {d1,d2,...} is a set of deduction structures for S1( S2, etc.
3. i) is a naming function (parameterised by agent), returning the id-constant of an 
individual. An id-constant is a "standard name" for an individual as used in the internal 
language for a particular agent. The internal language needs to have a notion analogous to 
the idea of a standard name in order to integrate the information acquired about 
individuals from different sources (eg perception, the knowledge-base). An id-constant 
could be equated with the usual concept of standard-name just when every agent knows to 
what it refers.
A class of belief systems with sound and complete deduction rules is called saturated. For 
saturated deduction structures, the belief set is closed under logical consequence.
3.2. The language Lbq
The external language LBQ is a variant of allowing quantifying-in, and having an
additional term operator read as "bullet". If a is an arbitrary skolem constant 
denoting an individual, then *a is the id-constant (which could be the standard-name, 
see above) of the individual. The technical function of the operator is to preserve 
satisfiability in substitutions within de re belief contexts.
If "a" is a term in an internal language L, then a and «a are both terms in LBQ (-a  is 
illegal). L^q includes L and additionally, if $ is a formula (NB - not a sentence) in LBQ, 
then [Si]$ is a formula in LBQ. Bullet operators only occur within the scope of belief 
operators.
4. Proof methods
Konolige discusses the tableau refutation proof procedure for standard first-order 
logics. He shows how to extend it for languages with a belief operator, essentially by 
introducing a rule allowing the embedded argument of the belief operator to open up an 
auxiliary tableau he calls a view. Reasoning within the auxiliary tableau is like 
reasoning from a point of view of a particular believer. A closed off auxiliary tableau 
will close off the branch of the original tableau which generated it.
For various technical reasons associated with control of the search space and variable 
instantiation, the tableau method is not suitable for automatic theorem-proving. 
Konolige however introduces a generalisation of Robinson's resolution rule, B-
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resolution, which in conjunction with the technique of semantic attachment provides a 
suitable basis for automatic theorem-proving for the language and Lqq .
5. The Introspective machine
Konolige makes the insightful remark that introspection about one's own beliefs is a 
special case of reasoning about other agent's beliefs, in this special case (in Konolige's 
model) the agent actually has access to its own belief system, rather than merely a 
partial description of it, as is the case for other agents. Konolige considers, for 
simplicity, the case where the internal and external languages are the same, and are LB 
(ie no quantifying in). He imagines a system which can be queried, and then replies 
"yes" or "no".
Given such a system S, a query of the form [S]4> to the top-level component of S (which 
will be called M) leads to a recursive query of $ to what will be called the Introspective 
Machine, IM. The reason for making this distinction is that the recursive procedure 
modelled by IM might well have different (tighter) resource bounds than the top-level 
component M. Naturally, the IM could be further decomposed for more deeply nested 
belief operators, but Konolige only wishes to consider the interaction between M and IM.
Under what conditions might M and IM agree in their answers to a query ? Obviously in 
an ideal world they would always agree, but resource limitations may prevent IM (for 
example) from coming to a conclusion in the time available, thus having to return a 
value such as "undecided". Konolige shows that certain patterns of agreement between M 
and IM correspond to the classic epistemic axiom schemas 4 and 5 holding.
6. Comparison with possible-worids semantics
Konolige is understandably interested in comparing his model with the standard possible 
worlds approach to modal logic semantics. He considers the case of his language LB,
parameterised by itself (thus allowing iterated modalities) and restricted to the 
propositions! case for simplicity.
Recall that for Konolige the meaning of the sentence [Sj<j> is that the sentence "4>" either 
resides in, or is deducible from, the sentences in S's belief system. On the other hand, in 
a possible-worlds framework, the interpretation of [S]4> makes no architectural 
commitment at all. It simply says that [S]<j> is true iff $ is true in all the worlds 
accessible to S from the current world.
Konolige then proves an important result for his more general quantification language LB
(also Lbq). That assuming sound and complete deductions on the part of agents, then the
corresponding deduction model logic can be given either a sentential semantics using 
deduction structures or a possible-worlds semantics, with the same notion of validity in 
either case.
7. Discussion
Konolige's arguments are well-presented and internally coherent. The difficulties
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concern the adequacy of the approach when it comes to understanding "cognitive" agents. 
While some of the more superficial criticism of "belief boxes" fails to recognise the 
sophistication of what Konolige is about, it is not clear that the approach he outlines 
properly distinguishes between:
1 . the theories of the world imputed to an agent (which is surely what we 
mean when we utter a belief report),
2 . the formal semantics of such theories, and
3. the internal structure of the agents which correctly implement the 
theories ascribed to them.
Although it is quite in order to have any. semantics which makes theories of belief valid, 
a semantics based upon "internal sentences" seems to make it mandatory that a believer 
is such by virtue of the architectural feature of necessarily possessing an internal set 
of sentence tokens. This seems an over-strong assumption to make.
Additionally, Konolige's approach seems to introduce a divergence between the 
denotational and operational semantics of doxastic theories, since in many "realistic" 
situations, agents have no access to other agents' alleged "internal sentences", and 
therefore cannot operationalise such a semantics1.
Possible-worlds semantics for belief have the advantage of not containing a commitment 
to special kinds of agent architecture, although the theory as conventionally presented 
does not give much ciue as to how it might be operationalised. This is one of the central 
motivations for the work reported in this thesis of course.
1 Notice the assumption here that it is desirable that the denotational semantics of 
attitude operators should extend to a performance theory as to how agents are able to 
successfully use attitude attributions to handle interactions with other agents.
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2.5: ROSENSCHEIN'S THEORY OF SITUATED AUTOMATA
1. In troduction
Given a temporal or dynamic logic extended with epistemic operators, how can we 
interpret the logic over situations in which the "knowers" are computing systems 
interacting with an environment ? For the temporal part of the logic, the temporal or 
action operators can be interpreted over states of the world, linked by actions which 
occur. The interpretation of the epistemic operators is more problematical however: in 
this section I examine a first attempt at a solution, Rosenschein's theory of "Situated 
Automata" ([Ros85]).
Rosenschein distinguishes between what he calls the "Interpreted Symbolic Structures" 
approach, and the "Situated Automata" approach, which he develops in the paper.
In the "Interpreted Symbolic Structures" approach, the computer system contains a 
knowledge-base, which we may think of as a finite conjunction of formulae in some 
language. In world w, we write kbase(w) for the knowledge-base of the machine in w.
The approach indicates that the machine knows p if p is semantically entailed by the 
contents of the knowledge-base, thus
w j« Kp i f f  Vw\ w '|= kbase(w) -» w* |= p,
so that p is true in at least all the worlds in which kbase(w) is true.
Rosenschein observes that this is equivalent to defining an epistemic accessibility 
relation E as:
wEw* i f f  w' |= kbase(w),
so w is connected to all the worlds which also satisfy its knowledge-base.
Of course, in order to act appropriately, the information entailed by kbase(w) must 
become syntactically available to the machine, hence it will have to approximate closing 
up its knowledge-base by doing some theorem-proving.
The problem Rosenschein finds with this approach is that the semantics ascribed by the 
designer to the language of the machine's knowledge-base seems only contingently related 
to the actual relation between the machine and its environment, as conditioned by the 
input-output transactions the machine makes.
It seems that we ought to be able to assign knowledge to the machine on the basis of these 
transactions, without necessarily being aware of the details of the system's internal 
state at all, hence the situated automata approach.
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2. The situated-automata approach
We start with a quick reminder about automata theory:
let S be a finite, or infinite set of states, 
let I be a set of inputs, or stimuli, 
let A be a set of outputs, or actions, 
let d : S x I -> S be a nextstate function, 
let a c t: S -> A be an output function, 
let s0 in S be an initial state.
Then M -  (S, I, A, d, act, s0) is a deterministic automaton, or machine.
We assume that the machine is coupled to an environment, with which it interacts. The 
machine-environment pair at a particular state will be called a worldstate; variables 
such as u, v, w, w* etc will range over worldstates.
We call a set of worldstates a world-condition, since it corresponds to the denotation of a 
formula in the usual (Kripke) semantics. Let W be the set of all worldstates, then W- 
•e t is the set of all subsets of W, which we think of as a lattice with W at the top, {} at 
the bottom, and with intersection and union as meet and join.
Each element of W-set is a world-condition. Greek letters like wiii be used as
variables over W-set: we write sometimes 4>(w) for w e Let n be the propositional 
function which takes a formula to the set of worlds in W in which the formula is true.
If we had some formula p so that n(p) *  4>, then $(w) iff w |= p.
If we have $, y  e W-set, and $ s y  (ie 4> is a subset of y ), then we say that $ is a 
stronger condition than y.
Note that if p |- q, then x(p) £ *(q), hence p is a stronger condition than q.
We suppose that corresponding to the machine being in state s0, there is a strongest 
world condition $0. Intuitively, this is the collection of ways the world might be, 
consistent with the machine being in state s0.
As the machine processes input and does things, its state changes, and as it does so the set 
of worlds compatible with its state changes too. Hence if i  is some input when world 
condition + held (at time t), then $ /i ("<J> over 1") is the most specific new world- 
condition holding after that input.
We extend the notion to sequences of inputs. Let I* be sequences of inputs from I (the 
front of the sequence is the first input), let 0 be the empty sequence, X be an element of 
I* and ; be concatenation, then:
4/0 *  ♦q
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♦/(i;X ) -  <*/i)/X.
Thus after input X, $q/X is the current world-condition.
Cieariy not every set in W-set will be accessible by the machine, it all depends on what 
the inputs are. For example, the knowable world-conditions KWC can be defined as
KWC -  {4>q/X I *  e I*}.
For each state of the machine s, there is a set of possible input sequences L(s), (the 
"Language" of s) which got the machine into state s starting from state s0. To define L(s) 
formally, we extend the nextstate-function d to sequences in the usual way:
d(s, 0 ) -  s
d(s, X;i) -  d(d(s,X), i)
So that now,
L(s) -  {X g I* | d(s0, X) -  s}.
Given a world-condition <j>, we may be interested in the input sequences which pick it 
out. Recall that a world-condition is "picked-out" if any subset is picked-out. So we 
have:
M $) *  {X e I* | $q/X < $}.
Now, suppose we know that the machine is in state s, then we know it could have got 
there by any sequence of input in L(s). What is the strongest world-condition which can 
be guaranteed to hold after any input in L(s) has happened, and which therefore 
corresponds to the machine being in state s ?
We write this strongest world condition as info(s), where
info(s) -  u  { <f>0/X | X e L(s)}.
We are basically taking the distributed union of each of the world conditions which was 
created by starting from 4>0 and doing one input sequence from L(s).
We are now almost prepared to give the situated automata definition of what it is for a 
machine to know something. Suppose the machine and its environment constitute 
worldstate w, and let state(w) be the machine's state in w.
We now define the epistemic accessibility relation E thus (see figure below):
wEw' iff state(w) » state(w').
This means we group together as accessible all the worlds which correspond to the
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machine being in state s.
Recall that info(s) was the world-condition equivalent to the machine being in state(s), 
hence for all the worlds w e info(s), state(w) is just the same, namely s itself. Hence
wEw* iff w' e info (state(w)).
Hence we can write of the machine that it knows p just in case p is true in the worlds 
info(state(w)).
w |- Kp iff w' |* p Vw’ e info(state(w)).
The interaction of state and info-
E
w |« Kp Iff p is true everywhere In there
Considering state as a function from W into S, it is easily seen that info is its (set­
valued) inverse. Hence info partitions W into equivalence classes, of which E is the 
equivalence relation. Hence the epistemic logic here is S5 (KT45).
3. Discussion
Rosenschein has demonstrated a simple theory of knowledge, which explicitly identifies 
the notion of the state of the knower, but which does so without any commitment to a 
propositional representation within that state: indeed no coding scheme of any kind is 
presupposed.
The theory is reliant however upon a pretheoretic notion of the operator of $/X. 
Given that we know how to assign a set <t>0 of worlds to the automaton in its initial state s0 
(itself a rather mysterious assumption), then the operator 7" will maintain the
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world-conditions-state correlation through arbitrary inputs.
In reality, it is the system designer who has to identify <f>Q, as the denotation of a
specification of the legal initial conditions for the machine to operate correctly. The 
designer is further obligated to show how an input sequence X terminating at time t can 
be used to deduce the most precise specification holding at this time, the one with 
denotation $qTX.
Finally, such a specification will express certain constraints on what the automaton is to 
do, allowing the functions d and act to be designed. It is significant that Rosenschein 
does not need "acf in his analysis at all.
Other points could be made: the association between automaton states and propositions 
has both an epistemic and temporal aspect to it, but these are not clearly demarcated in 
Rosenschein's treatment. A point could also be made that the worlds themselves are 
presumably complex entities constituted from the automaton, plus its environment 
(other automata ?). Yet this idea is completely unexplored.
Perhaps the appropriate stance to take towards this work is that it is really examining 
one idea, the correlation between agent state and propositiona! characterisations of the 
agent, and that the issues unexamined are pointers to a research programme in situated 
automata. From that point of view, much of this thesis can be seen as pursuing such 
questions.
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2.6: SITUATION SEMANTICS
Situation Semantics is a vast undertaking, it is simultaneously a research programme, 
based on ecological ideas about the nature of reality and the way reality is conceptually 
structured by human beings; a method, focusing on the way that uniformities in the 
world give rise to the possibility of information, and how information can be 
linguistically conveyed; and a technical programme, in the sense of seeking an 
alternative mathematical framework to that developed in traditional mathematical logic: 
that of a situation semantics.
To add to this, it is also the case that situation semantics is an evolving research 
programme, so that the base concepts are subject to change without notice. Given the size 
of the current literature, plus spin-off research, it is impossible to give a full account 
of situation semantics in the brief space here. What I propose to do is to highlight the 
main ideas and technical apparatus in so far as they seem most relevant to the objectives 
of this thesis, while omitting any detailed coverage of technical polemic with Fregean 
opponents1, and material oriented to the specialist problems of natural language per 
se. I will follow the treatment in the book "Situations and Attitudes” [BP83], with 
occasional reference to other material.
1. In troduction
In situation semantics, reality is taken to consist of situations: these are taken to consist 
of individuals having properties and standing in relations one to another at various 
space-time locations. The "theory of situations" is an abstract applied set theory for 
modelling situations, both actual and possible ones.
If we live in a sea of ever-changing situations, how is it possible to make any sense out 
of reality ? The answer is that there are relationships and similarities between 
situations, which Barwise and Perry call u n ifo rm itie s . Organisms (including 
ourselves) are defined to be those parts of reality which have the capability to acquire 
information about the flow of events through perception, and through attunement to the 
underlying uniformities.
Language is of course a very special kind of device for labelling uniformities, by 
establishing a conventional relationship between utterance of language tokens and the 
uniformities these are meant to identify. The endeavour of semantics is in a sense to 
reverse this process, and to use situations, and the relationships between situations, to 
classify language.
2. Event meaning vs event-type meaning
What sort of granularity do uniformities possess ? Take a very specific situation, one
11n fact the polemic against those holding to the view that the reference of an embedded 
sentence is a truth value reads rather strangely to those of us who believe that Kripke 
semantics was developed to address this problem. When the reference of a sentence is a set of 
possible worlds (or the characteristic function thereof), then this doesn't look a whole lot 
different (paradigmatically) from the Barwise and Perry stance of asserting the notion that the 
reference of a sentence might be a set of courses of events.
44
Agent Theories and Architectures Section 2.6/2
with smoke pouring out of a particular building. This means (say) that the building is on 
fire: it's an example of event meaning. The general relation which says that smoke 
coming out of a building means that the building is on fire is event-type meaning. It 
is a uniformity across many concrete events of smoky buildings on fire.
3. L inguistic meaning
The central idea of situation semantics is that the meaning of a simple declarative 
statement is a relation, associated with the sentence uttered in the statement, between 
certain utterance situations and described situations. The relation expresses the 
uniformity between the occasions when that sentence gets uttered, and the situations 
which correctly interpret the sentence.
For example, the meaning of an utterance of the sentence "I AM SITTING" is the relation
H I AM SITTING ]], where
u II I AM SITTING ]] e i f f
there is some location I, individual a, such that
in u: at I: speaks, a; yes
in e: at I: sits, a; yes,
(notation will be explained later; u and e are situations). The extension of this relation 
will be a large class of pairs of abstract situations, which we shall now proceed to 
discuss.
3.1. Abstract S ituations
Abstract situations are divided into actual, factual and non-factual situations. The actual 
situations correspond to real situations, the factual situations "classify" real situations 
as far as they go, while the ones which get something wrong about reality are non- 
factual. Abstract situations are built up from individuals, relations and space-time 
locations.
Variables a, b ... e A are used to represent individuals (the notion of "object" is 
introduced as a technical term, not synonymous with individuals: objects may be 
complex entities). Individuals are actually in the world (ie they are not mathematical 
objects).
We assume the world contains n-ary relations (n £ 0) for every n. These are part of 
reality. If n *  0, we have a situational state, such as the state a location is in when it's 
raining; if n « 1, we have properties. CRn is the collection of all n-ary relations, CR the
collection of all relations (= u n<En), and r, r' range over CR.
We represent the collection of all connected space-time locations by L, with I, I' ranging 
over it. We have relations over L such as:
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I < I' I is before i'
I • T I temporally overlaps I'
I @ I' I spatially overlaps I'.
The largest space-time location Is the universe, denoted by lu.
3.2. Situation Types
Situation types allow us to state the way things stand in a situation, possibly abstracting 
away from an explicit space-time location (thus a situation type can capture what is 
true at many different space-time locations). If we define a constituent sequence to be a 
sequence <r, x«j,...t xn> where r e <Jtn, and x-|...xn are objects, then a situation type is a
relation between constituent sequences and a polarity, 0 or 1 (interpreted as false or 
true). Thus we could define the situation type s as: s -  {(<r,a,b>,1), (<r,b,c>,0)}. The 
members of s are called "unlocated facts" in [Bar84a].
In fact we use the syntax:
s >  r,a,b; yes 
r,b,c; no.
If we want to talk about the contents of s without listing the whole extension of it, we can 
use the "in" notation:
in s: r,a,b; yes
r,b,c; no.
We can say:
in s: r,a,c; undefined
if neither (< r,a ,o ,1) or (<r,a,c>,0) is in s.
A situation-type s is coherent if:
(1) we don't have
in s: r, x1 t...,xn; yes
ins : r, x1  xn ; no.
(ii) If we have
in s: same, a, b; yes,
then a«b.
(iii) we don't have
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in s: same,a,a; no.
if s is not coherent, it is incoherent. Situation types s, s' are compatible if their union 
is coherent. Actual situations are coherent.
3.3. States of Affairs
A state of affairs (soa) is a pair s = (I, s0) where the (unlocated) facts represented by 
s0 hold somewhere in the space of I, throughout the time spanned by I.
A soa s is factual if s0 holds at the location I; it is actual if it is a complete description. 
We say that s is a part of s' « (I, s0') if s0 is (set-theoretically) contained in s0'.
A special kind of soa is called a discourse situation, which has exactly one individual a 
saying something. We let be the collection of discourse situations, with d, d' ranging 
over it. We use a^ for the speaker in d, and l<j for the discourse location.
3.4. Courses of Events
A course of events (coe) is a set of triples (I, y, i) where I is a location, y is a 
constituent sequence <r,x1 ,...,xn> and i is a polarity (ie 0 or 1)2. We use 6 as the 
collection of coe's, with e, e' ranging over it.
We can think of a coe as a partial function from locations to situation types. We say that e 
is part of e' if e is a subset of e' considered as a relation; (as a function, e is a part of e' 
if e is defined over a restriction of the domain of e' and returns situation types which are 
a part of those returned by e').
Example:
e :« at I: hungry,Molly; yes
at I': eating.Molly; yes
sleeping,Jackie; yes
at I": hungry,Molly; no
I < r < I".
The following coe is a part of e
6 q >  at I: hungry,Molly; yes
at I': eating,Molly; yes.
Two coe's are compatible if when applied to any location common to both their domains, 
the resulting situation types are compatible. A coe is coherent if it assigns only coherent 
situation types to locations in its domain.
2 The construct (i,<r, x - j x n>, i), i e {0,1} is called a located fact in [Bar84a].
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Note that the term "situation" is a generic one, covering both soa’s and coe's.
4. Structures of Situations
This is the situation semantics analogue to the traditional model-theoretic notion of 
structure. A structure M  of situations is a collection M of coe's with a non-empty 
collection M0 (the actual coe's) such that:
1. Every e in M0 is coherent.
2. If e is in M0> and e0 is a subset of e, then e0 is in M.
3. If X is a subset of M, then there is an e in M0 such that every e' in X is a part of e.
4. If C is any constraint in M then M respects C (more about constraints later).
In diagrammatic form:
figure 1.
The coe's in Mq are the actual coe's of M ,  those in M are factual.
Notice that every factual coe is part of an actual coe (by 3): since Mq is non-empty,
there must be at least one actual coe (corresponding to "reality"), but there need be no 
more. If reality is felt to contain lots of more "localised" situations, then Mq may be 
more than a singleton set, but we are then faced with the problem of how situations - 
parts of reality - are to be ind ividuated. Barwise and Perry argue that it Is particularly 
when dealing with the semantics of attitude sentences, where one is talking about the 
relationship between an agent and a situation, or collection of situations, that one is 
forced to consider such localised "chunks" of reality.
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5. Indeterminates and Event Types
To capture uniformities over coe's, we abstract from particular individuals, relations 
and locations. To do this we introduce a notion of indeterminates (a kind of semantic 
analogue to variables): we write a*, b* for individual indeterminates; r*, s* for 
relation indeterminates; I*, I'* for location indeterminates.
An event-type is then a coe with indeterminates replacing concrete individuals, locations 
and/or relations. E, E' range over event-types: we can index an event-type by the
indeterminates it contains, eg E(a*, r*, I*).
A function f binding indeterminates in E to actual individuals etc is called an anchor. The 
new event-type created from E by actually applying f is written E[f]. If f is total over
the indeterminates in E, then E[f] will be a coe; in this case f is called a total anchor.
A coe e is said to be of type E if E[f] is part of e (f is necessarily total here). Here, e is 
"more specialised" (contains more entries) than E[f].
5.1. Roles
The indeterminates a*, l \  r* etc will be called basic indeterminates. We now extend the 
notion by the following definition:
( i ) every basic indeterminate is an indeterminate
( i i ) if x* is an indeterminate, and E(x*,...) is an event-type, then <x#, E> is an
indeterminate.
We call the indeterminate <x*,E> a role, sometimes written x*E; E is called the kind of
event where the role is defined (it is basically providing a contextual definition for the 
kind of thing x* could be).
Note that the intent is to single-out one of the indices of E(...). We allow basic 
indeterminates to be written as multiple-letter strings (cf Barwise and Perry's self- 
referential example of thp* - for "tired hungry philosopher").
5.2. Example
Let E :« at T: tired, a"; yes
hungry, a"; yes 
philosopher, a*; yes
We can define thp* *  <a*. E> and l^p* *  <r, E>.
5.3. Special roles
Certain indeterminates have their meaning fixed by their participation in special roles.
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let LI be the event-type for a located individual.
LI >  at I*: present,a*; yes.
Define i* as the role < a \ Ll> and h* as <1*, Ll>. We call i* the agent, and h* the agent’s 
location, (cf "I" and "here”).
A "located individual" is then a situation where these roles are uniquely filled, ie a coe 
with only one individual present at some location.
The role "this", t* is defined as t* « <b*, ALI> where
AU >  at h*: attending to, i*, b*; yes.
(ALI stands for "Attending Located Individual").
The use of roles embedded in event-types (which Barwise and Perry call "indexed 
event-types"), essentially permit the uniformities identified by event-types to be 
further specialised by the "resource situations" captured by roles.
5.4. Schemata
A schema is a set of event-types. For example, the event of drawing a card from a deck 
could be any of:
E1 at I": Ace-of-spades, a"; yes
E52 >  at I*; 2-of-clubs, a*; yes.
We let S :« {E1, E 2 ,..., E52}, and any event of drawing a card will be of type S.
6. Constraints
Constraints capture the complex of regularities which structure an environment, to 
which successful organisms are attuned. A taxonomy of constraints can be defined.
1. Necessary constraints: In a traditional treatment, these might be called 
"logically necessary constraints", eg every dog is a mammal.
2. Nomic constraints: These are the contingent constraints arising from the 
way the universe is organised eg natural laws.
3 . Conventional constraints: socially-constructed constraints, eg those 
pertaining to the meaning of words.
4. Conditional constraints: These can be any of the above, when we pay 
attention to the specific conditions under which particular forms of the 
constraints hold, and what happens when these conditions are violated.
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6.1. C lassifying Unconditional Constraints
One type of event S1 involves another, S2 , if every actual event e1:S1 is part of an 
actual e2:S2.
For example, every event of type E involves one of type E\ where
E :* at P: kisses,a*,b"; yes
E' :* at P: touches,a",b"; yes
because kissing involves touching. To represent this, we define the soa CO (for 
constraint), where
CO :« at lu: involves,E,E\ yes.
The relation "involves", is thus highlighted as the bearer of constraints in the theory.
6.2. Conditional Constraints 
Example: Let C(P,a*,b") be a constraint:
C :* at ly: involves,E,E'; yes
E :« at P: p,a*; yes,
E' :« at P: r,a*,b"; yes
q,b"; yes
If C is factual, then from p(x) one can learn that for some y, r(x, y), and that y has 
properly q.
Suppose C is not factual, but valid only in a restricted space-time region, so
C*:« at I: involves,E + E-j ,E'; yes, where
E1 :« P < I.
If an organism lives before I, then C and C' are equivalent; this need not be the case 
subsequently however.
Let C be the following constraint
C :« at lu: involves, E, S; yes.
Then we can make the following definitions about how coe's interact with constraints:
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1. e is meaningful wrt C 
He is of type E.
2. s' is a meaningful option 
for e, (wrt C), If when 
a is of type E[f], then 
e* is of type S[f|.
3. e precludes e( wrt C If 
when e is of type E[f], 
then s' is of type not-S[g], 
where g extends f.
7. Sentence meanings
figure 2 .
The linguistic meaning of expressions in a language are conventional constraints on 
utterances. Given an indicative sentence $, we think of the meaning of $ as a relation 
[ft]] between situations ut in which $ is uttered, and situations e, described by such 
utterances (so that u [[4>]] e) . The latter are traditionally studied in model-theoretic 
semantics; the former have been seen more in terms of speech-act theory, theories of 
knowledge and belief.
7.1. Discourse situation
We define a "discourse situation", DU.
DU :« at I": speaking,a"; yes
addressing,a*,b* ; yes 
saying,a*,a"; yes.
This induces linguistic roles:
speaker*
addressee*
disc-loc
expression
<a*,DU>
<b*,DU>
<I*,DU>
<a*,DU>
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A situation in which these roles are uniquely anchored is called a discourse-situation.
7.2. Referring
let REF be the event-type:
REF :* at I*: speaking.a*; yes
addressing,a*,b*; yes 
saying,a*,a; yes 
re ferring-to ,a \a,a-|*; yes
and ref* *  <a1*,REF>, then a situation C in which the role ref* is uniquely filled by a 
referent will be called a referring situation. We write c(a) for the referent of a in C.
The function c which maps referring words a to their referents, c(a), is called "the 
speaker's connections" in the utterance. This function links the utterance to the 
described situation; note that it is partial.
To highlight the role of the speaker's connections, instead of u [[ ]] e, we subsequently 
write d, c [[<*>]] e (recall that d is the discourse situation).
8. The Attitudes
Attitude verbs are those which embed sentences, and are used to report perception and 
cognition. The use of attitude verbs falls into two main categories:
(1) to explain what people think or do by postulating psychological states which exhibit 
a systematic relation to behaviour and other external aspects of the situations people are 
in.
(2) to provide information about how the world is: "A tells B that C" is evidence for C, if 
A is informed, reliable etc.
Barwise and Ferry take the view that an attitude is a relation between an agent and a 
collection of alternative situations (this is the same intuition as that underlying 
Hintikka's view of the attitudes - see section 4.3). They begin by considering the case of 
visual perception. Consider the following argument:
MELANIE SAW THAT THE YELLOW CAT WAS PLAYING WITH THE WOOL
THE YELLOW CAT WAS THE CAT NAMED SCRUFFY
SO MELANIE SAW THAT SCRUFFY WAS PLAYING WITH THE WOOL
Our intuition is clearly that this fails: why? Barwise and Perry's explanation is as 
follows: Melanie has certain information on the basis of what she sees; information 
captured by a range of alternative situations compatible with what she sees and what she 
knows. The hypothesis that the yellow cat is a cat named scruffy only ensures that there 
is an actual situation where YELLOW CAT and SCRUFFY are bound to the same individual; 
yet they need not be in all of Melanie's "visual alternatives".
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We define a relation "SO" (seeing option) thus:
In s: at i: SO, a, e0; yes
if e0 is compatible with what a sees and knows;
in s: at I: SO, a, e0; no
if e0 is incompatible with what a sees and knows3.
We assume that if for some other coe e-j,
in s: at I: SO, a, e^; yes
then the scene e0 of which a was aware is part of e-j; that e0 does not preclude e-j wrt C; 
and that e-j is a meaningful option wrt C from e0; where C is the set of constraints a is 
attuned to (see figure 3).
figure 3.
The coe 6q might be some primary perceptual scene, while e-j is a more "sophisticated" 
situation which the agent "sees to be the case" by virtue of its knowledge of the 
constraints which apply.
Note that in a given situation, some coe's "within reality" are compatible with what the 
agent sees and knows, some are definitely not, and a whole lot are just not classified by 
the agent (those e’ such that: in s: at I: SO, a, e'; undefined).
3 Note we are still getting at cognitive processes indirectly, by considering the "worlds" the 
agent deduces it might be in. The relation SO is effectively a specification of a whole series of 
complex cognitive processes within the agent which serve to link the act of perception to those 
situations which the agent deduces consequently to be the case.
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I f
in S: at I: SO, a, e; yes,
we say e is a visual option for a. The visual options for a are pragmatically determined, 
in the sense that they depend upon the content of the cognitive activity which a carried 
out consequent upon its perception.
If it is not the case that:
in s: at I: SO, a, e; no,
we say e is a visual alternative for a. Visual alternatives are coe's which are not 
precluded by what a saw that they may contain extraneous or irrelevant facts (from 
a's point of view).
Suppose we assert: a SEES THAT $. If there is a visual option e for a in which $ fails, 
then it seems clear that a does not see that $ because a clearly recognises a possibility 
where 4 does not hold.
Because situations are partial, we cannot conclude that a does see that $ just because $ 
holds in all of a's visual options, because as we noted above, it is a rather pragmatic 
matter trying to decide which visual alternatives are to count as visual options: the safe 
choice is to make sure 4 holds in all of a's visual alternatives (this is again reminiscent 
of the possible worlds approach). Formally, a situation e is one where a sees that $ if $ 
holds in each of a's visual alternatives at the appropriate location.
^  SEES THAT*
figure 4
Thus d, c [[ SEES THAT *  ]j a, e
iff for every e \ either: d, c ([ $ ]] e\
or: in e: at l=c(SEES): SO, a, e'; no.
(That is, $ holds in all situations e' not precluded by SO - see figure 4).
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The only extra constraint placed on SO is its veridicality, so that it is not the case that 
for every actual e\
In e: at I: SO, a, e'; no.
8.1. Knowledge
If we find out that a knows then we know that $ holds in all of a's "epistemic 
alternatives" (ie all coe's not precluded by what a knows to be the case). If a DOESN'T 
KNOW then + fails in some active, epistemic alternative coe.
We therefore introduce a relation KO ("knowing option"), exactly analogous to SO.
8.2. Belief
There are two ways of thinking about belief. Firstly, belief as failed knowledge, typically 
by an organism finding itself in a situation where conditional constraints it assumes to 
hold, in fact don't.
Secondly, we can consider knowledge as successful belief, the result of induction over 
experience.
To deal with the first of these, we can introduce a relation BO, with exactly parallel 
treatment to KO, although without a veridicality constraint; Barwise and Perry do not 
analyse the second option.
We now show how situation semantics handles the argument.
J BELIEVES M -  M M « E
J BELIEVES M *  E (by substitution).
M Is here meant to be the "morning star" (ie Venus), and E the "evening star" (ie 
Venus); J names John.
We have
d, c [[ J BELIEVES M *  Mj] e
Iff for every e \ either
d, c [[ M -  M ]] e\ or
In e: at I -  c(BELIEVES): BO, John, e'; no.
Now, for any actual coe e1 defined at I, it &  the case that M -  E, so e-j will contain the 
soa e2, where
e2: -  at I: same, M,E; yes.
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However, there is no reason why e2 should be a constituent of every situation in John's 
doxastic alternatives, so John is under no obligation to believe M *  E.
9. Representing Mental States
The problem is this: how can we describe minds by referring to situations that aren't 
mental; situations external to minds and brains, and in the case of beliefs, situations 
which may not even be real? Situation Semantics makes use of indirect classification: 
the situation described by the embedded sentence of an attitude verb classifies the agent’s 
cognitive situation by exploiting various "folk psychological" constraints, different 
constraints for different verbs.
In Barwise and Perry's view, mental events are bodily events, uniformities currently 
ill-understood over structural states of live individuals. Beliefs, thoughts, perceptions 
are situations involving a located individual being in a definite bodily state. However, if 
these beliefs etc are about anything, then they will be anchored in a systematic way to 
the wider world; when they are, attitude verbs may exploit this connection.
These sentiments are entirely in keeping with the main line of this thesis. It is perhaps 
useful to add however that not only biological systems are appropriate subjects of 
intentional descriptions. Artificial systems whose required behaviour is indicated in 
intentional language pose design problems which Situation Semantics does not seek to 
address.
9.1. Representing Perceptions and Images
Consider the following example. Joe's seeing that Jackie is biting his dog Molly can be 
thought of as a primary perception.
Using the relation ST to model what happens when an agent sees that something, we 
can represent this as:
in e0: at I: ST, Joe.e; yes, where
in e : at I: biting, Jackie, Molly; yes
dog, Jackie; yes 
dog, Molly; yes.
As a way of classifying Joe's perceptual frame of mind, this is too concrete - it doesn't 
exhibit the similarities we know to exist between other kids, other dogs in other 
locations. We therefore abstract over location and particular dogs to construct an 
event-type E.
E :« a th *: b iting ,t1 \ t 2 "; yes 
dog.t-j*; yes
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dog,t2"; yes
We claim now that Joe is in a relation SR (not ST) to this event-type E (which we call 
the frame of mind! provided that a "setting" is given, which binds the indeterminates. So 
we say, (to properly describe Joe's perception situation)
in e: at I: SRlJoe,E; yes
of,t*| "Jackie; yes 
of,t2*;Molly; yes.
The different perceptions people have can be classified by modifying the setting 
appropriately.
0.2. Beliefs
Barwise and Perry assume that beliefs are complex event-types. Just as perceptions 
were factored into efficient perceptual conditions (accessed via SR) and settings, so
beliefs are factored into efficient doxastic conditions, and settings, the former accessed 
through a relation BR. To handle disjunctions, schemata replace individual indexed
event-types. Barwise and Perry stick to single event-types (singleton schemata) in 
simple examples.
9.3. Example
Take Joe's belief that Jackie is biting his dog, Molly. We can represent this as follows:
in e0: at I: BR,Joe,E; yes
of a*.Jackie; yes 
of b",Molly; yes
where
E >  at b l: biting, a",b"; yes
belongs to, b*,il; yes 
dog, a"; yes 
dog: b"; yes.
The indeterminates of e0, a", b* are called the "ideas" of e0. The roles i l  and h i  get
anchored to Joe and I by virtue of the kind of roles they are, indicating the location of 
believed situation etc. Barwise and Perry use the term "idea" in the context of the 
general definition of belief. A belief is an event-type eQ whose constituents at various
locations I are of the form:
In e0: at I: BR,a,S; yes
o f,x \b ; yes
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(where x* etc are the indeterminates in the schema S).
A semantics for beiief-sentences can be given in terms of Br , in terms similar to those 
we saw for BO previously.
10. Reaction to Criticisms of "Situations and Attitudes"
In "Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes" [BP84], Barwise and Perry respond to 
criticism of "Situations and Attitudes" from a number of commentators. The discussion is 
structured around four main themes: Realism, Efficiency, Partial Information and the 
Attitudes. In a document of 65 pages, many interesting ideas are developed; in the context 
of this thesis however, I mention just two.
10.1 A ttitude to  Posslble-Worlds Semantics
It is argued by some4 that situations, and structures of situations are (merely ?) 
non-standard possible-worlds.
Barwise and Perry appear to take violent exception to this surmise. Thus on page 13 we 
find "we felt that the possible worlds point of view is dead wrong, deeply unsatisfactory, 
both philosophically and mathematically". A little later on, we get a clearer idea of what 
the problem is: "We need to distinguish between intuitive ideas about possible states of 
affairs and the actual assumptions about possible worlds that are built into the 
mathematical theory called possible worlds semantics, as embodied in Montague 
Grammar. It is with the latter that we have our quarrel, not the former".
On the next page (p. 14), Barwise expands upon the problem with Montagovian semantics 
as he sees it: "The assumption ... built into Montague Grammar is that each world 
provides total information about the extension of every piece of language in that world, 
for all of time. When you recall that the interpretation of phrases in Montague grammar 
are total higher-type functions, of arbitrary finite type, defined on the set of all 
possible worlds, this becomes an incredibly strong assumption, and the thought that talk 
of Jackie biting Molly is really talk about this collection of worlds is simply beyond 
belief".
Note that the antipathy here is to the enormously artificial constructions due to 
Montague, as judged against the programme of providing a realistic, ecologically valid 
ontology for the major part of natural language. The original motivation for introducing 
possible worlds (cf [Hin 62/69]) is to handle the technical difficulties of opaque 
contexts: Barwise and Perry themselves make use of this strategy in their own 
semantics for the attitudes, as we saw above.
The approach in this thesis is to use "small worlds", which are richly endowed with 
structure, and to put a realist construa! upon the ontology of the epistemic alternatives 
(as in section 3.6). It is not clear that such an approach is vulnerable to the 
philosophical critique mentioned here, although some of the more technical criticisms of 
possible-worlds semantics (p 17/18) are perhaps more compelling; further work is 
required.____________
4 See [Hin86], [Cre85 p.168] for recent comments.
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10.2 Theories vs Models
On p. 23, Barwise and Perry make the interesting observation that Part II of "Situations 
and Attitudes", entitled a "Theory of Situations" presented in actuai fact a model of such a 
theory. To see this distinction, compare the models of the Reals, based upon Cauchy 
sequences or Dedekind cuts with the axiomatic characterisation of the Reals as a complete 
ordered field.
11. Work subsequent to "Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes"
The realisation of the need for an axiomatic development of the theory of Situation 
Semantics continued to be a major concern of Barwise, with treatments in "Lectures on 
Situation Semantics" [Bar84a], and "The Situation in Logic - ill: Situations, Sets and the 
Axiom of Foundation" [Bar85]. Here it is argued that any set-theoretic model of 
situations which respects the constituent relation over them (ie the relation of situation 
inclusion) cannot include the axiom of foundation.
Now, it is this axiom which ensures that there are no sets with infinitely embedded 
constituents, so if it is to be given up, what is to replace it ? Barwise appeals to the 
work of Peter Aczel, of Manchester University (U.K.), who has worked on a set theory 
which includes an "Anti-Foundation Axiom". Sets in the resulting set theory are termed 
hyper$ets.
The recent work on the technical development of Situation Semantics, described in "Notes 
on a model of a theory of situations, sets, types and propositions" [Bar87], and "The 
Liar" [BE87], has applied a situation theory based on non-weli-founded sets to analyse 
the semantics of "Uar" sentences, and most recently, to examine the circularities 
involved in Common Knowledge, in "The Situation in Logic-IV: On the Model Theory of 
Common Knowledge" [Bar88].
12. D iscussion
"Ordinary" language, as spoken by "ordinary people" mediates the complex of social 
relations constitutive of modern society. A theory which attempts this degree of semantic 
coverage necessarily has to deal with many questions, and has to base itself upon the 
most fundamentai uniformities for its ontological foundations.
The result, in Situation Semantics, is a theory which combines an extraordinary level of 
culture and sophistication, with a sprawling and idiosyncratic technical development. 
But there is no doubt that the central driving force is the semantics of natural language 
as it is actually spoken.
This is not of course the central concern of the work reported in this thesis. Here we are 
interested in theories of agents, and our interest in natural language semantics focuses 
on the way natural language description of such agents is treated, primarily via the 
attitudes.
The classic treatment, due to Hintikka using Kripke's semantics [Hin69] as developed by 
Montague [DWP85] performs well with respect to the technical concerns of
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compositionality in the presence of opaque contexts, but at the expense of a cluttered, 
mysterious and counter-intuitive ontology, as was noted in the remarks of Barwise and 
Perry quoted above. From an agent-theoretic point of view, the approach leaves it all to 
do, since essentially nothing of interest is said concerning the subjects of the attitudes.
Barwise and Perry's realistic approach to ontology on the other hand is concerned to lay 
equal stress on agents in discourse situations as on the situations described by their 
utterances, it talks at length about the uniformities in the world, to which organisms 
may be productively attuned. But for Barwise and Perry, the attitudes are one problem 
amongst many, and with progress required upon such a very broad front, the 
development of a sub-theory of agents has been very slow. In particular, Barwise and 
Perry expressly rule out an investigation of cognitive architecture as part of their 
endeavour ([BP83] p.272).
By considering very "small" worlds, involving a local environment including agents 
behaving in an intentional fashion, I hope to make more progress on a narrower front, 
and I believe that interesting things can be said without importing the apparatus (in so 
far as it exists) of Situation Semantics - up to a point.
That point is, I suspect, when we begin to model dialogue, for, as Barwise observed in 
example 11, p. 18 of [Bar85], for genuine dialogue to occur there must be common 
knowledge of intention. The treatment of common knowledge is notoriously difficult, and 
is a fast moving research area. It is therefore significant that some of the most 
promising work is being done in the Situation Semantics tradition [Bar88]. The impact 
of such work on the direction reported in this thesis however has yet to be determined.
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2.7: SPEECH ACTS AND DIALOGUE
1. In troduction
in recent years, many writers have noted a conflict between those analyses of language 
which attempt to situate it in the realm of social action (speech act and conversation 
theory), as compared to the traditional logical* approaches, which concern themselves 
with the examination of sentences as syntax, and with questions of sense and 
reference1.
As Habermas argues in [Hab79], dialogue occurs within an already established network 
of social relationships, and serves in the first instance to reproduce and modify it. In 
analysing utterances in dialogue, it is helpful to borrow one of the foundational ideas in 
Situation Semantics [BP83], and distinguish between discourse situation and described 
situation.
In a dialogue, the discourse situation includes the speaker and audience, plus the 
constellation of social relationships which structure their history, expectations, 
beliefs, objectives, obligations etc2. The purpose of dialogue is to reproduce these 
social relationships (in modified forms) by the indirect mechanism of modifying the 
cognitive states of the dialogue participants. The question of interest is: how does 
language manage to db that
The earliest attempt to give a systematic account of language as social action is speech act 
theory, developed principally in the work of Austin and Searle. This attempts to answer 
the question by distinguishing between the illocutionary force and propositions! content 
of an utterance.
1.1. Illocutionary force and propositional content
A linguistic intervention into a social situation can take various forms. A speaker may 
request a hearer to do something; or command, or advise , or warn, or thank, or 
greet, or promise. Acts such as requesting, commanding are said to be illocutionary 
acts, and can be analysed in terms of their appropriateness in given social situations, 
their anchoring to the world, and their social effects.
Speech acts also have (usually) a propositional content. A speaker may warn that 
som ething, request that som ething : the something  being a reference to the 
social/natural world. For example
"he warned me that <the bull was charging>m
"she requested that <1 open the door>
In Situation Semantics, the propositional content denoted by the embedded sentences <...> 
In the examples above is the described situation, and the relationship between the
1 See for instance [BP83 p. 275], [Sea69 p. 18], [Lew75], [Sow84 p. 266 ff].
2 The discourse situation gets only an impoverished treatment in existing versions of 
situation semantics.
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utterance (considered as text) and the propositional content corresponds to the 
traditional concerns of semantics.
So, how do we do things with words ? In brief, we manage social relationships by 
judicious choice of speech acts, which serve to modify the cognitive states of the dialogue 
participants (in the first instance). We achieve this by the indirect route of exhibiting 
to our audience a (possible) situation - the described situation, or propositional content 
- "painted” in words. The illocutionary force of our utterance indicates to our audience 
how they should take it, and what they should do about it.
Thus when I say to you "please make sure the door is shut" successfully, we first have to 
be in a social situation where:
* the door is in fact open
* you are able to shut it
* you weren't in the process of shutting it anyway
* we have the right sort of relationship of authority
* we both understand English
*
I then "paint the picture" of the door being shut (by using the words "the door is shut"), 
coupling this propositional content with the illocutionary force of a request, as indicated 
in English by the illocutionary force indicator "please make sure <a proposition".
At this point I have made a claim to a modification of our social and physical situation 
(your compliance + the future state of the door). If you accept the claim, you go do it3. 
If you do not, then as a fellow participant in the reproduction of our local social 
relationships, you will have to make a contrary engagement - "I think the cat's going to 
come in".
Clearly the analysis of speech acts is not entirely trivial. I start by reviewing Austin's 
seminal work, which set the agenda for subsequent research in speech act theory. I then 
consider Searle's attempts to focus down on the detailed analysis of speech acts, and his 
attempts at their taxonomisation and formalisation.
Finally, I say something about conversation, and what might be the conditions required to 
be a participant in a conversation.
2. How to Do Things with Words
Austin's work on Speech Act theory is reported in the book "How to Do Things with 
Words" [Aus62]. This is not in fact an academic treatise, but a collection of lecture notes 
from a 12 lecture series given by Austin at Harvard University in 1955. The work is 
squarely in the philosophical tradition (Austin was White's Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Oxford), but underneath the patina of mid-50's Oxford style, the work 
reads as remarkable modern in its content.
3 This is a perlocutionary effect.
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2.1. The perform ative/constative d is tinc tion
Austin begins by distinguishing performative statements, ("I do" in a marriage 
ceremony), from constative statements, ("the cat is on the mat"). A performative is not 
assigned truth or falsity (unlike a constative), but rather, by virtue of the utterance 
taking place, an acl is accomplished - eg the act of becoming married.
What is the analogue of truth conditions for performatives ? Austin argues that a 
performative can be "happy" or "unhappy" according to whether certain conditions exist 
by which the performative act accomplishes its ends. The "happiness conditions" (today 
called felicity conditions) include such things as the appropriateness of the social 
setting, the sincerity of the utterer, "uptake" by the listeners, and the subsequent 
conduct of those involved in the entire speech act.
Austin then considers the question as to whether there is some grammatical (ie 
syntactic) criterion for distinguishing performatives from constatives. Thus:
( a ) "I bet you sixpence tha t...". "OK".
is a performative utterance (the bet was actually accomplished by the speech act), 
whereas
( b ) "He bet him sixpence tha t...".
is a constative utterance, which cannot be performative.
Austin finds certain clues by which performative utterances can be identified as such. 
For example, the word "hereby" can often be inserted into a performative utterance 
without significantly changing the meaning: ("I hereby bet you sixpence that ..."). This 
cannot be done with a constative utterance ("he hereby bet him sixpence th a t...").
Unfortunately, this is not a grammatical distinction. Austin analyses many candidates for 
such a distinction, but the counterexamples come thick and fast. Thus "I apologise fo r ..." 
is clearly a performative, while "I am sorry for ..." can be either a performative or a 
constative, depending upon context, tone of voice etc. Faced with these difficulties, Austin 
changes tack, analysing speech acts in more detail.
2.2. Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts
When we say that "to say something is to do something" as an attempt to make the 
performative/constative distinction, we have not yet been very precise. After all, the 
mere act of speaking is clearly the performance of an action. We can immediately make 
three distinctions within the act of making an utterance.
1. The phonetic act: this is the production of phonetic sounds.
2. The phatic act: this is the production of lexically/syntactically constrained
elements.
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3. The rhetic act: this is the production of a meaningful utterance, raising questions
of sense and reference.
For example:
( a ) 'he said "the cat is on the mat"' 
reports a phatic act;
( b ) 'he said the cat was on the mat' 
reports a rhetic act.
The act of saying something, which comprises the phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts, is 
termed by Austin a locu tlo na ry  act. Note that a locutionary act could be either a 
performative or a constative (ie, it is not the carrier of this distinction).
Austin proposes to call the performance of a speech act in saying something, as distinct 
from the locutionary act a l saying something, an I l lo c u t io n a ry  act. Thus an 
illocutionary act could be a request, a warning, a command, a verdict, (or a statement).
We may ask questions such as "what was the illocutionary force of his utterance ?". 
Answers might include "It was a warning/ a question/ a comment" etc. Note the contrast 
with the question "what was the meaning of his utterance ?", which we would answer in 
terms of the utterance's sense or reference4.
Austin finally notes that the results of an illocutionary act are also of consequence. 
People will be warned, informed; answers, comments or physical (and non-linguistic) 
actions may be forthcoming. The further act (collection of consequences) which is 
consequent upon the illocution is called by Austin the perlocutlonary act: typically it 
is beyond the control of the utterer, unlike the locutionary and illocutionary acts.
Hence the perlocutlonary effect associated with the utterance "it's charging" was perhaps 
that the guy in the field was alerted to the situation of the oncoming bull, and then ran.
Austin devotes some efforts to finding tests which distinguish between sentences 
expressing illocutionary acts, and those expressing perlocutlonary acts. For example,
(a ) "In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him"
The use of mirf here expresses an illocutionary act, that of threatening.
( b ) "By. saying I would shoot him I alarmed him".
The use of "by" here expresses the perlocutlonary effect of him becoming alarmed.
4 The semantics of natural language expressions was only imperfectly understood at the 
time Austin was writing. Today, questions of the meaning of utterances are analysed in 
frameworks such as Barwise and Perry's Situation Semantics, or Montague's intensional 
logic. Natural language semantics is consequently somewhat less imperfectly understood.
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Unfortunately, Austin finds counterexamples to these simple tests: eg I n  saying x you 
were making a mistake" - by hypothesis, "in" introduces an illocutionary act, but 
making a mistake is not to perform an illocutionary, or even a locutionary act.
Having established the lack of any obvious textual distinction (the whole speech situation 
is implicated in the distinction), Austin seeks to bring his two styles of analysis 
together. What does the analysis of the various forms of locutions have to say about the 
performative/constative distinction ?
Recall that Austin initially identified the distinction thus:
(1  ) A performative does something, rather than savs something.
( 11) A performative is "happy” or "unhappy", rather than true or false.
On (i): our analysis has shown clearly that performatives are classified as illocutionary 
acts; but are constatives also illocutionary acts ? Austin suggests they are, because the 
same analysis of felicity conditions can be made for constatives as for other illocutionary 
acts (eg did uptake occur ? Was the statement contextually relevant ?), just as long as 
we understand that we are dealing with the uttered statement in a speech situation, not 
the decontextualised sentence in a text.
On (ii): the question of the truth conditions of a locutionary act are much less simple in 
real life than in logic. Consider the statement "France is hexagonal” (look at a map). For 
some purposes, such a rough and ready statement is perfectly adequate (ie true), for 
other totally misleading (ie false). As Austin says "It is a rough description; it is not a 
true or a false one" (per se).
On this basis, truth or falsity (in some highly contextualised way) can be ascribed 
equally to a number of illocutionary acts (eg warnings have content which can be true or 
false). Hence the distinction between constatives and performatives is nothing like so 
dear-cut as was first proposed.
Austin concludes that with the constative utterance, we are really concentrating upon the 
locutionary aspects, and in particular upon the rhetic aspect (ie the sense/reference) of 
the speech act. By contrast, with the performative utterance, we are mainly concerned 
with its illocutionary force, abstracting from questions of correspondence with the facts 
(such questions will arise in the felicity conditions).
Austin in fact considered the "doctrine” of the performative/constative distinction to 
stand in relations to his theory of locutionary/illocutionary acts as a special theory to a 
general theory.
3 . Searle's speech-act theory
In his book "Speech Acts” [Sea69], John Searie, who had been a student of Austin's, 
attempted to analyse in detail the structure of illocutionary acts. Adopting an analogy 
with playing a game, he compared the endeavour to that of a chess player who has learnt 
the game in a craft-sense, but who wishes to determine the rules of chess explicitly. We
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can ail use language appropriately: Searle wishes to uncover the underlying rules.
3.1. The illocu tionary act
Searle’s analysis of Illocutionary acts takes the form of rules, grouped under four 
headings: propositional content; preparatory; sincerity; and essential. Thus taking as his 
example the case of making a promise, he undertakes to establish rules constituting the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the case of: "a speaker S uttering a sentence T in 
the presence of a hearer H” to amount to: "S successfully promising p to H \
3.1.1. Propositional Content Rules
The rules here ensure that the utterance of T must express the proposition p (by virtue 
of T’s denotation), and that It must be an appropriate proposition for the embedding 
illocutionary act: (eg in a promise, p must refer to some future act A which S is 
promising to do).
3.1.2. Preparatory Rules
The rules here establish that the social context is appropriate for the illocutionary act to 
take place. For example, in the case of promising, the rules are that H would prefer S 
doing the future act A to his not doing A; and that S believes H would prefer his doing A 
to his not doing A. Also, it must not be obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the 
normal course of events (else why bother promising).
3.1.3. S incerity  Rules
These are "no cheating" rules, capturing the fact that the speech act has to be correctly 
anchored to (anticipated) social realities if mutual understanding between S and H is to 
be possible. In the case of promising, the rule is that S must actually intend to do A.
3.1.4. Essential Rules
The essential rules capture the fact that in a linguistic encounter, S enters into a 
specific engagement, so that H can rely upon him. This carries the notion of incurring a 
mutually agreed obligation. Thus in promising,
( I ) S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A, and
( i i ) S intends to produce in H the knowledge that the utterance of T is to count as 
placing S under such an obligation, and S also intends H to recognise S's 
intention.
Condition (ii) here expresses the Gricean conditions [Gri57, 69].
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3.2. A taxonomy of illocutionary acts
In [Sea75] Searie defined twelve dimensions along which illocutionary acts could be 
classified. He was then able to identify five significant clusters within the resulting 
taxonomic space to create a taxonomy of illocutionary acts. His classification is not 
without Interest, and will be briefly reviewed here, in terms of the most significant 
dimensions, and the resulting taxonomy.
3.2.1. Illocu tionary point dimension
This dimension corresponds to the essential conditions mentioned above. The illocut­
ionary point of an illocutionary act identifies its purpose (to state how the world is, to 
persuade someone else to do something etc).
3.2.2. Direction of f it  between world and word dimension
For example, when you hypothesise that p, the direction of fit is (to fit the) words to 
world: if there Is a mismatch, you change the words. When you request that p, the 
direction of fit is the other way around, (to fit the) world to words: if there is a 
mismatch, you change the world. The direction of fit is related to the propositional 
content of the illocutionary act.
3.2.3. Expressed psychological state dimension
This categorises the speaker's psychological state implicated in the illocutionary act - 
belief, intention, desire, pleasure ("I thank you for ..."), etc. It corresponds to the 
sincerity condition mentioned above.
3.2.4. Searle's Taxonomy
Searie considered these three dimensions to be the most important in defining his 
taxonomy, but he also mentioned a number of others. These included differences in 
strength, capturing the difference between "I suggest we go to the movies” and ”l insist 
we go to the movies”; differences in status - if mother asks child ”Please be quiet” 
this has different force to child asking mother the same thing, etc.
Given these dimensions, Searie then proposed a taxonomy consisting of five basic 
categories of illocutionary act as follows. The taxonomy (contra [Lev83 p.240]) is 
justified by the possible directions of fit, as shown.
Name D esc rip tio n  Direction o f f it
” Assertives: tell people how things are word to world
* Directives: try to get them to do things world to word
* Commissives: commit ourselves to doing things world to word
* Expressives: express our feelings and attitudes neither
* Declarations: changes result from our utterances both
The paper goes into considerable detail about how these five categories are positioned in
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the twelve dimensional space of Searle's taxonomic space for illocutionary acts.
3.3. Illocu tionary Logic
In [SV85], Searle and Vanderveken proposed a logic of illocutionary acts based upon a 
decomposition of Illocutionary force into 7 components (based upon the taxonomic 
dimensions just outlined). These seven components were:
* illocutionary point
* degree of strength
* mode of achievement (referring to the role of speaker)
* propositional content
* preparatory conditions
* sincerity conditions
* degree of strength of sincerity conditions
The logic itself is far too complicated to summarise here. Its basic flavour comes across 
as rather Montagovian, with primitive sets of speakers, hearers, time points, places of 
utterances, a space of possible worlds, propositions associated with functions from 
possible worlds to truth values, psychological states as functions which take individuals 
and times and propositions and worlds to truth values, etc.
The seven components of illocutionary force are then constructed as cartesian products 
and function types over these basic sets (plus the integers).
A comment from Werner is interesting. "As Searle and Vanderveken admit, they have no 
semantics for the two most central features in the definition of (illocutionary) force, 
namely, the (illocutionary) point, and the direction of fit of the speech act. Instead, they 
leave these notions primitive and unanalysed. That, however, amounts to leaving the 
notion of force an unanalysed concept. A proper theory of force requires a theory of 
intention." [Wer88],
Werner continues "On our view, the meaning of the speech act is best understood If we 
understand how the speech act is meant to influence the cognitive states of the 
conversants." [Wer88 ibid].
4. The Analysis of Conversation
Language in use is not the one-sided utterance of statements by speakers; it is 
conversation. The two major approaches to the study of conversation are identified by 
Levinson, [Lev83 chapter 6], as Discourse Analysis and Conversation Analysis5.
Discourse Analysis typically attempts to extend the speech-act style of analysis to whole 
conversation. There is a certain plausibility to this: "questions tend to be followed by 
answers; greetings by greetings; offers by acceptances or refusals; apologies by 
forgivings, and so on": [Lev81 p. 474]. A practical system based on this idea is the 
Coordinator, of Winograd and Flores, see [WF86].
5 But see also the style of text-based analysis of conversation developed in (eg) the domain 
of the Watergate tapes by Linde and Goguen in [LG78].
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In fact upon closer Inspection, large-scale difficulties begin to arise. For example, 
utterance units often do the job of more than one speech act, as in: "Would you like 
another drink V , which can be simultaneously a question and an offer.
Another problem is an utterance (eg "Could you pass the salt ?") which in its surface 
form Is suggestive of one speech act • a question, in fact functions as another • a request 
for action. The underlying (and intended) Illocutionary force associated with the 
utterance is called an Indirect speech act within the paradigm of speech act theory. 
Attempts to handle it within the paradigm have generated an extensive sub­
literature6.
In a more global sense, when conversation is looked at in detail, it does not appear to be 
particularly constructed from well-defined adjacency pairs such as "question-answer"; 
in fact there is enormous flexibility in scope for responses. Consider:
Q What does Joe do for a living ?
A1. Do you need to know ?
A2. Oh, this and that.
A3. I've no idea.
A4. What's that got to do with it ?
A5. He doesn't.
And so on. (From [Lev81 p. 483]).
Levinson argues that there is a sense in which conversation, as a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, is itself under-analysed. The recent discipline of Conversation Analysis 
attempts to remedy this by a rigorously empirical analysis of large corpora of recorded 
conversations. Perhaps surprisingly, significant generalisations have emerged over the 
resulting complexes of data.
Particularly important is the notion of turn-taking, in which one speaker stops talking 
and another continues the conversation. In some cases, the inter-speaker gaps are of the 
order of microseconds [Lev83 p. 296], showing sophisticated mechanisms at work in 
speaker coordination. Conversation Analysis sees significance in the way in which 
speaker scheduling is determined locally and contextually, organised by what is termed a 
local management system. One of the early achievements of Conversation Analysis has 
been to unveil some of the non-obvious properties of such a system.
Another important concept pioneered by Conversation Analysis is that of preference 
organisation. Unlike speech-act based Discourse Analysis, Conversation Analysis notes 
the enormous variety of continuations available to the conversation participant. All is 
not chaos however, because there are very distinct uniformities characterised by the 
notions of preferred and dispreferred responses.
6 In other paradigms such as Conversation Analysis (see further on), the problem of 
"indirect speech acts” is seen as an artifactual problem of Speech-Act Theory. The phenomenon 
is analysed instead in terms of (eg) pre-requests: for details see [Lev83 p. 356].
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A preferred response to a request for example is a statement registering compliance. A 
dispreferred response is a non-compliance which will be marked by features such as a 
slight delay in replying, introductory particles such as "ah", or "weir, together with 
further complex components expressing the non-compliance, giving reasons etc.
Conversation Analysis devotes a good deal of effort to systematising such conversational 
regularities, and its success in so doing is only hinted at in the remarks made here, see 
[Lev83 chapter 6] for details. Conversation Analysis is not however (and is not intended 
to be) a foundational theory.
As discussed in the introduction of this section, a foundational theory of conversation 
would have to show how its structure and process derived from the efforts of intentional 
agents to manage their social relationships. Although linguists such as Levinson are clear 
about the utility of such an approach [Lev83 p. 44], the natural home of such a style of 
analysis is not linguistics, but Al and cognitive science, to which I now turn.
5. Al-based Theories of Dialogue
In [AP80], Allen and Perrault unveil a quasi-formal scheme for analysing conversation 
in the domain of an information booth at Union Station, Toronto (based upon transcripts 
of conversations between members of the public (patrons) and the information booth 
clerk). The conversations are about trains, destinations, platforms and times, and as 
might be expected from such a heavily contextual situation, conversations tend to be 
terse:
Q The 3.15 train to Windsor ?
A. Gate 10.
How is context to be represented and reconstructed, how are dialogue acts to be 
represented, and how are context and dialogue to be brought together to produce a 
computationally efficacious model of dialogue ?
Allen and Perrault's suggestion is that context is organised in the form of plans which 
may be ascribed to patrons of the booth (in other words, plans express the intentionality 
of the patrons). Since the plans are implicit, they have to be reconstructed from 
evidence in the form of the utterance of the patron. Allen and Perrault analyse the speech 
acts of the patrons in terms of pre and post conditions over the cognitive states of the 
conversation participants, and then use this information to determine what plans might 
be blocked by lack of the information being requested (implicitly, or indirectly) in the 
patron's utterance.
Thus in the Q-A pair above, given that a patron wishes to board a train, the information 
required to successfully accomplish this is the tuple:
<gate, time, train-destination>
The only point in asking is if one or more of these components is unknown. Given an 
utterance specifying the time (3.15) and the train destination (Windsor), the 
implication is that the gate information is lacking, hence the response "Gate 10”.
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The work is operationally-oriented, concentrating upon the design of a system capable of 
replicating the information booth clerk's helpfully-terse responses. The deeper 
theoretical questions are only alluded to7. A more theoretically-inclined intentional 
analysis, still within a Searlean speech-act paradigm however can be found in Allen and 
Perrault's companion paper [PA80].
A significant step forward has been taken recently however in work by Cohen and 
Levesque in their paper "Rational Interaction as the Basis for Communication" [CL87c]. 
This work follows on from the analysis of intention already discussed in section 2.3 
above, using their logic to formalise the complex transformations in the beliefs and 
intentions of dialogue participants engendered by speech acts such as requesting and 
informing. They make two points of interest:
* it is possible to recover Searle's conceptual analysis of speech acts (felicity
conditions, propositional content) as theorems from their axiomatic analysis.
* They believe that the mechanisms of cognitive and behavioural coordination
work through mutual recognition of the beliefs and intentions of dialogue
participants, and that there is no need for explicit recognition of 
illocutionary force per se by the participants.
On this analysis, speech acts express important conceptual uniformities in a competence 
analysis of language, but need not be part of the operational machinery of language use at 
the performance level.
6. Discussion
The analysis of discourse is a multi-layered affair, with constraints derived 
constitutively from the foundational requirement that dialogue sustain multi-agent 
interaction, right up to the detailed analyses of constructions characteristic of 
historically and socially localised features of natural languages. No extant theory 
separates out the various levels of abstraction in a manner which both exposes the 
essential structure of language, and which also accounts for the greater part of the 
phenomena.
Conversation Analysis has done a good job in identifying the subtleties of actual language 
use, while the intentional analyses within Al have begun to address the foundational 
issues. Much further work remains to be done.
7 Note that it is very important to separate out a theoretical analysis of "plan management", 
which accounts for why the dialogues have the form they do, from the provision of a procedure 
for generating adequate responses to patron queries. The former is a competence model, the 
latter a performance model, which may be quite shallow by comparison.
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CHAPTER 3: APPROACHES TO AGENT DESIGN
3.1: In troduction
Chapter 3 is the main original technical contribution of this thesis. A family of models 
of synchronous interacting automata is developed, which are capable of modelling 
arbitrary computational behaviour. The intent however is to model cognitively 
interesting objects, agents, interacting with their environments.
In section 3 .2, a very basic model is introduced, and it is shown how to design an object 
which can learn about the properties of the other objects in its environment.
Section 3.3 extends the model, showing how to implement objects which not only learn 
about their environments, but also act upon it. The scenario analysed is the game 
"scissors cut paper".
If we want a theory of cognitive systems, we need to introduce formal languages which 
describe them at a level higher than the "design stance" (cf [Den78]). In section 3.4, 
the "scissors cut paper" model is re-analysed in terms of an epistemic-temporal logic, 
which is interpreted over the interacting objects introduced in 3.3. Although such an 
interpretation can be made to work, and key properties of the game can be derived 
formally in the logic, the deeper mysteries of the role of epistemic operators, and the 
genesis of the possible-worlds semantics remain.
Section 3.5 takes another example, that of a psychological experiment of an agent in a 
Skinner Box, seeking to attain rewards and avoid shocks. The experiment is given an 
object-model as before, although now the object-model is fully elaborated into the 
notion of "SRS-model", SRS standing for "Synchronous Reactive Systems". The SRS- 
model is used as the intended interpretation of a purely temporal logic, APTL, the intent 
being to examine what can't be said in the absence of intentional operators for belief and 
desire. It is shown how the temporal logic can state a rather coarse-grained behavioural 
model, but fails to account for cognitive features of the agent, such as making errors, and 
learning.
In section 3.6, a full attack is made upon the problem of introducing intentional 
operators, via the idea of an SRS-space of SRS-worlds. It is shown how the belief and 
desire attributions characteristic of taking the "intentional stance" [Den78, Den87J 
flow naturally from the agent's ability to perceive evidence from the world and to 
combine it with conditional constraints in order to determine the concrete constraints 
holding locally. The formal treatment shows how the combination of perception and 
attunement to conditional constraints on the part of the agent induces a space of possible 
SRS-worids together with accessibility relations, and that a logic, ECTL, encapsulating 
these structures is capable of predicting action based upon learning. This produces a 
finer-grained competence model for a learning, perceiving agent.
Section 3.7 extends the analysis by analysing the distinctions we intuitively make 
between agents and non-agent objects, considering cases where agent perception is 
partial and/or non-veridical, and by examining the implications of the work for topics
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such as plausible reasoning and the problems of logical omniscience.
Finally in section 3.8, the direction of further research is considered. The agents of this 
thesis are, in Dennett's language, first-order intentional systems [Den78 p. 273]. They 
may be appropriately described intentionally, but they themselves do not explicitly 
model other agents in their environments as intentional systems1. It seems clear 
however that for meaningful communication to take place between agents, such explicit 
higher-order intentionality is essential (cf Grice's theory of non-natural meaning 
[Gri57, Gri69]). It is also taken by Dennett to be part of the conditions of personhood 
(q.v. in [Den78 p. 267], a concept it would be very pleasant to be able to analyse. Hence 
further work Is planned in these areas.
To sum up: there are two main achievements of this thesis. Firstly, it is shown how to 
set up a model of interacting automata, and demonstrate how to use it as the intended 
interpretation for languages with temporal, epistemic and conative operators. Secondly, 
it Is shown how a possible worlds semantics for these operators can be deduced from 
design and perceptual constraints, in contrast to conventional treatments, which merely 
postulate sets of possible worlds and the accessibility relations over them as model 
parameters.
Most of the work reported here has been published as follows.
* A somewhat more polemical version of section 3.2 was published in 
ECAI-84 as [See84];
* sections 3.3 and 3.4 are extended from a paper in ECAI-88 [See88];
* an earlier version of section 3.5 was published in shortened form in 
AISB-89 [See89J;
* a paper, co-authored with Hamid Lesan, which deals with "dialogue- 
based hoi" is published in the Proceedings of the 3rd IEE Colloquium 
on Format Methods in HCI (December 1989). This paper derives in 
part from work reported in sections 2.7 and 3.8.
A paper was published in the Cybernetics conference in 1986 [See86] which tried to 
define the notion of "agent" (as a cognitively interesting object) in a formal way. The 
over-complexities of that paper were only overcome by the realisation that properties 
which are very hard to state clearly in a "possible-worlds" language can be very 
elegantly expressed in modal logic (cf Moore's remarks reported in section 2 .2). This 
realisation is reflected here in the transition between sections 3.3 and 3.4.
1A system which did model agents in its environment intentionally would, in Dennett's 
parlance, be a higher-order intentional system.
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3.2: A MODEL OF INTERACTING AUTOMATA
1. In troduction
in this section i discuss a straightforward model of interacting objects, and show that the 
model is suitable for analysing a very simple cognitive agent - an agent which is capable 
of building predictively-efficient hypotheses about the other objects in its environment.
An object is taken to be a pair, consisting of a current state and a nextstate function. The 
latter takes as argument all the object-states in the environment (including its own) 
and from this information computes the very next state of its object. Each nextstate 
function may be applied in parallel so that the whole environment moves into its next 
state, the application being organised by an underlying "next" function.
2. Objects and environments
We call the type of object states OBJSTATE and the type of nextstate functions NSF. The 
type of objects and environments (containing m objects) is then given by:
NSF -  OBJSTATE x ... x OBJSTATE -> OBJSTATE (m times in domain)
OBJECT « OBJSTATE x NSF
ENVIRONMENT *  OBJECT x... x OBJECT (m times).
We often need to talk about the state of an environment, so we define environment states
ENVSTATEm = OBJSTATE x... ... x OBJSTATE (m times).
ENVSTATEm.-j = OBJSTATE x... x OBJSTATE (m-1 times).
Variables x, xs will range over object states; f, fj over nextstate functions; p, pit q over 
objects; e, ej over environments; y, yj over environment states.
3. Activating the Environment
The way in which change is modelled in an environment of objects is by actually applying 
the nextstate functions. This is done by the function next.
Let e ■ [(x1f f j )  (xm, fm)] be an environment. Then we define
next: ENVIRONMENT -> ENVIRONMENT
—
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next ((x,, f-i) (xm, fm)] -  [ ( f i ( x ,  xm), »,)....... ( ^ ( x ! .........xm), fm)].
If we are given an initial environment state e = (p-j ) then we can express the
history of the environment as the sequence:
[e, next(e), next(next(e)), next(next(next(e))), ...].
The indefinite recursion representing the activity of the environment is initiated by 
applying the function g defined by g(e) -  g (next(e)).
3.1. Example
Consider an environment consisting of two objects (x j.fj)  and (x2 ,f2). Let 
e0 *  [ (2 , ^ ) ,  (1,f2 ) l  
and let fj (x<|,X2 ) -  x1 + x2, f2 (x j, X2) « - x2 . Then we have
e! -  next(e0) -  1 (3 ,^ ) , (1,f2 ) l  
6 2 - 0 6 x 1 ( 6 ! ) -  [ ( 4 , f ), (2,f2 )]
etc.
4. Using these ideas to define a simple learning system
We now move on to the task of defining a distinguished cognitive object X. Let e be an 
environment, and let X be an object in e. Then we require:
1: that starting from no initial information about e, X should acquire through 
observation the ability to predict e's behaviour,
2: that for each property of each object in e, X should determine as far as possible, 
which properties are implicated in its computation. Intuitively this is equivalent to 
unravelling the causality underlying the observations. (The notion of property is defined 
below).
Let x be the state of X, and f be its nextstate function, so that X -  (x, f).
4.1. Overview of the system architecture
The architecture of X is illustrated in the figure.
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The mode of operation of X in an environment e is as follows:
( i ) compare INPUT and PREDICTIONS to create an error-report ERROR,
( i i ) update HYPOTHESES on the basis of INPUT and ERROR, and 
( i i I ) use HYPOTHESES to make new PREDICTIONS.
The key issues turn out to be the handling of representations and the modifying of 
hypotheses: we start by looking at representation.
4.2. Properties and the ir representations
Let OBJECTNAMES be a set of identifiers suitable for naming objects.
We will assume that the state of an object is actually a tuple of values, of various types. 
That is, we will assume we can write
OBJSTATE *= PROPS} x ... x PROPSp for some p.
These sets PROPSj will be called properties. Since we need to call these sets something, 
we introduce a set PROPERTYNAMES of names for them (eg PROPERTYNAMES could be 
{location, weight, velocity, ...}). We can then describe the value v of an object a's 
property s as the triple (a, s, v), which I shall call a rep. Reps are of type REP, defined 
thus:
REP -  OBJECTNAMES x PROPERTYNAMES x VALUES, 
where VALUES = u  PROPSj, i e [1..p].
We introduce reps as values which the agent X is going to build (using some 
representation function) as part of its modelling of the environment.
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4.3. Representation function
We make two assumptions about the representation function (abusing notation slightly): 
A1: it is of type ENVSTATEm_-j REP-set1, and 
A2 : it is total and injective over ENVSTATEm.1.
If we relax A1, permitting the domain to be ENVSTATEm, we admit the possibility of X 
recursively creating representations (and subsequently hypotheses) about its own 
properties, and this can create (interesting) self-referential problems.
If we relax A2, we allow X only partial information about the environment state and/or 
inadequate resolution over the various properties of objects in the environment state. 
This situation is easier to analyse once the more idealised situation has been examined.
4.4. Hypothesis form ation
We now move on to hypothesis formation by X, introduced informally by a small 
example. From the definition of the environment, we know that each property of each 
object can vary in its own way, depending upon the antecedent values of certain 
properties of certain other objects. Supposing X observes the following rep set:
1 . {(p,a,0), (q,b,0 )} 
and a little later,
2 . {(p,a,0 ), (q,b,1)}.
Clearly we are observing two objects named p and q. Object p has a property named a and 
object q has a property named b. Since there are no other objects or properties around, 
the changing values must be functionally related.
Thus if we wish to account for the "a" property of object p, either it is constant, or it is 
a function of its own previous value, or it is a function of the previous value of the "b" 
property of q, or maybe it jointly depends upon both values.
A neater way of handling these options is to take the index set I *  {(p.a), (q,b)} 
corresponding to the rep sets observed, and then generate the powerset P as a lattice, 
partially ordered by set inclusion, (see figure).
* If X is a set, then X-set is the set of finite subsets of X.
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{ (P» a), (q, b ) }
/  \
{ (P> ®) J { (q, b ) }
\  /
{}
This gives us aii the possible domains for each of our hypotheses. Clearly we can work on 
hypotheses for each property in parallel: for simplicity here we only consider the 
property indexed by (p,a).
So an hypothesis turns out to be a set of elements of type REP-set x REP correlating 
existing observations of property values with an expected next property value. We 
write the elements of hypotheses using an arrow N-*" to capture this predictive aspect.
We can generate four possible hypotheses structures for the property indexed by (p,a), 
corresponding to the four elements of the P lattice, and thus we have an induced 
hypothesis lattice. We build the elements of the hypothesis lattice in parallel. From our 
initial two observations we have:
H1
H2
H3
H4
10 (p.a.O)]
[{(P.a.0)} (p,a,0)]
[{(q.b.O)} -> (p,a,0)]
[{(p,a,0),(q,b,0)} -> (p,a,0)l
Clearly H1 can be ruled out, as the only function with domain the empty set is the empty 
function. Our third observation is
3. {(p,a,1), (q,b,0)},
and if we add this value to our hypotheses we get
H2 : [{(p,a,0)} (p,a,0)]
K(P»a,0)} (p,a,1)]
H3: [{(q,b,0)} -► (p.a.O)]
K(q»b,1)} (p,a,1)J
H4: [{ (p ,a ,0 )) ,(q ,b ,0 ))}  -> (p,a,0)]
[{ (p ,a ,0 )) ,(q ,b ,1 ))} (P.a,1)3
Hypothesis H2 is clearly inconsistent at this point, since it is not the graph of a function. 
Thus the only remaining candidate hypotheses are H3 and H4, of which H3 is minimal on
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the lattice.
The fourth and fifth observations are:
4. {(p,a,1), (q,b,1)},
5. {(p.a.O), (q,b,0)},
and it is straightforward to continue the process to deal with these observations.
Since observation 5 is the same as observation 1, all subsequent observations are now 
determinable.
4.5. Computational Complexity
The agent X will be maintaining n*2n distinct hypotheses if there are n distinct 
properties in the environment. To improve the space/time complexity we note that 
given a hypothesis lattice H, we are only really interested in the minimal unfalsified 
elements of Ht which we call the working set W. If we call the set of failed hypotheses at 
any particular moment F, then W is the set of minimal elements of (H - F). This can be 
computed by a backtracking algorithm. In addition, any domain information about 
constraints over object interaction can be used to further refine the hypothesis selection 
process.
4.6. Further results end implementation
The architecture of X is discussed in more detail in [See84a] where a proof that the 
system successfully meets the requirement is given. It is shown that from an initially 
empty set of lattices:
( I ) if any subset of the environment ever cycles, then X will predict that subset 
without error from then on, and
( i i )  that X can always determine a subset of the object properties actually 
determining a given property, although there may be several plausible 
candidates and X may not be able to determine which of the candidates is the 
correct subset.
The system described here was implemented in the applicative language ML [GMW79] on 
a VAX 11/780 running UNIX.
5. Discussion
This section has introduced two important ideas:
* a basic model of interacting objects suitable for modelling "realistic" environments 
in a computational way;
* the consideration of some objects having the potential to be agents, in the sense of
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this thesis - intentional systems.
5.1. Object Model
The object model presented above is oversimplified in two major respects. Firstly, it 
fails to provide a means of identifying objects as they progress through various states. 
This can be rectified by tagging each object with a unique and invariant name.
Secondly, it is an actual constraint over the agents we deal with in the "real world" that 
the states which serve to guide their actions are not public. The central nervous systems 
of biological systems, the control systems of robotic artifacts, these are perceptually 
unavailable to biological and robotic agents in the normal course of events. The model 
therefore needs to be extended to support private states, which nevertheless are part of 
the causal order for the agent's own nextstate function.
5.2. Theories vs models of theories
In the review of Situation Semantics (section 2 .6) it was noted that in "Situations and 
Attitudes", Barwise and Perry had provided a model of a theory of situations, rather than 
a theory of situations.
The model presented above, even with the extensions suggested, is a candidate model for a 
theory of agents, not such a theory itself. There is no shortage of possibilities of course 
for logics within which to state such theories - chapter 4 reviews a number of them. 
Nor is it too difficult to see what is required of such a logic: it needs to be able to model 
time, in particular a linear discrete time, and behavioural attributes; and it may need to 
model attitudes such as "knows", "wants", in so far as it is attempting the detailed 
specification of agent behaviour.
The problem is that such logics are typically given semantics (possible worlds, or 
syntactic formulae) which are very far removed from the kinds of object model 
described here. The next two sections describe a first attempt to extend the object model, 
and to use it as a domain of interpretation for an epistemic temporal language.
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3.3: EXTENDING THE OBJECT MODEL
1. in troduction
In this section I extend the object model of the previous section to consider a more 
sophisticated agent design. The agent of the previous section could learn about its 
environment, but could not act in any way. In this section I consider an agent which both 
learns about its environment, and also acts upon its knowledge to attain its objectives. As 
a practical example, I have chosen to model agents playing the game of "scissors cut 
paper".
The game of "scissors cut paper" is played as follows. There are three possible hand 
configurations, which respectively model a pair of scissors, a sheet of paper, or a stone. 
In a game, two players each secretly choose one of the three possibilities, and then 
simultaneously exhibit their choice to the other player.
The winner of a game is determined as follows:
( I ) scissors beats paper (it can cut it);
( i i ) paper beats stone (it can wrap it);
( I i i ) stone beats scissors (it can blunt it).
A match is a sequence of games, and the winner of a match is the player who has won 
more games.
The game is usually considered to involve iterated intention. Arguments of the form "my 
opponent won the last game with scissors against my paper, she will believe I will play 
stone so she will play paper, hence I will play scissors" are typical; the game being 
considered to be essentially about strategy inference.
In the first part of this section I will construct a formal model of the game, and show that 
on a plausible model of what it means to "second-guess your opponent", rather than an 
infinite collection of more and more deeply nested strategies emerging, there are in fact 
only six.
I will then present a design for a parameterised agent capable of playing the SCP-game. 
An implementation is described, together with a description of matches played between 
various levels of machine-agent and human players.
2. Defining the SCP game
I will call the model SCP. An SCP match is then a sequence of games between two players 
(A and B): the winner at a game t is the player who has won most games In the first t 
games. I will say A beats B if, after a certain number of games, A wins thereafter. A 
game is described in the following terms.
Write the moves "scissors", "paper", and "stone" (as "rock"), as the set D *  {S, P, R},
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with a relation "is-beaten-by\ V  such that 
P < S, S < R, R < P.
As can be seen, this is a circular ordering.
A game is a pair (x,y) : D x D, where x and y are simultaneously chosen. I will suppose 
A chooses x, and B chooses y; we say x is A's move, y is B's move. If x > y then A wins: if 
x < y then B wins: if x = y then it is a draw. Examples of games are (S,P), (R,R) etc.
Since SCP is entirely symmetrical between the two players, there can be no guaranteed 
winning strategy (because if there were, both players could adopt it, and both be sure of 
winning, which is impossible). However, it is possible to identify a family of strategies 
based on the iterated modelling of the strategy of the opposing player. We start by 
modelling the base case of a fixed strategy.
2.1. An SCP-0 strategy
Define a classification function "c", on games from A's point of view:
i
c (x,y) = win if x > y; 
c (x,y) « draw if x = y; 
c (x,y) « lose if x < y.
We let c be a variable ranging over C «= {win, draw, lose} (letting context decide the 
correct meaning for c) and define a function "opp" so that
opp(win) *  lose, -
opp(draw)= draw,
opp(lose) -  win.
In a particular situation, (win, draw or lose), a player may choose to persist in her 
current move, to play the next move "up" in the ordering hierarchy, or to play the next 
move "down" in the ordering hierarchy.
For example, suppose a game is the draw (S,S), then if A plays the same, then A will 
piay S as the next move; if A decides to play up, then A will play R, and if A decides to 
play down, then A will play P. (B's choices can be described in similar terms).
We can formalise this notion by defining the set of functions
F = {up, down, same},
where up, down, same are defined by giving their graphs:
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up -  {(P -> S). (R -> P), (S -> R)}
down -  {(S -> P), (P -> R), (R -> S)}
same *  {(S -> S), (P -> P), (R -> R)}.
To reconstruct the choice of functions in F a player made, we let fun(x, y) « the f e F 
such that f(x) *  y, so that for example;
fun(S, R) = up, 
fun(S, S) *  same, 
fun(S, P) -  down.
An SCP-0 strategy-map for A is then a mapping:
M -  [(win, g-|)v (draw, g2), (lose, g3)], 
where g-|, g2, ga e F.
This is interpreted to mean that if, for example, A won this game, then A will play (g  ^
applied to A's current move) next. This can be shown on a diagram:
J01
B
y c(x,y) = win
x'
The nextmove function of a player using an SCP-0 strategy can be modelled as the
function A0 taking a strategy-map M and a game (x, y) to a move thus:
A 0 (M, (x, y)) -  let c « c (x,y) and g -  M(c) 
in g(x).
Note that mappings are treated as finite functions, and can be applied.
Supposing player B is using an SCP-0 strategy, is there a strategy that A can adopt
which is guaranteed to beat it ? Such a strategy exists, and is called an SCP-1 strategy.
2.2. An SCP-1 strategy
Suppose that B is following an SCP-0 strategy-map M', described from A's point of 
view, so that
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M' -  [(win, f ^ ,  (draw, f2), (lose, f3)], iU ’ fa  f3 e F)»
then it might be thought that all A has to do is implement a strategy-map something like
M = [(win, up o f-j), (draw, up o f2), (lose, up o f3)],
where "oH is functional composition and we need to make an adjustment so that A can 
apply its functions to its own moves, not those of its opponent.
However, although A can safely assume B is operating an SCP-0 strategy, it is not the 
case that the strategy-map is itself known to A, it therefore has to be inferred.
It might appear that A should adopt the straightforward strategy of building B's 
strategy-map M' by observation, and then constructing M as shown above. However, it is 
not necessary to build an explicit model of M', as we shall see. Suppose we have the 
following scenario:
A B
xp yp c = c(xp, yp)
J'
y (= f(yp))
We can deduce that B*s strategy-map includes (opp c, f). We therefore see that in games 
classified by A as c, A should play (up o f) yp. This can be re-expressed in terms of A's 
previous move xp in the following way.
(x)
i
A
xp
U£_
B
yp c = c(xp, yp)
y (- f(yp))
In this diagram, x is the move which A actually played, and (x) is the move A should play
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to win; h is fun(xp, y). In the same way, g is the function A actually applied to xpi and g' 
is the function which should have been applied in order to win. So, g* « up o h.
A's strategy now is to start with a default strategy-map M defined arbitrarily as eg 
M -  [(win,g-j), (draw,g2), (lose,g3)].
Records of the last two games played, (xp,yp) and (x,y) are kept.
A then computes c « c (xp,yp) and the function h which maps xp to y. A can then update 
M with the map element (c, up o h). Because B has a fixed strategy, A will never 
subsequently lose a game in which c holds.
We can summarise the above argument by modelling the nextmove function of an SCP-1 
player by the function A-j, taking strategy-maps and previous games and games, to new 
strategy maps and next moves, defined thus:
A i(M , (xp,yp), (x,y)) -  let M' *  newmap(M, (xp,yp), (x,y)) in
let x’ *  A0 (M', (x,y)) in
(M\ x').
newmap (M, (null,null), (x,y))= M. -  initial game.
newmap (M, (xp,yp), (x.y)) -  let c = c (xp,yp)
and h « fun xp y in 
M overwritten by (c, up o h).
Note that Ai updates its own strategy-map M, and then applies A0 to compute its next 
move. An obvious optimisation suggests that whenever A wins game (x,y), then it should 
not bother to update M, since it was obviously doing the right thing in game (xp,yp).
3.3. An SCP-2 strategy
We have seen how a player deploying an SCP-1 strategy can quickly beat an SCP-0 
strategy. Deriving a corresponding strategy which beats an SCP-1 strategy is 
straightforward. Supposing B is playing an SCP-1 strategy, the following diagram 
applies:
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A
xp
B
yp
l '
c = c(xp, yp)
m . (y)
(X) ^
B argues as follows: "A played g (xp), so I will play
(up o j)(yp) = f  (yp)" (this is an SCP-1 type argument).
Hence B's new map element is: (opp c, up o j).
A therefore argues: "I will play
(up o up o j) yp *= (up o up o g) xp = (down o g) xp".
Hence A's new map element is: (c, down o g).
2.4. The general case
The kind of argument used above is perfectly general. For each level strategy which B is 
assumed to be playing (eg SCP-0, SCP-1 etc) we can deduce the strategy-map update- 
rule which A should use to beat B. Doing so results in the following table.
B's strateay A's update rule (and strateav}
SCP-0 (c, up o h) = SCP-1
SCP-1 (c, down o g) = SCP-2
SCP-2 (c, same oh) ^ SCP-3
SCP-3 (c, up o g) = SCP-4
SCP-4 (c, down oh) = SCP-5
SCP-5 (c, same o g) = SCP-0
The results so far can be summarised thus:
1. For all i, j, an SCP-i strategy = an SCP-j strategy iff i=j mod 6;
2. For ail i, an SCP(i+1 mod 6) strategy beats an SCP(i) strategy.
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These results are at first sight counter-intuitive since they indicate that rather than an 
infinite hierarchy of increasingly sophisticated "second guessing" strategies, there are 
in fact only 6, and that the apparently ultra-sophisticated strategy SCP-5 can be beaten 
by the constant strategy SCP-0 .
We can now give a more precise characterisation of what a strategy is, summarised in 
the slogan: strategy = strategy-map update-rule + strategy-map application-rule.
This definition is reflected in the following "nextmove" function for a generalised 
player, parameterised by strategy number n:[0-5].
A (n, M, (xp,yp), (x,y)) « let M' -  newmap (n, M, (xp,yp), (x,y)) in
let x' *  A0 (M\ (x,y)) in 
(M \ x').
newmap (n, M, (null,null), (x,y)) *  M. -  initial game.
newmap (n, M, (xp,yp), (x,y)) -  let c -  c (xp,yp) in
let g « fun xp x in
let h « fun xp y in
let g1 -  newg n g h in 
M overwritten by (c, g’).
newg n g h *  case n of
0 -> same o g
1 -> up oh
2 -> down o g
3 -> same o h
4 -> up o g
5 -> down o h.
3. Agent design and Implementation
Considered as a computational agent, an SCP level-n player is a 4-tuple:
(name, (level, map, xp, yp), x; f).
1. name is the name of the player - A or B.
2 . (level, map, xp, yp) is the internal state of this player.
2.1 level is the level of the player, (0-5);
2.2. map corresponds to M above;
2 .3 . Xp, yp are the previous moves of this player, and the opponent;
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3. x is the current move being played by this player (the external state);
4. f is this player's nextstate function, defined thus: 
f [name, (level, map, xp, yp), x, envstate] =
let y -  getOppMove(name, envstate) in
let (map', x') = A (level, map, (xp,yp), (x,y)) in
[(level, map', x, y), x'J.
The function getOppMove searches the environment state for a player with a different 
name from name, and returns that player's current move y.
A game starts with a player initialised to a starting move x e {S, P, R}, with xp and yp 
set to null values, and map set to an arbitrary value.
The agent computes its next move by first running the function getOppMove, which 
allows it to acquire the opponent's current move (it already knows its own current move 
since this is part of its own state). It then runs A to compute its updated map and next 
move, and then repackages the various values into its updated state.
To run a simulation requires an environment of three objects: the two players and a 
board, which keeps the score. The environment is activated by a "next' function, similar 
to that described in the previous section. This constructs the arguments for the various 
nextstate functions, applies them, and then repackages the objects with the results, to 
construct the next environment.
A human player is interfaced to a machine-agent by modifying the nextstate function of a 
"surrogate" object to operate via a terminal. The implementation was carried through in 
Common Lisp and the results itemised above were experimentally corroborated. Full 
details of the implementation are included in section 5.3.
Various individuals were persuaded to play the SCP-0, SCP-1 and SCP-5 systems. The 
SCP-0 system, surprisingly, is hard to beat (apparently even a fixed strategy is hard to 
infer from the local experience of immediately preceding games). Most people 
empirically find a winning strategy in the end however.
Beating the SCP-1 system seems beyond the competence of human players who are not 
previously acquainted with the SCP-2 strategy.
The SCP-5 system is in fact the easiest to beat, since it has the surprising property of 
adapting to lose. If the human opponent persists in entering any one of S, P or R, the 
system will adapt so that after a few games, the user always wins thereafter (note that 
playing the same move in all situations is an example of an SCP-0 strategy).
4. D iscussion
In the previous section, the learning agent X constructed a simple language of "reps" to 
describe the properties of objects. One of the reasons for choosing the more sophisticated
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problem of this section was to investigate the implications for agent structure and 
language.
In fact there are two levels of language to be concerned with here. We can analyse a 
problem in a suitable specification language, and then come up with certain conclusions 
about the required structure and components of the agents. These components however, 
in so far as they play a representational role vis-a-vis the objects in the agent's 
environment, may themselves be considered as language constituents.
In the development above, I used traditional mathematical reasoning in the problem 
analysis phase, to come up with a very simple "cognitive architecture" for the players, 
one almost totally devoid of interest from a linguistic viewpoint. This is itself an 
interesting datum, because one's intuitions might well have suggested that players 
capable of operating deeply-nested strategies would of necessity be deploying highly- 
sophisticated internal languages.
The simplicity of the agent architectures should not be considered disappointing 
however, unless one is consumed by the dogma that cognitive systems must inherently be 
characterised by an advanced formula-processing architecture. From the designer's 
point of view, it is quite pleasant to be able to conceptualise a problem in cognitive 
terms, yet find a simple and efficient impiementational architecture which realises it: 
examples of this phenomenon can be found in biology too, (cf the well-known case of the 
Sphex wasp, recounted in [Den78 p.65j).
In fact we have not yet succeeded in specifying the SCP problem in cognitive terms, 
despite the suggestive informal language in the treatment above. The next section 
attempts to rectify this omission by modelling the problem in an epistemic-temporal 
language, and then interpreting this language over the model derived here.
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3.4: A LOGIC WITH OBJECT SEMANTICS
1. In troduction
In this section I will formalise the mathematical model developed in the previous 
section, concentrating on those aspects of the model concerned with predicting the course 
of a match, and with characterising the knowledge of the players.
For simplicity, I will only consider matches in which a level-1 system (A) plays a 
level-0 system (B). These will be called SCP matches in this section.
If we were only interested in formally deriving the states of future games from initial 
conditions, then a propositional temporal logic would be adequate. However, in this 
section we are also interested in describing how A's state of knowledge changes, and 
deducing that on the basis of what A knows and learns, that A will eventually always win. 
We therefore require a (propositional) epistemic temporal logic.
The logic we shall define has some unusual features: in particular we will need to 
explicitly include the states of the agents A and B in the possible world semantics. The 
constraints about how those states change, which we examined in the previous section, 
will emerge as "felicity conditions" upon the epistemic and temporal accessibility 
relations.
As a result we shall be able to make a connection between the possible-worlds treatment 
of the knowledge of an agent, and what is going on in the agent's state.
2. The Language L-SCP.
2.1. Symbols
1. W, D, L are constants describing game-classifications: win, draw, lose.
2. S, P, R are constants denoting moves: scissors, paper, rock.
3. UP, DO, SA are strings denoting the move-functions: up, down, same.
4. The sentence-letter schema pcf stands for the 18 sentence letters which might hold 
when the agent (A or B) denoted by p, in a game classified (from A's point of view) by 
c, uses the function f to compute its next move from its current move.
One instantiation of pcf would be BWUP (B plays up when A wins).
5. The sentence-letter schema Gxy stands for the 9 sentence letters which might hold 
when, in a game, A plays x and B plays y.
One instantiation of Gxy would be GSS (a scissors-scissors draw).
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6. K is a modal operator, with intended interpretation that agent A knows the proposition 
denoted by K*s argument.
7. [1 ,0, and 0  are temporal operators with intended interpretation "always” , 
"eventually” and "next".
8. We have the usual boolean connectives a, v, <->.
9. We have the usual punctuation symbols
2.2. W ell-formed form ulae
1. The sentence letters W, D, L.
2. Each of the 18 instantiations of pcf are wff
3. Each of the 9 instantiations of Gxy  are wff.
4. If S, T are wffs, then so are S a  T, S v  T, S T, S o  T.
5. If S is a wff, then so are -iS , K S, |]S, OS and OS.
2.3. Axioms and inference Rules 
All propositional tautologies.
The axioms and inference rules for the operator K will be taken to be at least those of the 
logic KT [Che80], since we shall not need to theorise concerning iterated epistemic 
operators.
The treatment of the temporal operators will assume a propositional version of the 
linear discrete-time temporal logic given in [MP81] - see page 102 for details.
The applied axioms, modelling notions of game and strategy, are introduced at the end of 
this section.
2.4. Semantics
I adopt the approach used by Robert Moore in [M008O]. Moore took possible worlds to be 
instantaneous worldstates for his purposes, and proposed two accessibility relations: one 
to cover temporal sequencing, the other to handle epistemic alternatives (see section 
2 .2 ).
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I propose to augment Moore's approach in two respects. Firstly, following suggestions 
from Hintikka and Bierwisch1, I propose to consider instantaneous worldstates as 
structured objects, constituted from player's states in the course of a match; secondly, I 
will define the accessibility relations following the scp-analysis of the previous section.
This will permit me to validly introduce a number of SCP-specific axioms which will 
permit reasoning about matches, as we shall see below.
An SCP-interpretation is a tuple M = (W, w0, s, E, V).
1. W is a set of possible worlds, where a possible world is a pair of agents (these being 
the players of the SCP-game). An agent is itself a pair, comprising its strategy map and 
its move. Only the latter is "visible" to the other agent. Formally:
W - AGENTXAGENT,
where AGENT *  MAP x D ,
where MAP » C -> F,
C = (win, draw, lose},
F *  {up, down, same},
D -  {S, P, R}.
I adopt the notation that an element of W, w, may be written as (mapa, x, y, mapp), 
understood as defining A's strategy map, A's current move, B's current move, B's 
strategy-map in a particular game. Any decoration to w (eg w', w^) wiil be indicated by 
a corresponding decoration to each element of the corresponding tuple, so that for 
example, w' «(mapa\  x\ y\ mapb').
2 . The world w0 in W models the starting game of a match, providing initial conditions.
3. < is the temporal accessibility relation, which is a discrete linear order. It captures 
the sequencing generated by "next" operating over the environments corresponding to 
possible-worlds. It is convenient to define a relation N which holds between a world and 
its immediate successor under <.
This can be made precise by the following felicity condition
1 Hintikka suggested in [Hin86 p.65] that in possible-worlds semantics, worlds need not be 
thought of as merely indices nor as alternate space-time universes: they may be tailored to 
the problem as "small worlds". The idea of having an agent's state as a possible-world 
component is hinted at in [Bie80 p.6], a similar idea, although not in a possible-worlds 
framework, can be found in [Kon86 p.33}.
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Felicity Condition 1 (FC1)
Suppose wP -  (mapaP, xp, yP, mapbP), 
w *  (mapa, x, y, mapb), 
w' -  (mapa1, x \ y', mapb')
then w N w' iff
1. mapa -  if (BwP).wP N w then newmap mapa (xP,yP) (x,y) else mapa.
2 . x’ -  Ao mapa' (x,y).
3. y’ -  Aq mapb' (y,x).
4. mapb'« mapfc,.
This says that A's strategy map gets updated by newmap, A's next move is computed by 
applying the function A0, (as is B's), while B's strategy map is invariant - because it's 
a level-0 player. Hence FC1 is making N act like a combination of the nextstate 
functions of the agents, and the next function.
4. E is the epistemic accessibility relation, which is reflexive, intuitively, E captures 
the uncertainty of A concerning what B’s behaviour is, and satisfies this additional 
condition:
Eftllcliy—Condition 2  IFC 2 )
Suppose wP « (mapaP, xp, yP, mapbP),
wP+ -  (mapap+. xP+, yp+, maphP+) , 
w -  (mapa, x, y, mapb), 
w' -  (mapa', x', y', mapb’)
then w E w' iff
1. mapa' « mapa -  A knows its own strategy map
2 . x* » x --A  knows its own last move
3. y' *  y -  A knows B's last move
4. (V wP | wP £ w, wP w). wP N wP+ ((c(yP,xP) fun (yP, yP+)J e mapb').
A knows its own strategy, and the current moves of both players. Constraint 4 captures 
the fact that once B has played a particular function in a game-ciassification, then in any 
subsequent game B is known to have that strategy. This is explained in the following 
diagram (figure 1).
Note that FC1, FC2 constrain the class of models of L-SCP to be those corresponding to 
the mathematical model of the previous section.
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figure 1
5. V is a valuation function over terms. It does not take a possible-world argument when 
applied to function or move symbols since these are rigid designators. Note that V UP = 
up, V DO *  down, V SA = same. Primitive sentence letters are given a semantics 
directly via |*.
We exhibit the semantics of L-SCP via the satisfaction relation |=. Let s be a sentence 
letter, p, q be wffs in L-SCP, m,n stand for move symbols.
01. M ,w | -  -.p iff it is not the case that M,w |= p.
02. M,w \~ p a  q iff M,w |= p and M,w j=  q.
03. M,w |*  p v q iff M,w |= p or M.w |= q.
The other boolean connectives can be defined in terms of the above.
04. M ,w |= W
05. M,w |* D
06. M,w |= L
07. M,w |-  Acf
08. M,w |* Bcf
09. M,w |= Gmn
10. M,w |* K p
11. M,w J- []p
12. M,w j= Op
13. M,w |- Op
iff x>y. 
iff x=y. 
iff x<y.
iff M,w |= c and (3 w').wNw' and x' = (V f) x.
iff M,w |= c and (3 w'j.wNw' and y* -  (V f) y.
iff (V m) = x and (V n) = y.
iff (V w'| w E w'). M,w' |= p. 
iff (V w’| w < w'). M ,w' |= p. 
iff (3 w' | w < w’). M,w' |= p.
iff (3 w '| w N  w'). M,w' |= p.
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2.5. Applied axioms
As is shown in the appendix (at the end of this section), it is straightforward to 
axiomatise an SCP-match in (the temporal part of) L-SCP. The axioms occur in families 
thus:
S G -a xi o ms
SG1. I- GPR A  AWUP A  BWSA -> O AWSA A modifies strategy.
|- GPR a  ADUP *-» O ADUP frame axiom for A.
This set of axioms, involving ail the combinations of game-outcomes and player- 
strategies, describes how A teams a winning strategy.
The specification of the SCP-game captured by such axioms will be called SG. In the 
appendix it is shown that given initial conditions, the state of any subsequent game can be 
deduced, hence a theorem-prover could be used to simulate matches.
However, when a game starts, player A does not know player B's strategy. Consider a 
specification SA which models the game from A's point of view.
SA -a x io m s
SA1. I-W  -> (BWSA -» O K BWSA), ...
SA2. |- K BWSA K Q BWSA, ... 
SA3. |- K Q BWSA -> Q K 0 BWSA, ...
SA4. I - Q K O  BWSA -*  Q (W -> 0  W), ...
These axiom families are explained in the appendix at the end of this section, where it is 
shown how it is the felicity conditions which make these axiom families valid, and that 
on the basis of these epistemic axioms, it is possible to deduce j* 0[]W, ie that A will 
eventually always win.
If this was a specification exercise, these results would be taken as useful validation. For 
the purposes of this section, however, it is more interesting to consider the relation 
between the designer-theory expressed in L-SCP and the implementation architecture of 
the previous section, as reflected in the L-SCP semantics.
In the SCP-game, the internal states of the players are causally connected to their 
actions, constraining the sequences of games which can occur. These causal constraints 
are expressed by the felicity condition on the < accessibility relation.
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From A's point of view, sequences of games count as input which constrains the kind of 
system B could be (given that significant components of B's internal state are not 
perceptually available). These design constraints are captured by the felicity condition 
on the E accessibility relation.
As evidence of B's behaviour accumulates in successive games, the collapse in the 
number of possible designs (strategies) attributable by A to B is quite dramatic. It 
follows, for example from the result proved in the appendix that though initially there 
are 27 different states B might be in, by game 6, no matter how B plays, there is just 1.
3. Discussion
This section is a good example of a division of labour between specification and 
architecture. The axiomatic specification of the SCP game allows us (as designers) to 
reason about the progress of an SCP match, and the "state of knowledge" of a player 
which is modelling its opponent in order to beat it. The players themselves, however, 
are architecturally "mere mechanisms", implementing the axioms of the designer, but 
in themselves showing no insight.
The analysis of this section succeeds in demonstrating the existence of looicaltv distinct 
levels of analysis of agents: objects which are plausibly considered intentional (hence 
my unashamed use of an epistemic operator). It does M i succeed in casting sufficient 
light upon why a designer might choose to use an intentional specification language2, 
and fails to tell a good story about the origin and ontological status of the epistemic
alternatives and the accessibility relation3.
In the next section, I turn to modelling an agent subjected to a psychological experiment, 
trying to determine how far the modelling can be progressed without resorting to 
intentional modalities (as distinct from temporal reasoning). This will then permit a 
more focused investigation into the mysteries of modelling intentionality.
2 By which I mean a specification language which includes epistemic, doxastic, conative or 
similarly intentional modalities.
3 We will see in section 3.6 that the space of epistemically possible worlds, together with 
the accessibility relationship which knits them together, is a designer's or observer's artifact 
which is nevertheless created from the perceptual and design properties of the (designed) 
epistemic subject.
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Appendix
The axioms mentioned above are described here in more detail, and the results aliuded to 
above are proved.
SG-axioms
SG1. |* GSS a  ADUP a  BDUP 0  ADDO strategy move for A.
|- GSS a  AWUP -> 0  AWUP frame axiom for A
This set of axioms takes a game and a strategy description and says what A's next strategy 
will be.
SG2. |- BWSA D BWSA. frame axiom for B.
| - .......................................  8 similar axioms.
This set of axioms takes a strategy description for B, and says that B always sticks to it.
SG3. |* GSS a  ADDO a  BDUP -» 0  GPR predicts next game, 
j - ............................................ similar axioms.
This set of axioms takes a game and a strategy description for A and B, and says what the 
next game will be.
SG4. |- BWUP + BWSA + BWDO = 1 B's win options.
j -   two further axioms for D and L.
This set of axioms defines the function options open to B in the case of a win, draw or 
loss. We could postulate similar axioms for A. Note: truth valued at 1, falsity at 0.
We now apply these axioms to reasoning about games. Suppose we make some 
assumptions about initial conditions.
010. AWUP a  ADDO a  ALUP |- AWUP a  ADDO a  ALUP. A's initial strategy.
020. BWSA a  BDUP a  BLDO |- BWSA a  BDUP a  BLDO. B's initial strategy.
030. GSS |- GSS initial game: (S,S).
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Using a natural deduction style of presentation explained below, we can now use the 
axioms to deduce:
040. Assumptions above |- O (AWUP a  ADDO a  ALUP) 030,010,SG1
050. Assumptions above j- O (BWSA a  BDUP a  BLDO) 020.SG2
060. Assumptions above j- O GPR 040,050,SG3
Recall we need to deduce the subsequent state of each player's strategy map, and its next 
move. This is trivial in the case of B, and less so in the case of A. Clearly though, we 
could now carry on this procedure to deduce the results of any subsequent game: this is 
the benefit of having full information.
t
However, suppose we put ourselves in player A's position: when a game starts, player A 
does not know player B's strategy. We consider a specification SA which explicitly 
tracks A's knowledge.
S A - a x l o m s
First we write down some axioms about how A's knowledge changes in the course of 
events.
SA1. |-W  (BWSA O K BWSA)
This set of axioms says that if a game-classification holds (W, D or L), and if B, in this 
situation applies function SA, then in the next game, A will know that B does this. SA1 
is valid due to the felicity conditions.
SA2. |- K BWSA -> K  0 BWSA
This set of axioms says that if A knows B has a strategy, then A knows B always has that 
strategy, ie A knows B is a level-0 player.
SA3. |- K Q BWSA -> Q K Q BWSA
This set of axioms says (eg) that if A knows that it's always the case that B plays the 
function "same" when the game is a win (for A), then A always know this (ie no 
forgetting).
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SA4. |-D  K Q BWSA -> 0 (W -» O W)
This set of axioms says that (eg) if A always knows that B plays the function "same" 
when the game is a win for A, then if A wins a game with such knowledge, then A will 
win the next game (because A can use its knowledge of what B does to circumvent it).
We could now analyse in detail successive games as we did in the specification SG. Here 
we shall be more ambitious, and show how on the basis of the axioms, we can 
demonstrate that player A will eventually always win (this was shown in the previous 
section).
The proof relies on three lemmas, derived by natural deduction. The rules used are listed 
on the right: those prefixed by "mp" refer to rules in [MP81], MP is Modus Ponens, a 
plus V  affixed to a rule means it is used more than once.
To prove: |- 0[] W.
Lemma .1; I- c -> o d  (c -*  o  W) (c is w ,d  or L)
Lemma-1 states that if a game-classification (W, D, L) occurs, then whenever it 
occurs again, then the next game will be a win for A.
Assume a game classified L, in which B plays D.
010. |- BWUP + BWSA + BWDO = 1 SG4
020. |- L -» (BLDO -* O K BLDO) SA1
030. |- K BLDO -> K Q BLDO SA2
040. |- K 0 BLDO -*  Q K Q BLDO SA3
050. |- D K Q BLDO -» fl (L O W) SA4
060. L |- L Ass
070. L |- BLDO-* O K BLDO 060,020,MP
080. BLDO, L j- BLDO Ass
090. BLDO, L |- O K BLDO 080,070,MP
100. BLDO, L |- O K Q BLDO 090,030,mp20,MP
110. BLDO, L |- O Q K Q BLDO 100,040,mp20,MP
120. BLDO, L |- O Q (L -> O W) 110,050,mp20,MP
130. BLDO |- L -> O Q (L -> O W) 110,060,Dis
140. j- BLDO -» (L -*  0 []  (L -* O W)) 130,080, Dis
Now, the assumption BLDO was arbitrary, we might as well have had BLUP or BLSA.
We could repeat proof lines 080-140 to deduce:
|- BLUP -> (L -> 0 [ ]  (L -> 0  W))
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|- BLSA (L OO (L -4 0  W))
Since by axiom SG4, one of these conditions must hold, then by MR we can deduce:
|* (L 0[3 (L -> 0  W)) 140,........010,MP
Now, the proof depends in no way on the assumption that the game was a loss. We could 
repeat the proof assuming a draw or a win. Hence we can conclude:
|- c -> 0 [] (c -> O W) (c is W, D or L).
Lemma 2: |- c a  Ok c -* Ok+1 W (k>0)4
Lemma-2 states that if a game-ciassification occurs, and then occurs exactly k games 
later (k > 0), then the (k+1)th game will be a win.
010. c |- c Ass
020. c |- O Q (c -» O W) 010,lemma-1 ,MP
030. c I- Ok (c -4 O W) 020,mp8+,mp7,k>0
040. c |- Ok c-> Ok+1 W 030,mp20
050. |- c a  Ok c -> Ok+1 W 040,Dis
Lem m a-3: |-W  a O 11 W -> «D W (k>0)
Lemma-3 states that if a win occurs, and then k games later (k > 0) a second win occurs, 
then eventually A will always win (in fact a stronger result is latent in the proof, that 
every subsequent game from k onwards is a win).
010. w i- w Ass
020. w I- O D (W -» O W) 010,lemma-1 ,MP,lnst
030. w, o k w I- o k w Ass,k>0
040. w, o k w I- Ok o (W -» O W) 020,mp8+
050. w, o k w I- Ok W A  Ok D (w -> O W) 030,040,A-intro
060. w, o k w I- Ok (W A  D (w ->  O W)) mp18+
070. w, o k w I- ok □ w mp35
080. w, o k w I- « D w (mp6,mp14,mp6,mp12)+
090. I- w  a o k w  -> «d w 080,Dis
4 The notation Ok means OO ... O iterated k times.
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Now, suppose we have an initial sequence of games classified thus:
[c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, ...].
a. Suppose c1, c2, c3 are all distinct, then c4 must be one of c1, c2, c3 hence by 
lemma-2, c5 will be a win. Since c5 will be the second win, lemma-3 now holds, leading 
to the result.
b. Suppose two of c1, c2, c3 are the same, and the third different. Then iet us cail the 
two classifications which are the same c, and the third x. Now, by lemma-2, after the 
second occurrence of c the next game must be a win, hence the first four games must 
have been {c, c, x, win}, with the win after the second "c \
Writing the fifth game as c5 and the sixth as c6, we can write the first six games as 
{c,x,c,win}c5,c6. Considering the possibilities for c5, it is easily seen (using lemma-2 
in the event x was a win) that c5 must be a game classification which has already 
occurred. Hence c6 will be a win, by lemma-2. Since lemma-3 now holds, the result 
follows.
c. The third case, in which c1 *  c2 ■ c3 is impossible (by lemma-2) unless they are all 
wins, In which case iemma-3 also applies, leading to the result.
To formalise this final part of the proof completely would require the introduction of the 
necessary axioms for number theory and the theory of sequences drawn from finite sets. 
Since this is of less relevance it has been omitted.
fMP811 axioms and lemmas used in proofs above
Linear discrete time temporal logic can be axiomatised in the system S4.3.1 (see 
[HC72] page 263), but the axiomatisation is not intuitive, and is not used in the proofs 
above. Of more utility are a series of lemmas listed in [MP81]: the lemmas from this 
source actually used in the proofs above are listed below: w, , w2 are formula schema.
mp6 : | = O w  -> 0 w
mp7: | = Q w ^  0  w
mp8 : |= D w -» 0 [ ]  w
m p12 : | -  0 w <-> 0 0 w
mp14: |= 0 0  w OO w
m p 1 8 :  |=  0  (w -|A  w 2 ) <-» ( O w - j a  O w 2 )
m p 2 0 :  |=  O  (w -|~ >  w 2 ) <-> (O w - | ->  O w 2 )
mp3 5 : |= □ (w-> O w) -> (w ->  []w ) -- an induction rule.
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3.5: A LOGIC FOR AGENTS AS REACTIVE SYSTEMS
1. In tro d u c tio n
In this section I continue the analysis of the interplay between object models and the 
logics which describe them. The notion of objects as named entities, with both public and 
private states, driven by nextstate functions is formalised, and (unlike in the previous 
section) the full model is taken as the semantic domain for a modal logic.
The problem analysed is that of designing an agent to operate in accordance with a 
"cognitive" specification, in a Skinner Box. The analysis of biological systems (pigeons, 
rats) in such devices has a long history in experimental psychology. Eschewing the 
complex protocols underpinning experiments in perception, memory and problem­
solving which were typically undertaken, the experiment here is a simple one: to test 
the ability of the agent to learn correlations between stimuli and responses leading to 
rewards and shocks, and to choose the former while evading the latter.
The purpose of the modelling exercise is two-fold: firstly, as mentioned, to do the 
object-model and semantics "properly"; secondly to explore the extent to which an 
adequate account can be given of non-trivial agent behaviour prior to resorting to 
explicitly Intentional descriptions1. The logic of this section contains no attitude 
operators: we shall see in a moment the class of phenomena about which we are thereby 
obligated to remain silent.
2. Experiment configuration
The Skinner box consists of two objects, a light and a rewarder. The light can be turned 
on or off, and the rewarder can give a positive output (a reward), a neutral output (it 
does,nothing) or a negative output (say, an electric shock).
The task is to design an agent which can be put into the box, and which has two possible 
actions: press, which presses a button on the rewarder, and not-press, which leaves the 
button alone. We are to assume that the agent can see the light, and that the agent is to 
prefer situations in which a reward occurs, and attempt to avoid situations in which a 
shock occurs (see figure).
figure 1
1This is of course precisely the area of debate between behaviourists and cognitive 
scientists.
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Associated with the Skinner box is a set of four rules which determines how it works. An 
example of such rules is:
1. If the light is on, and then the button is pressed, then next the rewarder will give a
reward.
2. If the light is on, and then the button is not pressed, then next the rewarder will give 
a shock.
Rules 3 and 4 deal with the outcome of the other two light-button possibilities.
I will first consider an abstract model of interacting automata, capable of modelling this 
kind of situation. Secondly I will introduce a propositional temporal logic to describe the 
experimental configuration and the objectives of the agent. Finally I will axiomatise the 
experimental setup, showing how to systematically derive the structure of an agent with 
the above properties.
3. The Synchronous Reactive Systems (SRS) Model
According to Pnuelli [Pnu86], "reactive systems are systems that cannot be adequately 
described by the relational or functional view. The relational view regards programs as 
functions (or as relations, in the non-deterministic case) from an initial state to a 
terminal state. Typically, the main role of reactive systems is to maintain an interaction
with their environments, and therefore they must be described (and specified) in terms
of their on-going behaviour".
The SRS model developed here defines a finite collection of objects which possess both 
observable and unobservable state components, and which are capable of observing and 
Interacting with each other. For formal definitions see the addendum on page 196.
The details of the SRS model are as follows. An object is a 4-tuple (n, i, x, f) where n 
is the object's name, i is its private, internal state, x is its external state, and f is its 
nextstate function.
A worldstate is a set of objects, and a world (sometimes called an SRS-world) is a 
sequence of worldstates generated by "next" (see below), the nextstate function on 
worldstates. So how does an object compute its next state ? Suppose ws is a worldstate:
ws -  {(n ,, i , , x , , f , ) (nm, im, Xm , fm)},
then the "visible to other objects" version of ws is called the "external worldstate, the
set of (name, external-state) pairs "xws":
xws -  { ( n ^ ) ......... (nm,xm)}.
Each nextstate function has access to xws, as well as to its own name, internal and
external states, and can use the information to compute its subsequent internal and
external states. Thus we can write
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\
1 <n, i, x, xws) « (i\ x').
To compute the next worldstate ws' from ws, it suffices to make each object compute its 
own next state (i', x'), and then re-assemble the name and nextstate function to give the 
next version of the object. This is what "next" does, like this.
ws *  {(n1, i1, x1f f-|)*•• ? (^pp, ipp, xm, fpp)} 
xws « {(n1t x1) (nm, xm)}
next(ws) -  {(nt , ^ ( n 1, i1, x1, xws), ^ ), ..., (nm, fm(nm , im, xa i,xws), fm)}.
The function "next" takes sets of objects structured thus: („,_ ,_ ,_ ), and appears to 
return objects structured thus: We assume an im plicit "flattening"
operation to map the latter structure back to the former. This is suppressed in the 
definitions for clarity. Note also that names and nextstate functions are invariant under 
"next".
The "external worldstate" xws is rather like an "assoc list". It is convenient to define a 
function "get" which takes a name n as key, and returns the external state of the object of 
that name, (get can also be defined over SRS-worlds to do an analogous task). Thus
( i ) get n {....,(n, x ) , ... } -  x.
( i i )  get n {.... (n, i, x, f), ...) « x.
4. Modelling the experiment configuration
A model of the Skinner box problem can be set up as follows. Let a be the agent object, let 
b be the light, and let c be the rewarder object.
4.1. The agent
The experimental configuration gives us some information about a's repertoire of 
actions, but the agent's assigned state and nextstate function are as yet undefined.
a *  (agent, i, x, f) where
i is as yet undefined, x e {press, nothing}, f(n, i, x, xws) is as yet undefined.
4.2. The light
We will assume that the light is to flash regularly. A particular implementation of this 
constraint might have the light flashing on every tenth instant, and then going off again. 
To do this it needs to keep a counter, (s), and test it. Nat is the set of natural number 
{0, 1, 2, ...}
b « (light, i, x, g) where
i e Nat, x e {on, off}, g(n,s,y,xws) = (i+1, if i=0 mod 10 then on else off).
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This light object completely ignores its environment, merely Incrementing the counter i 
in its assigned state, and setting its external state x to be on or off depending whether its 
counter is at a multiple of ten or not.
4.3. The rewarder
The rewarder object c produces output of reward, nothing or shock, depending upon 
whether the light previously flashed or not, and subsequently on whether its button was 
pressed or not. Taking the rule set presented above, c could be implemented as follows:
c -  (rewarder, (j,k), z, h) where
j -  {((on, press), reward), ((on, not-press), shock),
((off, press), shock), ((off, not-press), nothing)},
k e {on, off},
z e {reward, nothing, shock},
h(n,G,k), z, xws) -  let x -  get agent xws in ; x is agent's action
let z' -  j (k, x) ; k is previous light
in ((j, get light xws), z') ; z’ is current output.
The rewarder uses the previous external state of the light k, stored in its internal state 
(j,k), plus the current external state of the agent as observed, (x), to work out how it 
should behave (using the rules in j). It finally looks at the current state of the light and 
stores it in its internal state for next time.
5. APTL: a logic to describe SRS-worlds
In this section, I wili define a propositional temporal logic - APTL.
5.1. Syntax of APTL
1. A countable set of strings, corresponding to the usual notion of sentence letters.
2. if A, B are wff of APTL, then so are -A  (not A), A v B (A or B), A a  B (A and B),
A B (A implies B).
3. If A is a wff of APTL, then so are OA (next A), *A (immediately previously A),
OA (eventually A), []A (henceforth A).
4. Nothing else is a wff of APTL.
Formulae of APTL which do not contain instances of the operators O, 0, Q are called 
past formulae. Conversely, formulae which do not contain instances of • are called 
future formulae. Note that formulae which omit all temporal operators are both past 
and future formulae.
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5.2. Semantics of APTL
A conventional model for a propositional modal logic is a triple M *  <W,R,V> (see for 
example [Che80]). W is a set of worlds, R an accessibility relation over the worlds, and
V a valuation function assigning truth values to formulae in the various worlds. A 
formula Is then evaluated with respect to the model at a particular world w, thus if A is a 
formula, we say that M,w |= A iff A is true in M at world w.
in linear discrete-time temporal logic we may choose to think of the worlds in W as 
instantaneous worldstates. We can introduce a relation S which holds between an instant 
and its successor: R is then the reflexive-transitive closure of S, and is a total order.
It therefore makes sense to pack together the set W and the relation R into a structure 
such as a sequence. The intuition that the pair <W,R> can be profitably considered 
together, prior to the truth functional evaluation of formulae, is indicated in 
terminology: the combination <W,R> is called a frame (cf [HC84]).
The SRS model can be considered to be a non-standard model for linear discrete-time 
logic. S, the precursor to the accessibility relation R, can be identified with the function 
"next" described above, while the frame created from an initial worldstate by repeated 
application of "next" is called a generated frame.
It is this which we have been calling an "SRS-world" above. There is a reason for this 
apparently perverse terminology - in subsequent work using the SRS model (see 
section 3.6), it is useful to introduce accessibility relations between SRS-worlds, to 
capture the semantics of attitude operators: in that context, the "worlds" in the Kripke 
semantics are indeed SRS-worids.
A given SRS-worid, since it may be considered a frame, will function as part of a model 
provided we know how to evaluate formulae at each worldstate. We introduce a valuation 
function V taking SRS-worlds, indices and sentence letters to truth values (0-false; 1- 
true).
V follows the usual recursion rules for formulae, but I prefer to present truth 
conditions for formulae via |* in the standard way. We evaluate all formulae in an SRS- 
world w, at an index i e Nat, used to identify the worldstate w(i) in w.
Models will differ in the initial conditions given to objects, the detailed behaviour of 
objects, and in any "junk" objects whose existence and behaviour is unspecified by the 
logic.
An APTL model is a pair (w, V) where w is an SRS-world (subject to the conditions 
mentioned above, and V is a valuation function as defined above. The semantics of APTL 
are given with respect to the satisfaction relation |=. A, B are wff of APTL, A, is a 
sentence letter of APTL.
<w,i> |= X iff V (w, i, X) = 1.
<w,i> |«= -iA iff it is not the case that <w,i> |= A.
<w,i> |-  AvB iff <w,i> |*= A or <w,i> j* B
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<w,i> |* Aa B iff <w,i> |- A and <w,
<w,i> |- OA iff <w,i+1> |« A
<w,i> |« OA iff 3j £ i, <w,j> |- A.
<w,i> I- DA iff V] £ i, <w,j> |« A.
<w,i> | .  -A iff i>0 and <w,i-1> |«
The other boolean connectives can be defined by the usual rules.
A Is satisflable iff there is some w, i so that <w,i> |= A. A is valid in an SRS-world w 
(w |- A), iff <w,i> |-  A for all i e Nat. A is valid iff w |« A for all w (in the class of 
models under consideration).
5.3. Logical Axioms
The logical axioms of APTL are all the propositional tautologies in the sentence letters 
of APTL, plus the axiomatisation of the temporal operators suggested by the above 
semantics (see [MP81] for an account of axioms suitable for linear discrete-time 
temporal logic).
6. Specialising the logic for the experimental configuration
In order to model the Skinner Box problem in a way which abstracts from considerations 
of mechanism, we specialise the logic APTL by introducing special proposition names.
The sentence letter L means light on; P means the action of the agent pressing; R means 
a reward from the rewarder, N means a nothing response from the rewarder, S means a 
shock; INIT is true in the initial state in an SRS-world.
The formal semantics of these names is provided by specialising the valuation function V.
V (w, i, L) -  1
V (w, i, P) *  1
V (w, i, R) -  1
V (w, I, N) -  1
V (w, i, S) -  1
V (w, i, INIT) -  1
6.1. The light
The behaviour of the light is defined by the following axiom.
iff get light w(i) -  on 
iff get agent w(i) *  press 
iff get rewarder w(i) -  reward 
iff get rewarder w(i) -  nothing 
iff get rewarder w(i) « shock 
iff i *  0.
L 1 :  |- [ ] ( 0 L  a  Q - i L )
This says that at all points in time, there will be a subsequent moment when the light is 
on, and also a subsequent moment when the light is off. It is a liveness condition on the 
light, precluding situations in which the light is on for ever, or off for ever.
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6.2. The rewarder
We Know that the rewarder will produce an output, one of reward, shock, or nothing, 
following any pair of events involving the light being on or off, and the agent pushing the 
button, or not. It is easy to see that there are 3x3x3x3=81 possible distinct rule sets 
for the rewarder.
In order to avoid driving the agent psychotic, we assume two further constraints. 
Firstly, that there is always one combination of light-state and button-press which will
enable a reward; secondly, that in either light-state (on or off), there is always a way
for the agent to avoid a shock. With these two extra constraints, the number of distinct 
rule sets drops to 55.
The rewarder is characterised by the following axioms.
R1a: |- (•••L a  **P a  *R) -4 D(*L a  P —» OR)
R1b: |- (•••L a  «»P a  »S) —> [](*L  a  P OS)
R1c: |- (•••L a  - P  a  *N) -> []{*L  a  P -4 ON)
Rule R1a says, for example, that in any world, if ever the light was on, followed by a 
press, followed by a reward occurring, then always a light, followed by a press, will 
result in a reward.
Axioms R2a-R4c are similar, dealing with courses of events in which the light was on 
followed by a nothing response (->P) from the agent; where the light was not on, followed 
by press , etc. The axioms R la  - R4c legitimise inductive learning by the agent.
R5: |- R+S+N = 1.
Axiom R5 asserts that only one of R, S or N could be the case at any one time (truth
being arithmetically valued at 1, falsity at 0).
R6: |- [0(L a  OP) a  0(L a  0 -,P ) a  0{->L a  OP) a  0(^L  a  0 -,P )] -> OR
Axiom R6 says that there is always a way in principle of getting a reward (although the 
agent is not coerced into finding it - it can act perversely and never get rewarded if it 
chooses).
R7a: |- (L a  O P O O S ) -> Q(L a  0->P -> 00-.S )
R7b: |- (L a  0-»P - 4  OOS) -4 Q(L a O P ->  00 -.S )
R7c: |- (—iL a  OP -4 OOS) -> [](-X  a  0-,P  -4 0 0 -,$ )
R7d: |- (—iL a  0-.P  -4 OOS) -4 D(->L a  OP 4  00 -.S )
This collection of axioms says that there is a way of avoiding a shock.
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6.3. The agent
The agent could be characterised by an axiom saying that rewards should always occur, 
and eventually shocks should never occur, ie
A: J- I]0R  a 0 [ ] - ,S .2
What we shall in fact do is axiomatise the required behaviour of the agent, in a variant of 
the mLaw of Effect from psychology (see [Sta83] - the Law of Effect says roughly that 
behaviour which is followed by a reward tends to be repeated). This is accomplished by 
the following axioms (A is a consequence of these, plus L and R axioms, as we shall see 
below).
A1 a: D (L a O -,P ^ O O - iR )  |- (•••L  a  *«P a  * R ) -> 0 [ ] ( » L -» P)
A1b: j - (•••L  a  **P a  *S) —> 0 [ ] (• L —» -»P)
A1 a says that providing that a light stimulus, followed by a non-press, does not lead to a 
reward, then if ever the sequence "light-press-reward" occurs, then eventually the 
stimulus of a light will always be followed by a press.
Axioms A2a-A4b are similar, dealing with courses of events in which the light was on 
followed by a not-press response from the agent; where the light was not on, followed by 
a press etc.
A5: | - INIT -> [0(L a  OP) a  0(L a  0 -,P ) a  0(-,L a  OP) a  0(-,L a  O ^P)]
A5 is a "curiosity axiom", which ensures that all possibilities will be tried at least once 
by the agent. This is necessary to prevent the agent from (say) settling into a "light - 
press - nothing" pattern when there is an alternative "light -> not-press -> reward" 
pattern, and thereby failing to get a reward which otherwise it might have had. It would 
be sufficient to say that alternatives to actions which result in nothing outcomes should 
be tried, unless they are shocks, but this seems to have a clumsy axiomatisation.
I will now show why these axioms entail axiom A mentioned above.
6.4. Results 
To show: []QR
If the agent had ever experienced all combinations of light on/off and agent 
press/nothing, and had never got rewarded, then by axiom R1, there must be no way to 
get a reward. But this contradicts R6, hence there is a way to get a reward. Since it is 
always the case that after some time the light comes on and after some time the light goes 
off, the agent just has to do the right thing to get a reward, but by A1-5 it will.
2 Notice that []0R a  0[]-nS is equivalent to []0R a  -iI]0S by the usual rules.
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To show: 00~,S
If no combination of light on/off and agent press/nothing results in a shock, the result
holds. Hence suppose there is at least one combination which results in a shock. Then by
axiom R7, if in that light state the agent subsequently does the opposite, then the shock 
will not occur. By A1-5 the agent will in fact always do this, so eventually it will never 
be shocked again. This argument will hold for all sequences which result in a shock.
Since at design time we have no further information as to which of the antecedents in 
A1-5 hold, we can do no further simplification - the selection of behaviour rules must 
be deferred, to be done by the agent at run-time. This brings us then to architectural 
considerations.
7. Agent architecture
An agent architecture can be derived in a systematic way from the axioms above. The 
agent stores In its internal state:
( i ) the previous light state I,
( I i ) its previous action a,
( i i i )  a list which is initially set up thus: [light-* press,
light -> not-press, 
not-light -> press, 
not-light -» not-press].
Initially the agent uses "get" to look at the current rewarder output r.
It now looks at (i, a), the previous light situation and its own subsequent action, vis-a- 
vis the current rewarder output r.
If r was reward, then it promotes the (I, a) in the list to the front of the list.
If r was shock, it deletes (I, a) from the list.
If r was nothing, it moves (I, a) to the back of the list.
It then looks at the current state of the light (via "get") giving I'. It searches the list
from the front using I* as key, and retrieving the pair (I', a'), it then does al.
Now, on this basis, it never gets shocked twice in the same way, for shock-producing 
sequences get deleted; it never chooses nothing outcomes over reward outcomes, 
because it puts nothing outcomes at the back of the list. Hence it satisfies axioms A1a- 
A4b. This architecture has been implemented in Common Lisp; see section 5.4.
To satisfy axiom A5 it would need to keep a note of any untried entry in the list and make 
sure that at some point it was tried. This would be a straightforward matter to 
implement, if it was found necessary.
Note that the agent of this experiment would not appear trivial to an observer. It would
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exhibit trial and error behaviour, and would learn rapidly from experience to avoid 
shock-inducing activities, and to prefer reward-inducing actions. It would exhibit this 
behaviour in a wide variety of rewarder regimes3 .
8. Discussion
This section has presented a detailed formal framework, the Synchronous Reactive 
Systems (SRS) model for analysing multi-agent interactions. The SRS model has been 
used to analyse a simple, behaviourist style experiment, which has been formalised in a 
propositional temporal logic APTL. The instantiated SRS model plays the role of 
intended interpretation for the applied version of APTL.
The approach followed in this paper has been very much in the "software engineering" 
tradition, in which designers do not make use of epistemic, doxastic or conative logics, 
but concern themselves primarily with defining the objective constraints which an 
agent is to satisfy, and with implementational concerns.
So why would we ever wish to engage in reasoning about such an agent's epistemic or 
conative attributes ? To answer this, we note that the traditional approaches begin to 
fail just when we need to reason about agents which may be unclear about the 
circumstances in which they find themselves or as to what their objectives should be. As 
a consequence of such inadequate information, agents may make mistakes, undertake 
actions motivated by the need to learn something, reformulate their objectives etc. 
These kinds of phenomena are literally indescribable in the traditional logics used in 
formal software engineering, where it is assumed that all important information is 
available at design-time.
Turning to the "possible-worlds" tradition however, such phenomena call be analysed, 
by considering the agent to be in definite relationships to (possibly non-actual) 
situations which capture the agent's information about how its environment might be, 
and how it should be in the future. These relationships, grounded in the agent's 
perceptions, experiences and design, are then used to account for its behaviour (see 
[Den78] p. 305, and [BP83]).
It is at this point that formal logics of the attitudes, encapsulating such semantics, 
become appropriate specification or description languages4. In the next section, this 
suggestion is examined further.
3 The idea for this architecture came from [Den78j p. 75.
4 Indeed, it might be suggested that the non-gratuitous ascription of such "personal realities" 
to an agent is precisely equivalent to taking a well-founded intentional stance towards it, in the 
sense proposed by Dennett in [Den78].
112
Agent Theories and Architectures Section 3.6/1
3.6: AGENTS AS FIRST ORDER INTENTIONAL SYSTEMS
1. In troduction
In the previous section we saw how to model a class of psychological experiments in 
which an autonomous agent is placed in a Skinner Box and its behaviour analysed. The 
Skinner Box consisted of a rewarder, which can output a reward, shock, or nothing; a 
light, which couid flash on, or be off; and a button, which could be pressed by the agent, 
or left alone.
A protocol for an experiment is a collection of rules which tell the rewarder how to 
behave, conditional upon the light and button behaviour. The task for the agent is to 
operate the button so as to ensure rewards, and avoid shocks.
The analysis concentrated upon axiomatising the box and agent behaviour in a special 
temporal logic called APTL, and on providing a computational model of the box and agent 
to interpret that logic, called the SRS model. The APTL logic is a behaviourist's logic, 
describing the box and agent in terms of actually occurring public events. As was pointed 
out, such a style of analysis fails to account for mistakes and learning.
In this section, by contrast, we formalise Dennett's analysis of such agents as "first- 
order intentional systems" (see [Den 78] chapter 4; [Den87] p. 243), extending the 
APTL logic with operators capturing "knowledge" and "desire" in a non-architectural 
fashion. In particular, I make no assumption that the agent has to "represent" its 
environment in terms of "internal databases" comprised of formulae, as is done for 
instance in [Kon86].
I start by analysing the "epistemic alternative worlds" induced by the partial ignorance 
of an agent with only evidence of the past to go on. This permits a definition of the 
"possible-worlds" semantics of a modal operator KNOWABLE, where the space of 
possible-worlds and the accessibility relation are not arbitrary parameters, but emerge 
in a natural way from the analysis.
A similar analysis permits the agent's objectives to be factored in, introducing an 
operator ACCEPTABLE. Finally, it is shown how the increase in an agent's knowledge, 
as evidence accumulates, permits acceptable actions to be identified, and to be carried 
out. In this way, the section provides a formal predictive theory of a Skinner Box agent 
considered as a first-order intentional system.
1.1 Axioms for the box and agent
There is an important distinction to be made between the axioms which describe the 
agent's environment, the Skinner Box (which I shall call world axioms) and axioms 
which describe or prescribe the agent's behaviour, the agent axioms. I will also 
distinguish between constraints (which are just axioms, holding uniformly) and 
conditional constraints. Which are axioms of the form
|- evidence D constraint.
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Given the evidence- a formula holding contingently, the constraint subsequently holds 
uniformly. This can be expressed by saying the conditional constraint becomes actual.
I will now briefly summarise (in a slightly altered form) the axioms describing the 
behaviour of the Skinner Box introduced in the previous section.
L i :  |- [1(0L a 0 - iL )
This axiom expresses the fact that the light alternates between being on and off.
R1 a: |- (•••L a «*P a «R) —» [](*L a P —» OR)
R1 b: |- (•••L a *«P a *S) —» [](*L  a P —» OS)
R 1c: |- (•••L a - P  a *N) -♦ [](*L a P —> ON)
These conditional constraints describe the fact that in any particular experiment, the
rewarder protocol is invariant, and they legitimise inductive learning by the agent.
I will encode the various combinations of light and subsequent press as follows:
Clpr means the constraint: [ ] ( * L a P OR)
Cl_,ps means the constraint: D(*L a - iP -* OS)
C -iP N  means the constraint: l ] (—«L a P ON)
etc, so that C . ^ p p  should be understood as saying that in a (light-off followed by not- 
press) situation, a reward is given.
Then axioms labelled R5, R6, R7a-d of the previous section describe additional 
properties of the rewarder, indicating it produces just one output at a time, that there is 
always a way to get a reward and to avoid shocks.
2. Epistemic Theories and Alternatives
We start by collecting together those axioms which characterise legitimate 
environments for an agent, in a set called W orld  A x iom s. So in the Skinner Box 
example,
W orldA xiom ssk *  {propositional tautologies, L1, R la-R 4c, R5, R6, R7a-d}. 
Let Worlds be the set of SRS-worlds which satisfy W orldAxioms.
For the Skinner Box example, note that in any SRS-world in Worlds, the light behaves 
properly; the rewarder will obey a definite protocol, and the agent may do whatsoever 
it likes: for example, there is a world in which the agent acts so as to maximise shock- 
outcomes. There is also the possibility of "junk" objects which APTL doesn't mention.
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Suppose we take a particular world w in W orlds, and examine the woridstates w(0), 
w(1), w(2), etc. Let's suppose that in these three woridstates, the sequence "light-on, 
press; reward" occurred. Then it follows that in this particular world the conditional 
constraint introduced by R1a has become actual: in w, it is the case that Clpr .
Now of course, w is not the only world with this particular introductory sequence in 
woridstates 0, 1,2: many worlds will have started thus, but will subsequently diverge. 
Nevertheless, there is an important concept here - the partitioning of W orlds at an 
index i into subsets which share "evidence so far".
If one of the objects in w is an agent which has complete and veridical perception (scoped 
by the expressive power of APTL), then at (w,i) it has the information available about
what happened at woridstates 0 .. (i-1)1. We can thus attribute a "situated theory" to 
such an agent, a theory which includes:
1. the constraints holding universally, expressed in W orldAxioms;
2. the evidence of what has happened so far, up to worldstate (i-1);
3. any conclusions which follow from (1) and (2).
I will call such a theory an "epistemic theory" at (w, i), and call the (other) worlds 
whose i-th states satisfy it, the epistemic alternative worlds at (w,i).
The technical development of these notions proceeds, however, without regard to whether 
such an agent is a constituent of the worlds in Worlds or not. Hence I am concerned in 
this section with a competence rather than a performance theory: (the kind of agents I 
have in mind though are those of the previous section).
2.1 An epistemic theory at a world-lndex pair
Let’s now do this properly. An "epistemic theory" for a world w, at index i will be 
written epistemicTheory(w,i) and will be defined as follows. For all w in W orlds, i in 
Nat (natural numbers 0, 1, ...), ap an APTL strict-past 2 formula:
1. all formulae in WorldAxioms belong to epistemicTheory(w,i);
2. if <w,i> |= Op, then ap belongs to epistemicTheory(w,i);
3. all logical consequences of 1 and 2 are in epistemicTheory(w,i);
4. nothing else is in epistemicTheory(w,i).
Note that <w,i> |*  epistemicTheory(w.i) itself. The set epistemicTheory(w,i) is in 
general not equal to the set of APTL-formulae satisfiable at <w,i> because it will omit 
w-contingent future formulae.
Informally, the various ways in which epistemicTheory(w,i) may be extended into a 
maximally-consistent set satisfiabie at i correspond to the various worlds which satisfy
1 Up to state (i-1) because the act of perception is itself a computational act, and each 
object's state (in the SRS model) at index i registers woridstates prior to i.
2 If f is a strict-past formula, then (w,i). |= f can be evaluated by considering only those 
indices j < i. Hence L is not a strict-past formula, but *L &.
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epistemicTheory(w,i).
Example;
epistemicTheory(w,i) ■
closure(WorkJAxiom* U **P, *R,...})
figure 1
Having moved from a definite worldstate w(i) to a set of formulae, via 
epistemicTheory(w,i), we will now examine the collection of worlds which satisfy this 
set of formulae, the epistemic alternatives of w at i.
We can define an indexed "propositional" function *, which takes an index i and a set of 
formulae A, and returns the maximal set of SRS-worlds in W orlds which satisfy the 
set of formulae at the index. Thus:
*(i, A) *  {w | <w,l> |* A}.
We define a function "epistemicAlts":
epistemicAlts(w.i) « *(i, epistemicTheory(w,i)),
-  {w | <w, i> |-  epistemicTheory(w,i)}.
The set epistemicAlts{w,i) is the set of worlds in which the theory 
epistemicTheory{w,i), is true. These worlds are therefore indistinguishable from each 
other by the "evidence so far". We call epistemicAlts(w.i) the set of e p is te m ic  
alternative worlds at <w,i>. An equivalent, perhaps clearer way to put this is that 
the epistemic alternatives are the worlds which agree on the APTL-nameable events 
which have occurred so far. I will now show that the sets of epistemic alternatives form 
a partition of W orlds.
Let us introduce a relation Ej between SRS-worlds such that for all worlds u,v, u Ej v if 
it is not possible to distinguish between u and v on the basis of APTL-nameable events 
which have occurred from indices 0 to (i-1) in the two worlds3. So we have:
V u, v e W orlds, u Ej v i f f  v e epistemicAlts(u,i), and
V u, v e Worlds, u Ej v iff epistemicTheory(u,i) « epistemicTheory(v.i),
3 This is the type of equivalence used in constructing filtrations. see [HC84 p. 137], and the 
discussion in section 4.2.
w
P..
hi, m
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Ej is the equivalence relation induced from the kernel of the function "epistemicTheory" 
[Coh81 p.16]. At each index i, Ej partitions the SRS-worlds in W orlds into equivalence 
classes of "indistinguishable so far" worlds. The function "epistemicAlts" returns the 
equivalence class of any particular world-index pair (w,i) (see figure 2 below).
For example: in the Skinner Box case, there are no more than 12 equivalence classes of 
E1t since in any initial worldstate, L, P may independently have any truth values, and 
any one of R, S, N may be true, it is straightforward to show that the number of 
equivalence classes of Ej is a non-decreasing function of i.
•p ls tam lc alternatives epistemic alternatives
figure 2.
2.2 Properties of the Epistemic Alternatives
Returning to our example of the world w at index 2, whose first three worldstates 0, 1, 
2 include the events (in order) "light-on; press; reward". From axiom R1a, we can 
now deduce that the sequence "light-on; press" will always be followed by a reward, 
hence the constraint Clpr  is actual. And this will be true of all the worlds in w's 
epistemic alternatives.
What about the sequence "light-on; not press" ? Well, in w, something perfectly definite 
will happen subsequent to the light having been on, followed by a non-press, but the 
evidence isn't yet in as to what that outcome will be: reward, shock or nothing. Hence 
there will be worlds in w's epistemic alternatives at 2 which have any of these possible 
outcomes following these two events.
Suppose a little later on, at index=7 say, it transpires that in w, the event "light-on; 
not-press" results in shock. Then all the worlds which agreed on C|_pr but disagree 
about C|_^ps will be excluded from w's epistemic alternatives at 7.
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To sum up: the epistemic alternatives of world w at index i are the worlds which are in 
accordance with what can be deduced from the world axioms plus evidence so far. So 
things which are true in all of them seem good candidates for what is knowable at (w,i) 
(as distinct from what is deemed possible, or impossible) by an idealised agent with 
complete and veridical perception.
2.3 A Modal Operator: KNOWABLE
On this basis we can extend the APTL language with a new modal operator KNOWABLE. I 
give several definitions in order to link the definitions with the discussion above: the 
first gives a conventional Kripke-style semantics, with Ej playing the role of 
accessibility relation.
E1: <w,i> |- KNOWABLE a i f f  V u. w Ej u -> <u,i> j-  a.
This says that a is K N O W A B LE  in world w at index i, iff in every world evidentially- 
indistinguishable from worldstate w(i), then a was true. Note that since E-, is an 
equivalence relation, KNOW ABLE satisfies the modal axioms K, T, 4, 5.
E2: <w,i> |« KNOWABLE a i f f  epistemicAlts(w,i) is a subset of w(i,a).
This says that a is KNOWABLE in world w at index i, iff the epistemic alternative 
worlds at index i are included within the worlds in which a was true at i. This definition 
is formally equivalent to E1.
E3: <w,i> |-  KNOWABLE a LI a € epistemicTheory(w,i).
This says that a is KNOWABLE in world w at index i, if a belongs to the theory of the 
agent at <w,i>. Note the "if" here: there are sentences true in all the accessible worlds 
which are nonetheless not in epistemicTheory(w,i). Examples include "KNOWABLE a" 
itself, for by axiom 4 (positive introspection) it will be satisfiable in all the 
epistemically-accessible worlds, (although the significance of this fact is far from 
clear).
If it were merely a case of fixing up the construction rules for epistemicTheory(w,i), 
then no doubt this could be done; however there are deeper ways for problems to occur. 
If an agent's perception is not complete, then it can miss something which happens to be 
true in all the epistemic alternatives as currently constructed. Hence though that 
proposition is knowable, the agent in fact doesn't know it. The case of agents with limited 
perceptual powers is not treated in a systematic fashion in this thesis, although there is 
a further discussion of the issue in section 3.7.
For any strict-past formula ap, we have 
P i :  | -  ap -> KNOWABLE <xp
To show this is valid, suppose for some <w,i> we have <w,i> |= a p. Hence ap e
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epistemicTheory(w,i), so that <w,i> j*  KNOWABLE ap. This axiom can be seen as 
capturing the perceptual route to the acquisition of knowledge.
3. Conative Theories and Alternatives
Consider the set of worlds: epistemicAIts(w.i). In some of these worlds the agent is doing 
perfectly sensible things, in others the agent is doing stupid things: learning nothing; 
getting unnecessarily shocked etc. What is the formal basis on which these judgements 
are being made ? Clearly on the basis of conformance or non-conformance with the agent 
axioms.
3.1 Agent Axioms
In the previous section agent axioms somewhat like those below were defined.
A1a: 0(L a  0 —»P —» OO-iR) \- (***L a  a  »R) -» [](*L  -*  P)
A1b: | - (•••L a ~P a *S) -» [](*L -> -,P)
A1a says that providing that a light stimulus, followed by a non-press, does not lead to a 
reward, then if ever the sequence "light-press-reward" occurs, then the stimulus of a 
light will always be followed by a press.
/
Axioms A2a-A4b are similar, dealing with courses of events in which the light was on 
followed by a not-press response from the agent; where the light was not on, followed by 
a press etc. A5 expressed a "curiosity" axiom.
3.2 A conative theory at a world-index pair
Let AgentW orldAxloms be the set of axioms which are WorldAxIoms plus whatever 
extra axioms determine the required behaviour of the agent itself.
In the Skinner Box example, these extra axioms are {A la  - A4b, A5}.
Let AgentWorids be the set of SRS-worlds which satisfy AgentWorldAxloms.
Then for all w in W orlds, i in Nat, ap an APTL strict-past formula:
1. all formulae in AgentW orldAxloms belong to conativeTheory(w,i);
2. if <w, i> |* 0^ , then Op belongs to conativeTheory(w.i);
3. all logical consequences of 1 and 2 are in conativeTheory(w,i);
4. nothing else is in conativeTheory(w,i).
I will call SRS-worlds belonging to AgentW orids sensible worlds, and SRS-worlds 
belonging to (Worlds - AgentWorlds)s/up/d worlds.
We can apply the propositional function n to "invert" the function "conativeTheory", as 
we earlier did with "epistemicTheory", and generate a derived function called 
"conativeAlts": conativeAlts(w,i) = rc(i, conativeTheory(w,i)).
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Note that for any (wf i), conativeAlts(w,i) is a subset of epistemicAlts(w.i). This is 
because conativeTheory(wt i) entails epistemicTheory(w,i), since the former is an 
extension of the latter by construction (see [BJ80] p. 174). There are three possible 
cases:
* if there is no course of action available to the agent which conforms to 
the agent axioms, ie conativeTheory(w.i) is inconsistent, then 
conativeAlts(w, i) is empty;
* if the agent will conform to the agent axioms whatever it does (eg it 
has become clear that the rewarder always gives a reward), then 
conativeAlts(w.i) is identical to epistemicAlts(w,i).
* if some of the worlds in epistemicAlts(w, i) are sensible, and others 
are stupid, then conativeAlts(w, i) is the non-empty proper subset of 
epistemicAlts(w, i) comprising the sensible worlds.
Now, if w, at i is a sensible world, then conativeAlts(w,i) will return the maximal set 
of all the other "evidentially-indistinguishable" sensible worlds, the worlds which 
satisfy the agent axioms. If w, at i, is a stupid world, then conativeAlts(w.i) may return 
a set of sensible worlds (see figure 3, below), but more likely it will return an empty 
set of worlds, since if the "agent" has previously done something perversely stupid, then 
no sensible world could be evidentially indistinguishable from w.
Epistemic alternatives of w at I
Sensible worlds Stupid worlds
w u V 1
_L_ L T "
P P p
R R R
•••
L 1 L L 1
P P -,P
IN
R R ' S
•••
1
figure 3.
Now, an "agent" in a stupid world just doesn't count: it violates the design principles we 
are concerned with (the agent axioms). We are really interested in those agents in the
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sensible worlds, in their ability to decide what to do next based upon the "evidence so 
far". Hence I will introduce a relation Cj (for 'conative'), which is a relation within the 
sensible worlds:
V u . v e  AgentWorids. u Cj v i f f  ve  conativeAlts(u.i).
Note that Cj is clearly an equivalence relation over A gen tW orids . I will call the 
sensible alternatives from a sensible world the conative alternatives.
3.3 Properties of the conative alternatives
Consider an example of a world w, which started with the sequence of events "light-on; 
not-press; shock", and later, around index 7 had the sequence "light-on; press; reward". 
Suppose the index is now 10.
Since this is a sensible world, then in w, and in all of its conative alternatives at 10, 
whenever the light comes on, the agent presses to get its reward. This is a consequence of 
the axiom A1a.
What should the agent do in the case that the light isn't on (assuming this case has not yet 
occurred) ? Since there is no evidence on the outcome of a press or non-press in these 
circumstances, then the sensible worlds in conativeAlts(w,10) include worlds with the 
following sequences:
1. "light-off; press; reward" 4. "light-off; not-press; reward"
2. "light-off; press; nothing" 5. "light-off; not-press; nothing"
3. "light-off; press; shock" 6. "light-off; not-press; shock".
In any particular world, of course, only one outcome will result from "light-off; press" 
and only one from "light-off; not-press", but only later will the evidence be available 
to show which choice a particular world makes. At that point the conative alternatives 
will contract to exclude the worlds which supported different choices.
So, in the sensible worlds at index 10, there are some situations, "light-on" for 
example, where there is no doubt as to what to do: every world says press. Other 
situations, such as Might-off" have some worlds saying "press", other worlds saying 
"not-press": hence no information is available.
It seems that the agent can profit from those things which are true in all the sensible 
worlds, providing they contain some useful information (P v ~.P is true but unhelpful): 
this suggest defining an operator capturing the idea of choosing an outcome.
3.4 A Modal Operator: ACCEPTABLE
On this basis we can define a modal operator ACCEPTABLE.
C1: <w,i> |-= AgentWorlds ACCEPTABLE a i f f  V u. w C| u -> <u,i> |- a.
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This says that a is ACCEPTABLE in world w at index i, iff in every sensible world 
evidentia lly-ind istingu ishable  from worldstate w(i), then a was true. Note that 
ACCEPTABLE satisfies the modal axioms K, T, 4, 5, given that the set of worlds in the 
interpretation is constrained to be sensible.
Note that if a proposition a is knowable at some (w,i), then it's true in all of the 
epistemic alternatives. Since the sensible worlds are a subset of these, then a will 
certainly be true in ail the sensible worlds, hence will be "acceptable”. Thus we have the 
axiom (reminiscent of [CL87a p. 321]) that
EC1: | - KNOWABLE a -4 ACCEPTABLE a.
3.5 Choosing to do something
In ordinary language, we make a distinction between those propositions which are 
"acceptable", and those which are "intended”, or "chosen". The difference seems to be 
that intended or chosen propositions describe situations which are consequent upon the
agent's own actions: this suggest a propositional classifier DOABLE, true of such
propositions, so that we clearly have for example: DOABLE P; DOABLE -»P; -DOABLE 
L etc. A theory of DOABLE will not be attempted here4, except to note that it could be 
used to define a more acceptable operator "CHOOSEABLE":
| - CHOOSEABLE a <-> ACCEPTABLE a a  DOABLE a.
3.6 Connecting perception to action
Given a worldstate (w,i), suppose a constraint (a -> p) holds in all its conative 
alternatives: thus (w,i) |* ACCEPTABLE (a -» P).
Now, if (w,i) j* a, then modus ponens ought to work correctly and we should be able to 
deduce (w,i) |« p. This suggests that the following should be valid (for any a and p):
C2: I- AgentWorids « *  ACCEPTABLE*. -  B -» P
This will be the case if we have:
C3: |« .  41X/ . . ACCEPTABLE y -» Y*1 AgentW orids *
But C3 is really the axiom T ,  which is an axiom of the logic of ACCEPTABLE, (KT45).
4. A Scenario
Having established the technical apparatus, I will now show that it does permit practical 
reasoning about the time-varying cognitive states of an agent in a Skinner Box, leading 
to predictions of action. Suppose the experimenter sets up a Skinner Box in conformance 
with the following protocol fragment:
4 A theory of DOABLE must, for instance, rule out the possibility of an agent simultaneously 
carrying out mutually exclusive actions.
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* "light-on" followed by "press" results in Reward (Clpr );
* "light-on" followed by "not-press" results in Shock (C ^ p s );
Let w be a world in which the following scenario takes place: in worldstate 0 the light is 
on, the agent does nothing, and neither does the rewarder. Next, in worldstate 1 the light 
is stiil on, the agent pushes the button, and the rewarder does nothing. Next, in 
worldstate 2 the light is still on, the agent doesn't push, and the rewarder gives a 
reward.
What should the agent do next ? And what are its epistemic and conative states as this 
sequence of events unfolds ?
First note that for all states i, the agent "knows" the general conditional constraints in 
WorldAxioms and "knows" what has just happened, it also "accepts the constraints" in 
AgentWorldAxioms, so we are in a sensible world5.
In woridstate 0 we have by assumption: {L, -nP, N}. In worldstate 1 we have by 
assumption: {L, P, N}; and from worldstate 0: {*L, *--,P, *N}. Similarly, in worldstate 
2 we have, by assumption: {L, -iP, R}; and from previous worldstates: {*L,*P,*N; 
••L, ••-nP, ••N). Hence we can write, in natural deduction style:
10. • • • L ,  * *P,  *R |- •••L a  •• P a  • R Assumption
20. • • • L , - * P , - R  |- K N O W A B L E  (•••L a  **P a  »R) 10, rule P1
30. • • • L ,  **P,  • R |- ACCEPTABLE («»L a  « P a  »R) 20, rule EC 1
Because an agent can have perceived that the sequence "light-on; press; reward" has 
just occurred, then it is KNOWABLE that (•••L a  *«P a  *R), by rule P I, and hence 
ACCEPTABLE ( - L  a  **P a  *R).
40. |- A C C E P T A B L E  ((•••L a  - P  a  -R) -> [](*L -» P)) axiom A1a
Assume that if the agent hadn't pressed, it wouldn’t have been rewarded: axiom A la  
permits indeterminacy of behaviour if both press and non-press actions each lead to 
reward. The prefixing of ACCEPTABLE to the axiom is permitted by necessitation.
50.
60.
70.
• • • L ,  
• • • L ,  
• L
P, • R |- ACCEPTABLE [J{*L -> P) 
P , • R |- ACCEPTABLE (*L -* P)
|- • L
30,40, axiom 'K' 
50, axiom T* for [] 
assumption
The assumption that the light was just on again.
80. • • • L ,  **P,  • R , • L |- P 60,70, rule C2
90. • • • L ,  * -P ,  *R,  • L j -O R  10,70,80, axiom R1 a
5 A possible reading of these sentiments which respects the "scare quotes" might be to say 
that the agent is built in conformance to these constraints.
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Hence the agent presses in worldstate 3 ensuring a subsequent reward (by the protocol 
fragment).
This demonstrates how an observer, making assumptions about the axioms describing 
world and agent behaviour, together with assumptions about the agent's perceptual and 
action capabilities, can undertake an epistemic-conative analysis of the agent leading to 
viable predictions of agent behaviour.
5. Formal Semantics
Let our original temporal logic extended with intentional operators KNOWABLE and 
ACCEPTABLE be called ECTL (epistemic-conative temporal logic).
ECTL is an applied logic, parameterised by two sets of formulae: WorldAxioms, which 
describe the intended behaviour of the environment; and AgentWorldAxloms, which is 
WorldAxioms plus extra axioms describing the behaviour desired of the agent. Writing 
E, C as 3-place relations E(i, u, v), C(i, u, v) corresponding to u Ej v, u Cj v above, an 
ECTL model Ot is now a 5-tuple:
Ot -  (Worlds, AgentW orids, V, E, C).
Worlds is a set of SRS-worlds satisfying W orldAxioms; AgentW orids is a subset of 
W orlds satisfying Age nt Wo r l dAx lo ms ;  V is a valuation function as discussed 
previously; E, C are the epistemic and conative accessibility relations defined thus:
E *  {(i, u, v) | <v, i> |-  epistemicTheory(u,i)} u, v e W orlds
C *  {(i, u, v) | <v, i> |« conativeTheory(u,l)} u, v e AgentW orids.
Recall E and C are both equivalence relations (at an index i) by virtue of the properties 
of "epistemicTheory" and "conativeTheory" discussed above.
The semantics for the propositional temporal logic given earlier essentially carry 
across unchanged into this more elaborate model. Rather then repeating it, I will just 
give semantics for an arbitrary sentence letter X, and for the temporal operator 0 .
O l , w, i |* X i f f  V (w, i, X) -  1.
O t, w, i |-  OA i f f  O t, w, i+1 |= A.
O t , w, i |- KNOWABLE a i f f  V w' | E(i, w, wf). O t , w\ i j-  a.
O t , w, i |-  ACCEPTABLE a i f f  V w' | C(i, w, w’). O t , w \ i |« a.
Note that ACCEPTABLE a is vacuously true for stupid worlds, which are dead-ends 
under C [HC84 p. 9].
6. Discussion
Taking sections 3.5 and 3.6 together, we have accomplished a mathematical model of a
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collection of Skinner Box experiments, plus two axiomatic-theoretical treatments of 
agent behaviour in such experiments: the first a behaviourist account using a temporal 
logic; the second an intentional account using epistemic and conative operators.
The main technical procedure in this section, of:
defining a notion of sets of formula constituting "evidence so far" (via the 
functions "epistemicTheory" and "conativeTheory");
generating equivalence classes of worlds which satisfy them at an index;
using the equivalence relations to induce modal operators which plausibly 
capture our epistemic and conative intuitions;
has been carried out in a fashion very close to the problem-setting. It seems likely that a 
more abstract formulation would be possible akin to the way in which filtrations are 
constructed in the examination of modal systems possessing the finite-model property, 
albeit at the expense of some pedagogic clarity6.
Returning to our agent-theoretic concerns, a number of issues now present themselves, 
issues such as:
* Under what conditions is an SRS-object to be considered an agent ?
* What ontological commitment ought we to have to the epistemic and 
conative alternative possible worlds ?
* What happens if it is required to model fallible perception, and plausible 
reasoning ?
* How can the intentional stance be used to give an intentional architecture 
account of agents ?
* How does the treatment here of an experiment in traditional psychology 
compare with the theories of the experimental psychologists themselves ?
These, and related issues are discussed in detail in the next section.
6 See section 4.2.
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3.7: DISCUSSION
in this section I will try to pull together and extend the main ideas of section 3.5 and
3.6, and address some more general issues.
1. What makes an object an agent ?
In section 3.5, "A Logic for Agents as Reactive Systems", we defined an objective for the
Skinner Box agent that it should always eventually be rewarded, and eventually never get 
shocked:
A: j - Q0 R a 0[ ] -. S .
Constraints over the behaviour of the agent were provided by axioms which essentially 
formalised the Law of Effect, indicating that the agent would replicate behaviour leading 
to rewards, and suppress behaviour leading to shocks. It was not by virtue of this
however that the agent became distinguished from the other objects in the model. After
all, syntactically similar axioms describe the rewarder and the light.
The finer-grained analysis of section 3.6, "A Logic for Agents as First Order Intentional 
Systems" showed the looseness of the agent's specification, in that although there were 
conformant SRS-worlds in which the agent was maximally rewarded and never shocked, 
there were other conformant worlds in which the agent missed possible rewards, and 
suffered avoidable shocks. This was explained by showing that the more detailed concrete 
constraints in any particular SRS-world could only be deduced to hold after some 
concrete evidence was in. Section 3.6 was mostly about a logic to permit such concrete 
constraints to be determined from evidence, and to permit such deductions to guide 
actions.
To explain the mistakes of the agent and its improvement in performance, it was 
formally necessary to assign to the agent at each world-index pair a personal epistemic 
theory of what it "knew" about its environment based upon evidence "so far"; and a 
personal conative theory, which in addition told the agent what it could deduce it should 
do, based upon the evidence "so far". The assertion of this thesis is that in some sense, 
such personalised ascription of epistemic and conative theories is the key distinguishing 
feature which differentiates cognitively-interesting agents from the general run of 
objects1.
1.1. The rewarder as agent ?
Note that nothing stops us from making a similar analysis of (say) the rewarder. Its
epistemic theory has the light and agent behaving properly, while the rewarder does 
whatsoever it likes: its conative theory has the rewarder behaving properly. The 
conditionality of the rewarder axioms (q.v.) ensure that the rewarder has "freedom" 
initially to respond to "light/press" stimuli as it "likes", but that whatever it does, that
1 Architecturally, the implication of section 3.6 was that any agent conforming to the
epistemic-conative theory developed there would require a means of perceiving evidence, and a 
way of using it to transform its action-producing state in an appropriate fashion.
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behaviour pattern is then frozen forever.
Now in practice, it is the experimenter who sets the protocol, but the mathematical 
model of 3.5/3.6 is consistent with a set-up in which the rewarder "freely" assigns 
itself a protocol, as just described. So here too, intentional talk can be iegitimised: 
initially we can say the rewarder is not sure how it will behave - as time progresses we 
can say it makes choices. Because these choices are "for life" however, the rewarder's 
(ability of behaviour is brief, to be followed by behaviour of the utmost rigidity. At this 
point, in every conative alternative, a given stimulus (eg **L a *P) results in exactly 
the same response (say R).
This does not mean that all the rewarder's conative alternatives are future-identical. 
Variety may be introduced by other objects, and this may feed into diversity of input 
stimuli to the rewarder. The fact remains however that it is possible to determine an 
exhaustive table for the rewarder's future behaviour of the form:
stimulus^ => action1
=>
stimulusn => actionn.
This means that a relapse to pure behaviourism is predictivelv effectual. In ibis. sense 
the use of intentional talk is superfluous, although it may still retain some explanatory 
power. In intentional language, the rewarder may not be sure about how the environment 
is going to behave, but it knows how it itself will behave. Ironically, "not sure" is a 
much more powerful indicator of essential intentionality than "knows".
This points to the conclusion that the utility, the non-Qratuitousness. of intentional 
language in the behavioural prediction of systems correlates with the capability of those 
systems to become attuned to contingent actual constraints: what Bennett in [Ben76 pp 
84-86] calls educability. When systems cease to be responsive to the comings and goings 
of constraints in their environments, when labile and plastic responses are replaced by 
rigidity, then prediction by behavioural invariants can appropriately replace an 
intentional mode of description.
1.2. Making mistakes and learning
Let us try to be a little more precise about this. Conditional constraints, which have not 
become actual, and which have a bearing on the agent's objectives, manifest themselves 
in the space of conative alternatives in the form of indeterminacy as to what the agent is 
to do.
For example, if it is not clear whether the Skinner Box agent is to press or not, 
following the light being off, to obtain a reward, then:
* in some conative alternatives the constraint C_,lpr  will be actual, and the 
agent will successfully press to get a reward;
* in some conative alternatives the constraint C^l^ pr will be actual, and the
agent will successfully not press to get a reward;
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* in some conative alternatives the constraint C_,|_ps will be actual, and the 
agent will mistakenly press to get a shock;
* etc (three more).
Let us focus briefly on the notion of mistake here. There is no doubt that a mistake 
occurs through a combination of underdetermination of agent-action in the conative 
alternatives, coupled with the requirement that the agent do something. How would we 
capture the notion of mistake more formally ?
Define POSS a as the dual of ACCEPTABLE, (POSS a «def -ACCEPTABLE -*x), so that 
a is possible if it's an option in at least one of the conative alternative worlds. Then for 
the Skinner Box agent, we can define
MISTAKE «dBf POSS OR a  OR,
glossed as "a mistake occurs if a reward next is possible, but the agent actually acts so as 
not to get a reward".
In general, we would like to define something like
MISTAKE «dsf POSS (something good next) a  0(somethlng bad). 
Unfortunately ECTL is too impoverished to state the latter definition formally.
Now, in any sensible world, a mistake will not be repeated (at least not in the same 
way), because the very fact of it occurring will alert the agent to the "actualness" of the 
relevant conditional constraint, and it will modify itself so that in a similar situation in 
future it will behave more appropriately. In ECTL, this agent property is registered by 
the conative alternatives contracting to exclude SRS-worlds in which such mistaken 
courses of action recur. (Recall this is all driven off the agent axioms, which capture the 
Law of Effect).
1.3. When Intentional explanations are vacuous
What happens if we try to apply the intentional style of analysis, with epistemic and 
conative alternatives et al, to a case where intuitively, it seems quite inappropriate. 
Consider the case of "training a ball, by altering its environment, so that it bounces in a 
special way (say, into a box)”. Why does it seem quite inappropriate to talk of "training 
a ball"?
We will assume that a ball's behaviour, like that of its environment, is constrained to 
obey classical laws of physics, in particular Newtonian mechanics. The appropriate 
axiomatlsation will be included in W orldAxioms.
Assume we want the ball to always eventually exhibit a trajectory such that the sentence 
letter B becomes true, by virtue of the other objects in the environment changing their 
attributes (position, orientation) • ie. this is how the other objects "train the ball".
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We suppose initially we have two choices for W orldAxioms: either they simply consist 
of axioms for Newtonian Dynamics, or they further include the axiom |- OB.
In the first case, the worlds in W or lds  will be distinguished by initial conditions 
(position, mass, velocity, spin etc). In some worlds, []0B will be satisfiable, in 
others not. Since the laws of Newtonian Mechanics are determinate, different initial 
conditions generate different outcomes, hence the epistemic alternatives of each world 
are just that world itself.
If the world happens to satisfy []0B, then the epistemic alternatives « the conative 
alternatives, otherwise it's a "stupid world".
The second case (where DOB is included in WorldAxioms) is just like this, except 
every world is a sensible world.
This collapse of epistemic and conative alternatives occurs because the laws of Newtonian 
Mechanics plus initial conditions entirely determine an SRS-world. In intentional 
language, the ball is omniscient both about the world and about its own behaviour. Such 
omniscience removes the possibilities for mistakes and learning, and hence renders void 
the notion of "trainability".
Suppose we make the environment more interesting by populating it with "intelligent 
agents". We have not violated the laws of physics: our intelligent agents are equipped 
with internal "free energy" plus ingenious private mechanisms. This permits the agents 
to behave In a wide variety of ways without violating the laws of physics. We will assume 
however that the agents' behaviour la design-constrained so that they wish to secure the 
objective D^B *or the ball.
The W orldAxiom s will now contain, as well as physics axioms, some design axioms 
expressing the "intelligence" of the agents. At least in principle, these now subvert the 
omniscience of the ball: the epistemic alternatives are no longer collapsed, but expand to 
encompass the space of possibilities for the agents.
However, it is still the case that the epistemic and conative alternatives of the ball are 
identical. This is because the actual constraints over the ball are only that it behave 
ballistically, according to Newtonian Mechanics, and these were already included in 
W orldAxioms. Hence in any actual world, the physical situation "up to now", at least at 
the level of ball-interactional properties, is replicated across all the conative 
alternatives. Hence these all agree about what the ball should do next, and a conative 
analysis is vacuous.
The ball can be "unsure" about what the (agents in the) environment will do next, but it 
is never unsure about what j l  will do in the very next instant, and it cannot be mistaken 
about its best course of action. In some very basic sense, the axioms defining the bail's 
behaviour permit it no residual autonomy.
so, in general it is conditional constraints, anchored by contingent evidence, and 
determining environment and agent behaviour, which sets the scene for the epistemic-
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conative analysis of objects as agents.
1.4. More precise characterisations of agents
We could therefore refine the identification of agent with intentional system made in 
the introduction (section 1.1). We could say that an agent is a system which continually 
exhibits the capability of becoming attuned to the various conditional constraints which 
become actual in the situations it encounters2. It is this facility which would make 
such agents trainable (by the manipulation of the actual constraints which they are 
subject to) in a way in which non-agent objects are not.
It is ironic though that with this definition of agents, there are now effectively no agents 
in sections 3.5/3.6 at all. For the lack of flexibility in the environment ensures that the 
"agent", once it has determined the behaviour of the rewarder, can similarly collapse 
into a rigid mode of behaviour. Our intuitions about agenthood in these sections are based 
upon the fact that the biological agents used in Skinner Boxes are agents in the sense I 
have defined, just because their usual environments are much richer than the set-up 
described.
This points to a need for a more sophisticated notion of conditional constraint to that 
suggested in section 3.6, viz
j- evidence -> 0 constraint.
We should perhaps be looking at spatially- and temporally-bounded constraints. There 
is no particular problem with spatially-bounded constraints • we have axioms like:
{ • e v id e n c e - *  0 (being-at-some-location -> constraint).
For temporally-bounded constraints, we could introduce a temporal operator UNTIL:
w, I a UNTIL p i f f  3 k 2: i | w, k |« p a  Vj e [i...k-1], w, j |-  a
or, w, i |« [] a.
Then a temporally-bounded constraint could be written:
| -  evidence -» (constraint UNTIL some-event-happens).
These are resources for future analyses however.
Note that enriching the Skinner Box environment either calls for the experimenter, as 
Deus ex machina, to change protocols at suitable points, or more tractably has the 
rewarder changing its protocol itself according to some meta-protocol. This new set-up 
could be handled by an agent with not too different an architecture from that of section
3.5 (eg. we should avoid deleting behaviours, which may be needed later).
If the rewarder’s meta-protocol was driven from evidence in its environment however,
then It itself would then be classified as an agent (and as surrogate for the
2 One has to finesse this somewhat, making sure that the attunement is to constraints 
relevant to the agent's goals.
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experimenter’s ”10161119601" choice of when to change protocol, why not ?). I make some 
further remarks about classifying various kinds of agent in the next section (3.8).
2. What is the significance of the possible worlds ?
The epistemic and conative alternative worlds are not of course real, they are
mathematical abstractions. But abstractions of what ?
When we design artifacts, we usually do so genericaily. That is, we do not know all the 
situations, in detail, which the artifact is going to encounter. This is reinforced if 
multiple copies of the artifact we design are going to be produced, which will each 
encounter their own distinct futures. As designers, the most we can state are the 
assumptions about the environments which we "took into account" in the artifact- 
design3.
The SRS-space of possible SRS-worlds can be seen as the mathematical space 
corresponding to the different possible histories which design-conformant artifacts 
might have, in design-conformant environments, (in biology, the SRS-space might be 
an appropriate extensionai concept to capture the notion of ecological niche).
The conative alternatives at (w, i) can then be thought of as a mathematical model of all
the histories of design-conformant artifacts/environments which agree on what has
(ECTL -observably) happened so far, but possibly diverge in the future. The fact that in 
general there is more than one conative alternative reflects the looseness of the 
constraints known to the designer. Similar remarks can be made about the epistemic 
alternatives, provided we are prepared to countenance histories with flawed artifacts.
3. Perception and the possib ility of error
Up to now, we have concentrated upon agents which know general truths about the world 
(although they are initially ignorant about specifics); which are capable of complete and 
veridical perception of the names and external states of all objects in their environment; 
and which can draw any necessary conclusions from their combination of general 
knowledge and specific evidence (although as I keep reiterating, we don't demand that 
they internally follow chains of reasoning, only that their internal state- 
transformations satisfy a logic which does exemplify such reasoning).
It is no small thing to introduce the possibility of error. I propose to investigate where 
error might arise from (perception, incorrect assumptions, incorrect "reasoning"), 
and how recovery from error might be effected.
3.1. Perceptual error
Assume a component of an agent's nextstate function which is applied to external 
worldstates and returns representations - call this function "see". We will assume see 
is surjective, no point in wasting representations which will never be used. We can now
3 The same point holds for biological systems: the species-genotype is a uniformity across 
the species (ignoring the genetic diversity across individuals), which will typically be 
phenotypically viable across a number of organism histories.
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examine whether see is injective or not.
If see  is injective, then we are back to our previous situation: every distinct external 
worldstate will be mapped by see to a distinct representation. On the other hand, if see 
is non-injective, then certain objects in the environment may fail to register at all, 
whilst others may be seen "fuzzily", in that different values of their external states get 
mapped by see to the same representational value.
Non-injective Perception
actual woddstate
("i" injects the actual worldstate into the space of possibilities).
figure 1.
To see this, recall that see will certainly be total: it will return a value when applied to 
any worldstate. Non-injectivity means that different woridstates may map to the same 
representation - one way of doing this is to "drop" some of the objects in a worldstate; 
another is to "blur" some of the attributes in an object's external state.lf the range of 
see contains a value "undefined", then uncertainty of perception can also be modelled.
If we take see to be acquiring information as to the satisfiability or otherwise of certain 
sentence letters in the actual worldstate, then it is clear that the representation value 
resulting from a non-injective see is compatible with the presence of a space of 
possible woridstates "out there" (see figure 1 above). Only if a sentence letter which is 
true or false in the actual worldstate has the same truth value in all the others will it 
definitely be seen to be/not to be the case, otherwise the truth value will be undefined. 
This clearly suggests that if we wish to introduce an operator PERCEIVES into ECTL to 
capture perception, then this operator will be modal, satisfying axiom T thus (a a non- 
modal formula):
| - PERCEIVES a -> a (but not the other way round).
It is a complex matter discussing the connection between the structure of the 
representation, and the structure of possible woridstates. in some sense, the 
representation can be thought of as a partial model, expandable to a set of distinguishable 
total models in a manner reminiscent of some comparisons between situation semantics 
and possible-worlds semantics. This issues takes us too far afield here though.
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Note that in this model, it is impossible to make a perceptual mistake, the worst case is 
perceptual ignorance.
3.2. Incorrect assumptions and incorrect "reasoning"
Suppose the agent in the Skinner Box experiment believes L QL when in fact it is the 
case that L 0->L. How could it have acquired such a wrong assumption ?
(a ) It might have deduced this from correct assumptions but faulty 
perceptions.
(b )  This might be an incorrect assumption of the designer, hence was 
included as a constituent of Wo rid Axioms - which we would now 
have to rename as WoridAssumptions.
(c )  it might have acquired this "conclusion" by plausible reasoning. For 
example, the agent might be inclined to hasty generalisation, 
described by a transformation rule such as this:
• • • a  a  » * a  a  » a
• a -> [ ] a
which (we may assume), although often satisfied, is not valid, hence 
not an inference rule.
3.3. Implications for Knowledge and belief
Non-injectivity of perception means that less sentence letters of ECTL get assigned 
definite truth values (hence less is known). As time marches on, this implies that there 
is indeterminacy of the past as well as of the future. The equivalence classes under Ej are 
larger, and coarser grained, and less can be deduced. Veridicality is still preserved 
however, the actual world still belongs to its equivalence class.
When we permit incorrect or "plausible" reasoning however, all this changes. The 
formal construction rules for an agent's "doxastic theory" can be written as follows:
1. all formulae in WoridAssumptions belong to doxasticTheory(w.i);
2. if <w,f> |« PERCEIVES a, then a belongs to doxasticTheory(w,i);
3. all logical and plausible consequences of 1 and 2 are in doxasticTheory(w,i);
4. nothing else is in doxasticTheory(w,i).
We could, in an analogous fashion to KNOWABLE introduce an operator BELIEVABLE, 
where a was believed at worldstate w(i) if it belonged to doxasticTheory(w,i). From the 
definition of a doxastic theory, it is easy to see that the following axiom holds:
PB1: |- PERCEIVES u ->  BELIEVABLE a
What can be said about such a set of sentences as doxasticTheory(w,i) ? Firstly, we
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could require it to be consistent (a usual doxastic requirement, requiring axiom D hold 
for BELIEVABLE).
Secondly we could note that due to the inclusion of "incorrect reasoning", the theory is no 
longer necessarily satisfiable in the worldstate w(i) itself, hence the following is not an 
axiom (ie T does not hold):
BELIEVABLE a a.
This is also a familiar doxastic requirement.
Thirdly, there is the issue of persistence, in the case of KNOWABLE, defined by virtue 
of the accessibility relation Ej, it is easy to show that the equivalence classes of Ej+1 are 
always included within Ej. This means that knowledge is persistent - if anything is 
known, then It continues to be known at all subsequent indices (with suitable time- 
scaling). Hence we have a theorem which says:
KPER: |- KNOWABLE a -> O KNOWABLE -a.
This is certainly not the case for any doxastic operator BELIEVABLE based upon 
doxasticTheory(w.i), as we shall now see.
Assume the agent, on three successive instants, sees the light on (assumption A1), 
hence we have:
10. A1 | PERCEIVES -L a  * PERCEIVES -L a  PERCEIVES *L.
Now, since perceptions are veridical, we will be able to conclude:
20. A1 | - B E L I E V A B L E  (— L a  - L a  *L)  line 10, axiom
PB1,..
Suppose the non-valid assumption mentioned above is also believed, (assumption A2), 
30. A2 | -  B E L I E V A B L E  [(— L a  - L a  * L ) - *  (*L -> f ]  L) ]
where the transformation rule has been written as an implicational formula.
Then by axiom K for BELIEVABLE, we can deduce
40. A1, A2 | - BELIEVABLE («L [ ]L)  lines 20, 30
Now, from line 20 we can deduce (A-distributivity)
50. A1 |- BELIEVABLE «L line 20, and then
60. A1.A2 |- BELIEVABLE []L  lines 50, 40 - axiom K.
70. A1, A2 |- BELIEVABLE L line 60 - axiom T for [].
If the light in fact now goes off, and this is perceived (assumption A3) we will then have
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80. A3 j- O PERCEIVES—nL by assumption, hence
90. A3 |- O BELIEVABLE *^L  axiom PB1 from line 70.
100. A1-3 |- BELIEVABLE L a  O BELIEVABLE —,L lines 70,90.
So the agent will currently believe that the light is on, by "plausible reasoning", while 
at the next instant, it will come to believe the light was off, by perception. Compare and 
contrast with the axiom KPER for KNOWABLE and temporal reasoning above.
Clearly any form of belief persistence will lead to belief contradiction * violations of 
axiom D - (such as the persistent deduction from BELIEVABLE L th a t  O 
BELIEVABLE *L in the context of line 100). This raises questions of belief revision to 
avoid contradictions.
Any attempt to avoid contradiction by failing to provide axioms providing at least some 
form of belief persistence will however render the system incapable of drawing any 
conclusions about the uniformities prevailing in its environment.
It seems possible that the general questions of belief modification, plausible reasoning
and perhaps some forms of valid non-monotonic reasoning4 could be fruitfully 
examined in the SRS-framework, but further consideration is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
4. Notional Worlds
How do we use the facilities of the logic ECTL in practice ? We start by assuming the 
existence of an agent a *  (agent1f i, x, f), which has been designed to operate in SRS- 
worlds conformant with Wor ldAx ioms,  and which behaves in conformance with 
AgentW orld Axioms.
We either were told this by the designer, or we have hypothesised it as informed 
observers.
We then assume the agent a is capable of perceiving ECTL events which are occurring 
around it, and capable of acting in the manner nameable in ECTL (in this case by 
pressing or not-pressing). As the scenario of 3.6 showed, we can then, by purely formal 
reasoning, deduce the expected behaviour of the agent.
But what do we think the agent is ? At one level we know that it is an SRS-object, with 
internal state and nextstate function, but if we are another object observing the agent 
from within an SRS-world, these details are observation ally unavailable to us. By 
using the operators KNOWABLE and ACCEPTABLE we are, in a sense to be explicated 
below, creating a fictitious architecture (or executable specification) for the agent, one
4 I notice that sophisticated non-monotonic reasoning systems, such as the autoepistemic 
system of Moore [M0088 in [SMDP88]] do not explicitly capture the temporal dimension to 
changes in belief. Thus Moore notes that additions to his assumption set A may force 
retractions of previously derivable formulae, but in fact the mechanism for changing A is 
outside the theory, and is a-temporal. However, I am not at all an expert in this area of logic.
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which associates it with a dynamic "cloud" of notional worlds.
This cioud is a cloud of possibilities for the agent at that time and place, created at every
worldstate by epistemicAlts (cf [Den87 p. 153]).
I will call this fictitious architecture the intentional architecture, and contrast it with
the agent modelled as a -  (agent^, i, x, f), which I will call the m echanism  
architecture.
Now, for any sensible w and index i, conativeAlts(w.i) is a subset of epistemicAlts(w.i) 
(we saw this in section 3.6). Picturesquely we can think of conativeAlts as 
"highlighting" part of the agent’s epistemic cloud, to indicate desired or preferred
outcomes5.
It is within these highlighted worlds that the agent seeks to find the actions it should 
carry out by seeing whether there is an action common to its own analogues in all of the 
conative alternatives at i. Note that in the intentional architecture, the agent needs to 
store the value of the current index so that it can index properly into its notional worlds.
The act of perception serves to transform the contents and highlighting of the cloud in a 
straightforward way. Recall that epistemic and conative alternatives are worlds which 
are (i) axiom conformant to their respective axiom sets; (ii) in agreement on ECTL 
observations. "so far”. As an index goes from i to i+1, corresponding to an act of 
perception, the agent gets perceptual evidence of the truth values of «a (where a is a 
sentence letter of ECTL) valued at <w, i>. This extra information is used to prune away 
those notional worlds, if any, which differ in truth valuations from those conformant to 
what was perceived. Hence the size of the cloud of notional worlds is a non-increasing 
function of i.
This discussion makes it clear that the functions epistemicAlts, conativeAlts are very 
much anchored to the agent, especially if we make W o r ld A x io m s  and 
AgentWorldAxioms specific to each agent, capturing each agent's unique epistemic and 
conative design constraints. We can therefore incorporate these functions into a
fictitious intentional architecture for a like this
alnt *  <agent1, (index, epistemicAlts, conativeAlts), x, f)
agent-j is the name of the agent
index indicates the worldstate
epistemicAlts gives the agent's epistemic alternatives
conativeAlts gives the agent’s conative alternatives
5 This "notional worlds cloud” is reminiscent of the wave function which physicists associate
with elementary particles in quantum mechanics. The wave function is generally supposed not 
to "really exist", but can be used to make behavioural predictions, in a situation where the real 
mechanisms underlying particle behaviour are unknown: see [FLS65 Vol 3 section1-10].
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x is the external state,
f is the nextstate function, defined like this:
f(n, (i, e, c), x, w) = let x' = get(n, u(i)), where u e c(w, i)
in ((i+1, e, c), x'j.
The nextstate function constructs the conative alternatives c(w, i) from the actual world 
w at index i, and then non-deterministically selects an action from one of the agent's 
conative analogues. Jf there was an ACCEPTABLE action, one true in all of the conative 
alternatives, then that gets bound to x'; otherwise the agent doesn't know what it should 
do, and the non-determinism constitutes trial and error behaviour.
What is the connection between the actual _aQenra._defined_bv_ilS-JD.&chanism 
architecture, and the fictitious agent alnt defined bNLanJnleational architecture?
It is certainly not equality, for the non-determinacy in the computation of x', the "next" 
external state, may well result in a different action being assigned to a{n{ than the one 
which a actually computes. However, both a and a|nt conform to the same environment 
and the same agent axioms, hence if it can be proven that a will do something, then this 
will be true in all the notional worlds of aint, and therefore a|nt will behave identically 
to a.
Note that a |nt is not a new agent in a new environment, but a novel way of 
conceptualising a in its actual environment. Since a is assumed to be the "real" agent, 
while 8 |nt is a convenient simulation of it, then if a |nt makes a non-deterministic 
mistake wrt a's behaviour, the observer deploying a jnt may simply choose to "reset" 
a|nt to the actual value a computed. This is just equivalent to forcing a different non- 
deterministic choice on a|nt.
Whv should we be bothered with intentional architectures in the first place ?
If we knew the mechanism architecture, then this might very well suffice to predict a's 
behaviour. Often however details of internal state are unknown to observers, or prove 
computationally intractable. In this case, if we have a theory about what the agent knows 
of its environment, about what the agent's objectives are (cf W o r ld A x io m s ,  
AgentW orldAxlom s), and we can characterise the agent's perceptual and action 
possibilities, then we can carry out an intentional analysis ("take the intentional 
stance"), and derive the functions epistemicAlts and conativeAlts. By pretending that 
these functions (plus index) are actually maintained and used by the agent, we can 
secure predictive power concerning the agent's likely behaviour without knowing its 
internal state and mechanisms.
In a multi-agent situation, if we (as designers) model agent^ as an intentional system, 
and agent^ treats agentg as an intentional system, then we might expect agent's notional 
worlds to include agent2 in its intentional architecture guise. This kind of modelling 
seems promising in analysing higher-order intentionaiity.
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Whv do we need both epistemicAlts and conative Alts in the intentional ...architecture?
Maybe we don't, it depends upon the kinds of models we wish to analyse.
Recall that in the worlds in epistemicAlts(w, i), the agent environment behaves 
properly (ie axiom-conformantly), but the agent may exhibit any behaviour. The 
conative alternatives are that subset of the epistemic alternatives in which the agent 
does behave properly (conformant with the agent axioms). So it looks like we only need 
conativeAlts.
The problem is that it may be much harder to characterise conativeAlts than 
epistemicAlts. A good example is that of designing an agent to play good chess. The axioms 
which define the chess pieces, their legal moves etc are straightforward: the axioms 
which define good play on behalf of the agent however are not weil-understood. it is 
therefore impossible from a practical point of view, at (w, i) to directly generate the 
"good plays" (ie the conative alternatives at (w, i)). Instead, the epistemic alternatives 
are generated, in a game tree, and then a complex decision procedure is applied to prune 
the epistemic alternatives into an approximation to the conative alternatives. These then 
provide the move to be played.
To permit this kind of analysis to be carried out, it seems appropriate to furnish the 
intentional architecture with the ability to compute in principle both epistemic and 
conative alternatives, and permit the nextstate function to be adapted to what is feasible. 
For example, instead of using the conative alternatives directly as above, it could 
implement a generate and test algorithm based upon epistemicAlts, and never use 
conativeAlts at all (because, as in the chess example, its value might not be predefined).
The nextstate function in Ihe intentional architecture isn't rioht I
I had originally hoped that the intentional architecture could be coerced into exactly the 
same form as the mechanism architecture. Unfortunately in the latter case, an object's 
view of the world is of an external worldstate: the inability to observe other objects' 
internal states and nextstate functions is built into the model.
In the intentional architecture however, the functions epistemicAlts, conativeAlts (and 
therefore the nextstate function) take not external woridstates but whole worlds as their 
arguments. So what to do ? There seem to be three choices:
a  give up the attempt to reconcile intentional and mechanism architectures,
within one unified object model,
b. let ordinary objects also have access to their embedding SRS>world,
c. restrict the arguments to epistemicAlts and conativeAlts to something less
than the embedding SRS world.
The first choice is ruled out if we want some objects in an SRS-world to routinely 
construct notional worlds which are just like ordinary SRS-worlds except that some of
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the objects in them have intentional architectures. As observed above, we probably need 
to do this to analyse higher-order intentionality,.
The second choice is really a decision to make the lack of access to other object's internal 
states (and to the real past and future I) a contingent rather than necessary property of 
the SRS model. Should an object's nextstate function have access to its entire SRS- 
world though ? There is scope for paradox here, because SRS-worlds are constructed 
iteratively, by application of a "next" function - see section 3.5. When a worldstate at 
index i is in process of computing its subsequent worldstate at (i+1), the (i+1)th, 
(i+2)th etc worldstates do not yet exist. Hence permitting SRS-worlds in the 
arguments of nextstate functions would have severe implications for the computational 
model of SRS-worlds, as well as vioiating our intuitions about directions of causality in 
the problems we seek to model.
So what's to do ? Clearly some changes will have to be made, but it seems a bad idea to 
make them arbitrarily, or by superficial guessing. The strategy to adopt is that already 
used to good effect in this thesis: to take a new problem involving more sophisticated 
cognitive activity, and examine carefully how to mathematically model it. On that basis 
determine exactly how to extend the SRS-model. This is work to be done in the future.
5. A comparison with the experimental psychologists
It is instructive to contrast the approach taken in this thesis in the analysis of Skinner 
Box experiments with that traditionally taken by experimental psychologists (see 
[Sta83]>.
An obvious difference is that I am making use of the apparatus of logic and discrete 
mathematics, whereas the theoretical models of experimental psychologists make 
extensive use of control-theoretic notions, expressed in the language of differential 
equations.
This difference in technical apparatus subtly delineates the problems which can be 
addressed. Tropistic or stability behaviours where continuous parameters can be 
identified are ideally suited to the "organism as controller" paradigm, modelled by 
differential equations.
On the other hand, the analysis of behaviour in which the system, or organism, is 
aligning itself in accordance with perceived environmental constraints requires a means 
of stating and reasoning about such constraints. It requires herculean efforts to encode 
such constraints in the language of differential equations, and the payoff scarcely seems 
worth it (recall the assessment of Ashby's work in section 2.1). In fact the appropriate 
mathematical language for specifying and reasoning about constraints is logic.
Let us go further. A pure logician might well be horrified by much of the material in this 
thesis. There is far too much concern for special classes of model (composed from SRS- 
worlds), (s)he might argue, which corrupts the endeavour of finding good logics for 
cognition.
The truth of the matter is quite the opposite. If we are to understand cognitive systems, 
then the progress of that understanding is measured in our success in building
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mathematical models of them. Here "ecological realism" is paramount. If it is important 
to cognition that agents have environments which they perceive and act upon, and that 
cognition is a phenomenon associated with such agents acting in their environments over 
time, then our mathematical models must at least model these things. Creating standard
models is a very strong objective in our endeavour of agent theory6.
The task of finding good specification languages and axiomatisations which capture the 
important principles of cognition is the second important objective of agent theory, and 
it is pleasant that the philosophers, logicians and formal software engineers have given 
us so many possibilities to play with. We accept, reject or modify them to the extent to 
which they do a good job for us vis-a-vis our mathematical models.
A final point about the SRS-model. I have found the approach - of defining SRS-worlds 
• a useful mechanism for modelling perspicuous and educational problems. The model 
has changed as experience has been gained with new problems and those changes have 
been logged in this thesis, as we moved for example from the learning system of 3.2 to 
the SCP system of 3.3 and 3.4 to the Skinner Box problem of 3.S-3.7. The discussion 
above shows that further modifications may be necessary when we seek to model higher- 
order Intentionality in agent-agent cooperation or competition. The requirement to have 
a model of the type of an SRS-model is an invariant however through all of this work.
6. Logical omniscience ?
As in all possible-worlds semantics, SRS-agents are omniscient with regard to all 
necessary truths. This is because such truths hold in all possible worlds, and therefore 
are certainly true in all the epistemic alternatives.
The reason this is not a problem is that there are not very many non-trivial important 
necessary truths around. We are, after ali, concerned with SRS-worlds consisting of a 
finite number of objects, and with a language, ECTL, which in its applied version has a 
finite number of sentence letters naming model-significant events in the life of a 
Skinner box agent. In particular, the language of arithmetic is not supported, nor do the 
SRS-models given here provide the completed totality of the natural numbers.
Is this just a way of evading the problem ? Perhaps the problem is meant to be evaded. 
After all, rats in Skinner Boxes do not appear to engage in explicit reasoning about 
mathematics, hence there is no need to have a means of expressing such theorems in 
ECTL.
We tend to lose sight of the fact that mathematics, and the mathematical sciences (the 
domain of non-trivial, interesting necessary truths) are highly sophisticated human 
social constructs. Methods of modelling such human social practice are likely to be 
similarly sophisticated, and it is therefore not surprising that the naive modelling of 
inteiiectuai effort in current research generates a "logical omniscience” failure mode in 
the basic form of Kripke semantics.
6 Simitar intuitions underly situation theory of course: see section 2.6.
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3.8: TOWARDS A THEORY OF MULTI-AGENT INTERACTION
1. In troduction
In this section I will briefly summarise what has been achieved so far in this chapter, 
and then discuss some of the issues which arise when attempting to extend the analysis to 
the multi-agent case. So far we have looked primarily at "isolate agents", intentional 
agents which operate in a non-intentionai environment. It is possible to identify two 
kinds of isolate agents, depending upon the extent to which the properties of the 
environment and the objectives of the agent are known at 'agent design time'.
1.1 Trop istic  agents
in the first case, suppose we have an agent-environment situation which can be 
characterised so precisely that for every possible "legal" environment state, it is 
possible to state what the agent should do in order to achieve its objectives. In addition, 
we suppose that the agent can classify environment states with respect to requisite 
action via perception. On this basis, the designer can achieve optimal design for the 
agent at design-time.
The agent's behaviour may then be given by a table of:
[equivalence class of environment-states response behaviour],
or equivalently,
[stimulus corresponding to equivalence class -» response behaviour].
The agent, by virtue of being designed correctly for its environment, will not make 
mistakes and is not required to learn anything1. Hence a behavioural account will 
suffice for prediction of its behaviour.
It is possible to synthesise an epistemic/conative account of such an agent's behaviour, 
but this essentially adds nothing in predictive power to the behavioural analysis. 
(Although it may help to account for whv the behaviour is as it is - recall the discussion 
about when an object is to count as an agent, in the previous section).
It is commonly supposed that naturally occurring examples of this kind of agent are 
non-social insects, where behaviour is driven off perception by fixed instincts. In Ai, a 
certain amount of work in this area has been carried out under the banner of "reactive 
systems" (see the remarks in the introduction). Following [Den78 p.75/76] I will call 
such agents tropistic.
1 The real-world "mistakes" which such agents make is a consequence of the idealised nature 
of the assumptions above. Sometimes they are not very idealised though.
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1.2. Skinnerian agents
If, on the other hand, the specification of the agent-environment situation is "loose”, so 
that only conditional constraints can be universally given, then the agent at runtime has 
to do more work. It has to determine from evidence which conditions are satisfied in the 
environment it finds itself, and therefore, which constraints are actual.
The indeterminacy as to which actual constraints hold in any particular environment 
state, plus the imperative that the agent always do something, generates the possibilities 
of mistakes being made, as we saw in the last section.
To create an agent to operate in such an environment, architecture design decisions, 
which could have been made by the designer in the "tropistic agent” case, must be 
deferred, to be made by the agent at runtime. Hence the agent must have an architecture 
which permits a degree of self-design (ie learning) to be achieved at runtime. Again 
following Dennett (ibid), I will call such agents Skinnerian.
The looseness of the agent-environment specification, and the under-determination of 
the environment by agent-perception "so far”, induces a space of possible environments 
for the agent at each environment state which are specification and evidence conformant. 
The environments constituting such spaces may or may not agree as to what the agent 
should do next, leaving the agent in a situation we might describe in English as "if that 
happens, it won't be sure what it should do next".
In previous sections, it was shown how to give a formal account of such intentional 
commentaries. In Dennett's language, such agents are first-order intentional systems, in 
that although we may usefully describe their behaviour in an intentional logic, they 
themselves are not required to characterise any object in their environment 
intentionally.
2. The Multi-Agent Case
Having reviewed progress so far, what would be involved in extending the approach of 
this thesis to the muiti-agent case ?
2.1. A collection of Isolate agents
There is a rather trivial sense in which we can create a multi-agent system by merely 
setting up an environment composed of a collection of first-order intentional systems. 
We (as external, God-like observers) will consider each agent intentional. The agents 
will not, however, consider each other intentional.
Is it possible to set up a coherent problem-specification which has this as a solution ? I 
believe that it is, a simple case being where each agent has to achieve goals which are 
largely Independent of all the other agent's goals2. A naturally occurring example of 
this kind of multi-agent set-up might be a collection of co-located non-social insects,
2 Apart from low level concerns, eg avoiding collisions, in the case of agents realised in a 
physical environment.
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examples of which can be seen in most gardens.
2.2. Tropistic (?) social agents
Even if we define a task, and implement its solution on a distributed collection of social, 
co-operating agents, this does not necessarily create too many difficulties, at feast 
architecturally.
In the introduction I referred to work on "artificial insects" carried out by the Mobile 
Robot Group at MIT. Luc Steels' group at the Free University of Brussels, working along 
similar lines3, has shown the astonishingly powerful behaviour modes of collections 
of agents which can communicate by simple tokens, and which internally are driven by a 
few simple rules; the so-called "ant models” . It is currently unknown what would 
constitute an epistemic-conative level of description of such ant-like models, hence it is 
not clear whether it is productive to assign to such agents an intentional stance vis-a- 
vis their co-agents, and therefore whether such agents are to be considered first-order 
or higher-order intentional systems.
2.3. The pre-conditions fo r dialogue
We can imagine however a more sophisticated problem definition, one which was loose in 
that it expressed environment and agent properties and objectives in a highly conditional 
fashion. A distributed solution to such a class of problems might involve agent 
manipulation of each other's goals and beliefs at run-time, rather than the kind of 
elementary "stimulus production and recognition" which constituted communication in 
the "ant" case.
On the biological evidence, the mechanisms for modifying a co-agent's cognitive state, 
above a certain level of sophistication, are primarily linguistic. Hence we might expect 
such agents to deploy conversation as part of an endeavour to define collective problems, 
assign problem-solving resource, co-ordinate behaviour, repair problems etc.
An analysis in this style, which is presumed to start from the design problem of 
achieving "underdetermined objectives" in an "underdetermined environment" using a 
collection of co-operating agents4, may result in the provision of higher-order 
intentional agents. Rather than rehearsing speculative details as to how the analysis 
might work through, I would prefer to contrast the method proposed here with two other 
approaches currently adopted in multi-agent interaction research.
Firstly, consider the work in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI), concerned either 
with reactive systems, as in the Luc Steels example, or with enhancements to 
STRIPS/NOAH-like isolate planners. This work is heavily architectural, and up to now 
has largely ignored the problems of designing agents which consider other agents in their 
environment to be intentional. It is perhaps quite surprising how much can be achieved 
in multi-agent interaction with merely first-order intentional systems.
3 see appendix to this section, where a short resume of this work is given.
4 Further assumptions are needed about the agents. Is it possible to make them functionally 
differentiated (like social insects, with workers, warriors etc), or do they all have to be 
architecturally the same ? Doubtlessly there are further, less obvious trade-offs.
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The second stream of work which should be mentioned is very far from architectural. It 
is concerned instead with formalising human-human linguistic behaviour, as a 
precursor to building computational dialogue partners (with potential applications in 
human-computer interaction). At present, this work has been largely driven off 
speech-act theory, as in the work of Allen, Perrault, Cohen, Levesque reported in 
Section 2.7.
It thereby inherits important weaknesses, because as we saw, speech-act theory itself 
ought to be rooted in a more fundamental theory of multi-agent interaction. The recent 
work of Cohen and Levesque, [CL87c], seems to have come to a similar conclusion, 
although their logic has a rather impoverished world model which makes it difficult for 
them to set up interesting agent-interactional problems to drive their analysis.
3. Conclusions
The approach of this thesis has, I believe, been quite successful in disentangling "what is 
really going on" in the attribution of "cognitive state" to isolate agents. I believe the 
work can be extended to the case of multi-agent interaction, with social agents and 
communication, although I see no evidence that the task will be easy.
I foresee the main problems being in areas which are currently the focus of both 
conceptual and technical difficulty. Pre-eminent here I believe is the problem of mutual 
knowledge and mutual intention. It arises in the (somewhat mysterious) Gricean 
analysis of non-natural meaning [Gri57,69], which was incorporated by Searle into 
speech-act theory. There have been a number of technical proposals as to how to model 
the phenomenon (see in particular [CL87c], [Pow84], [Bar88], [HM85], for about six 
approaches), without any completely compelling results.
Another problem is that of possible world models. A feature of conversation is the 
focusing of discourse around the topic of the conversation, where there is an almost 
tangible sense of building and examining a limited, relevant structure representing 
what the conversation is about. Situation Semantics, which takes such intuitions 
seriously, (see section 2 .6), introduced the technical device of situations as partial, 
relational structures. The approach of this thesis is to model situations as algebraic 
structures5-SRS worlds. Both these approaches are to be counterposed to the classical 
notion of worlds being all-encompassing totalities.
The power of the SRS approach is that it permits finite collections of agents and objects 
to be explicitly modelled as part of the causal order. This is a great advantage for agent 
theory over situation theory, but I have as yet no "topological" structure over SRS 
worlds which might correspond to the embedding of situations within other situations, 
the structures of situations mentioned in section 2.6, etc6. Further, as I noted in the 
previous section, there are in any case some unresolved conceptual and technical 
problems about the SRS model as regards what I called "intentional architectures".
5 As contrasted with relational structures, see [BS81 p. 192].
6 With reference to the finiteness of situations within situation theory, I have considered the 
possibility of an SRS space composed of fnext'-generated) finite sequences of SRS 
worldstates, to model the "local" understandings and goals of agents. This is briefly alluded to 
in section 4.4, but is basically work for the future.
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Stiil I am encouraged by results so far, and i have some confidence in addressing the 
further problems of multi-agent interaction with the same style of approach.
Appendix: A note on Luc Steels* work
Luc Steels reported on his work at a recent workshop (August ’89) on Multi-Agent 
Interaction. His talk, "Cooperation between Distributed Agents through Self- 
Organisation", concerned a simulated "Mars explorer system". The architecture was 
"ant-like", in the robotic tradition of work by Brooks at MiT. It consisted of a base ship, 
plus a large number of exploration robots, organised to act according to simple rules 
permitting exploration, return to the base ship, path-marking upon finding samples, 
and a general tendency to find marked paths attractive.
The explorer-robot architecture was based upon the well-known "subsumption" layered 
architecture explored at Stanford [Kae86] and at MiT [McL88]. The cleverness consists 
of finding the right collection of rules, and their relative prioritisations. A description 
was given of the behaviour of the simulation under different rules. This research is 
squarely within the "reactive systems" research paradigm, in which traditional 
cognitive science questions concerning intentional description are not asked. Thus the 
research does not address matters such as whether the robot explorers could usefully be 
described as having goals, knowledge, intentions etc. This is not necessarily a criticism 
however. As far as I am aware, an account of this work has not yet been published.
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CHAPTER 4: MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS 
4.1: introduction
The study of agents in the sense of this thesis presupposes entities located in time, which 
have a repertoire of actions, and which may be described in terms of knowledge, beliefs, 
goals and intentions. These notions are of course pre-theoretic, and the case for and 
against admitting them as necessarily the right theoretical concepts has been argued in, 
for example [Cla87, Sti83].
As noted in previous chapters, a significant amount of formal analysis of agency has been 
carried out using powerful tools based on classical and modal logics. We start in section
4.2 by reviewing the basics of modal logic, discussing in a propositional context moda! 
operators, Kripke semantics, connections between axiomatisations and accessibility 
relations and some decision procedures. This is then (briefly) extended to modal 
predicate logic.
in [Hin62, Hin69] Hintikka showed how a possible worlds semantics, in particular the 
semantics due to Kripke, could be used to make some sense out of our intuitions about 
knowledge and belief. The propositional development of this approach is discussed in 
some detail in section 4.3.
Behaviour occurs in time, and temporal reasoning is irreducibly part of any adequate 
agent theory. The subject bristles however with unsuspected complexities. In section 4.4 
the scope of the problem is outlined, and various traditions of work within philosophy, 
natural language semantics, Al and software engineering are discussed. There is a 
detailed discussion of some of the logics which have been extensively analysed in the 
course of this thesis work.
Finally in section 4.5, dynamic logic is introduced. There is something attractive about 
having actions explicitly represented in the syntax: the potential problem is that 
dynamic logic models actions as modal operators, where they are quite hard to "get at" if 
you wish to do anything other than reason about action composition. Dynamic logic has 
however been used successfully in Al, notably in [M008O].
The articles in this section represent those formal approaches which have seemed most 
significant to the problems this thesis is addressing, and to the approach to solving those 
problems which this thesis reports upon.
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4.2: SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS FOR MODAL LOGICS 
1. In troduction
The traditional starting point to explain modal logic is the modal propositional calculus. 
We start by looking at the system K. This is just the ordinary propositional calculus 
together with the extra modal operators 0 and []. Formally we define the primitive 
symbols thus:
1 . An enumerable set of sentence letters p, q,...
2 . monadic operators [j, 0,
3 . dyadic operators a ,  v , <-»,
4. punctuation symbols (, ).
From these building blocks we can produce the well-formed formulae (wff) of K thus:
1. Any sentence letter is a wff.
2. If A Is a wff, then so are -.A, []A, OA.
3. If A, B are wff, then so are Aa B, Av B, A-»B, A<-»B.
Note that Q and 0 are connected by the rules:
1. For any wff A, QA is the same as -.0-A.
2. For any wff A, OA is the same as -.Q^A.
0 is interpreted as ’’it is logically necessary that", while 0 is interpreted as "it is 
possible that". Other interpretations are possible as we shall see later, when we 
consider epistemic and temporal logics.
The axioms of K are ail the propositional tautologies plus the following axiom schema 
(where A and B are wff in the language of K).
K. [JA a  0(A —> B) —> []B.
We now turn our attention to the inference rules. These are:
1 . Modus ponens: from |- A and |- A B infer j- B
2. Necessitation: from j- A infer j- []A
where A and B are any theses (axioms or theorems) of K.
The system K is very weak, since it says nothing about how the modal operators interact 
with themselves or each other. By adding further properties of the modal operators we 
can get a number of other systems. We adopt the naming scheme by which the systems 
are named by the axioms which characterise them.
The system KT (or T) is obtained by adding the axiom schema
T. DA -> A.
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This says that if something is necessarily true, then it is actually true.
The system KT4 (or S4) is obtained from KT by adding the axiom schema:
4. DA -> DDA,
which loosely states that whenever a proposition is true by logical necessity, then this is 
never a matter of accident, but is always bound to be the case [HC72 p.43].
Note that because of axiom T, we actually have 
DA <-> DDA.
This logical equivalence can be used as a reduction rule (to cancel iterated modalities). 
The system KT45 (S5) is obtained from KT4 by adding the axiom:
5. OA -» 00A.
This can also be written -4]A -» D“ »DA. The logic KT45 is sometimes written KT5, since
the axiom schema 4 is derivable from 5, and thus is not independent.
These axiom schemas for KT4 and KT45 induce extra reduction rules. As a consequence, 
there are just 14 distinct modalities in KT4, and just 6 in KT45 (see [HC72 p.50].
If we were to add the axiom schema
I- A -> DA
to any of KT, KT4 or KT45 we then have as consequences 
QA <-> A, 
and therefore 
OA «-» A.
We can now systematically delete all the modal operators, and the resulting system is 
said to "collapse into propositional calculus"
2. Semantics
We now turn our attention to the semantics for propositional modal logic, starting with 
the system K. As suggested by the term "possible-worlds semantics”, the basic idea is 
that a particular model (for a set of sentences) includes a number of "possible worlds”. 
In each world, sentence letters may get different valuations, so that the different worlds 
correspond to different possible states of affairs.
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For a given world, the valuation for non-modal formulae is recursively constructed 
from the valuations of the individual sentence letters. However, for formulae containing 
modal operators, the valuation process has to look at sentence letter valuations in worlds 
other than the world currently considered (recall the intuition that something is 
necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds).
This raises the question of the connectivity of one world to another. We introduce the idea 
of an accessibility relation over worlds, which connects them together. It is a surprising 
fact (as we shall see) that certain very simple constraints over the form of the 
accessibility relation exactly correspond to the validity or otherwise of the axioms T, 4 
and 5.
For the propositional version of modal logic, the notion of world can be a very simple 
one, that of indices used to differentiate valuations. Let W be a set of indices, whose 
members are called worlds. We will use u, v, w as variables over W. Let R be a dyadic 
relation over W.
Let V: WFF -» W -» {0,1} be an interpretation function, where WFF is the set of wffs of 
modal propositional calculus.
Then a ^interpretation is a triple M = (W, R, V) so that:
1. If p is a sentence letter and u a world, then V p u e  {0,1}
2. If p is a wff and u a world, then V -,p u = (V p u)
3. If p, q are wff and u a world, then V pAq u *  (V p u) and (V q u)
The connectives v, and can be handled in terms of a  and -i.
4. if p e WFF and u e W, then V Qp u = 1 iff Vv e W. uRv implies (V p v) *  1.
If p e WFF and u e W, then V Op u *  1 iff 3v e W. uRv and (V p v) *  1.
Definition 4 says that p is necessarily true in u when it is true in all the worlds 
accessible to u; p is possible just when it is true in at least one world accessible from u 
(not necessarily in u itself).
Logical operators written in bold are considered part of a metalanguage for describing 
the logic.
Note that p does not have to be true in u itself, unless R is reflexive.
A wff p is valid in a model <W, R, V> iff V p w ■ 1 for every w in W.
A wff p is valid iff for every interpretation <W, R, V> and every u in W, (V p u)*11.
A KT interpretation is just the same as a K-interpretation, except that R has to be 
reflexive.
1 An increasingly popular style of presentation of semantics uses the satisfaction relation "I*:" 
in centre stage, rather than the valuation function V. This alternative approach is illustrated in
the discussion of epistemic logic in the next section.
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An KT4 interpretation is just the same as a ^interpretation, except that R has to be 
reflexive and transitive.
An KT45 interpretation is just the same as a ^interpretation, except that R has to be 
reflexive, symmetric and transitive, ie an equivalence relation.
3. F iltra tions
Given a logic L, let M « (W, R, V) be a model, and let r  be a set of sentences in L which is 
closed under subsentences. Then we can partition the worlds of W into equivalence 
classes which agree on the truth values of sentences in r .  For example, if r  -  {a}, then 
the equivalence classes are:
{w e W | w |-  a}, {w e W | w |* -ia}.
Clearly for n sentence letters in r ,  there are no more than 2n equivalence classes, 
corresponding to the lines in the truth-table for r .
Formally, a filtration of m through r  is a model M* *  (W*, R*, V*) where:
1 . W* is the set of equivalence classes in W.
2. Writing [u] for the equivalence class of u in W, if u R v, then [u] R* [v], and 
if [u] R* (vj, then for Qa in r ,  if M, u j* []a, then M, v |* a, and
if [uj R* [v], then for Oa in r ,  if M, v |= a, then M, u |« Oa.
3. V*(a, (uj) -  V(a, u).
The conditions on R* essentially make it mimic R over W, in W*: it is important to note
that they do not uniquely determine R*, merely laying down conditions which any
candidate relation over W* must satisfy.
The fundamental theorem for filtrations says that if M* is a r-filtration of M, then for 
every a in T:
M ,u |-  a iff M‘ , [u] |= a.
To understand this, think of the proposition denoted by a, ir(a), as the set of worlds 
{u,..., v, .... w, ...}. If we replace each world in n(a) by its equivalence class under the
r-filtration, we get {[uj  [v], .... [w], ...}. The filtration theorem says this is just the
proposition denoted by a in M‘ . Hence a world u in W, and its equivalence class [u] in 
W* agree on every sentence in r .
The key property of filtrations which flows from the fundamental theorem is that if a is 
invalid in a model M, then it is invalid in every filtration of M through a r  containing a. 
This result, really the negative form of the theorem, is used below.
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A final point. It is always possible to construct a filtration of a model M such that M* 
satisfies the members of r ,  makes the modal operators work correctly etc. What is not 
given by the filtration construction is any guarantee that the derived relation R* 
satisfies some properties (eg transitivity, reflexivity) which R did. Thus M* may not be 
a model for the logic. Examining this issue is a major concern in modal logic, since it has 
a bearing on decidability results, which is where this discussion is really leading.
N ote: The relations Ej, Cj introduced in section 3.6 are equivalence relations over 
Worlds, AgentWorids, whose equivalence classes agree on the truth values of sets of 
sentences in ECTL closed under subsentences. The sentences satisfiabie in each 
equivalence class are those given by epistemicTheory(w,i) or conativeTheory(w.i). As 
the world w "changes" between equivalence classes, the same sentence letters of ECTL 
get assigned different truth values via the distinct observational histories associated 
with each equivalence class.
This construction is not a filtration, although it is analogous, since the equivalence 
relations are used to induce new modal operators KNOWABLE, ACCEPTABLE, not as a 
means of "translating" the denotations of pre-existing operators.
4. The fin ite-m odel property
There is an important property of a logic called the finite-model property. We say that a 
logic has this property if every non-theorem of the logic is false in some finite model 
(recall a model is finite if the cardinality of its set of worlds is finite). To show a logic 
has this property, we apply the following procedure.
1. We take a logic L and a class of models C such that L is sound and 
complete in C, ie
L |- a i f f  C |= a.
2 . By means of filtrations, we show that there is a class of finite models 
C-FIN in C, so that
L |- a i f f  C-FIN |= a.
Then L has the finite-model property, for if for some a it's not the case that L |- a, then 
in some finite model M in C-FIN, it's not the case that M |= a.
To show (2), we split the bi-conditional thus:
2.1 show L |- a implies C-FIN |= a.
This is straightforward, because we already have from (1) that L j- a implies C |= a, ie 
provable formulae are true in all models in C - soundness, hence they will certainly be 
true in any subset of C, and in particular in C-FIN.
2.2 show that C-FIN |= a implies L j- a, or contrapositively,
show that if it's not the case L |- a, then it's not the case C-FIN |= a.
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If it's not the case L |- a, then there is some model M in C where not M |« a. Construct a 
filtration via a set of subsentence-ciosed sentences containing a, from M giving M* in 
such a way that M* is in C. M*. being finite, is of course in C-FIN. Since M did not
satisfy a, then by the fundamental filtration theorem (above), neither does M*t and so
it's not the case that C-FIN |* a.
So if we can do ail of this, then the logic has the finite-model property, and we can
derive a decidability result.
5. The finite-model property and decidability
A logic is decidabie if there is an effective procedure which will state for any sentence of 
the logic whether it is a theorem or not. Such an effective procedure is really equivalent 
to two procedures:
a  a test which will respond "yes" if the sentence ia a theorem;
b. a test which will respond "no" if the sentence is not a theorem.
As regards (a), if the inference rules of the logic are computable and finite in number, 
and if there are a set of axioms for the logic, then the logic is said to be axiomatizable. In 
this case, every theorem has a proof (a finite sequence of sentences, each of which is an 
axiom, or follows from previous sentences by one of the inference rules). Hence an 
effective positive test for theoremhood is the enumeration of proofs in (partial) order of 
their lengths as sequences.
As regards (b), suppose we have a non-theorem a of the logic (as a non-theorem of
course, it won't have a proof: if contingent, it won't have a disproof either), if the logic
has the finite model property, then there will be some finite model Mn in which a is 
false.
In principle, we simply enumerate models (each model is finite), check each model to 
make sure it is a model of the logic (a finite task provided the logic is axiomatised by a 
finite number of axiom schemas and rules of inference), and then check whether a is 
false or not. Eventually, if a is a non-theorem, we will arrive at Mn, and ascertain a's 
non-theoremhood.
Clearly if a is not a non-theorem, then it is a theorem, and a proof can be sought as 
mentioned above. It follows that a logic is decidabie if it is axiomatisable (by a finite 
number of schemas), and it has the finite model property.
A number of the standard logics based upon schemas such as K, T, 4, 5 are decidabie, 
although the above argument does not provide the basis for an efficient decision 
procedure. We now briefly consider the question of more efficient decision procedures.
6 . Decision procedures
A decision procedure for wff's of a (modal) propositional calculus is an effective
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procedure which will indicate for any wff whether or not it is valid. An efficient 
technique for ordinary propositional calculus is that of the semantic tableaux, in which 
the truth-tables of the various propositional connectives are used "outermost inwards" 
to seek a falsifying interpretation of a wff. if this fails (through a requirement for 
inconsistent assignment), then the wff must be valid.
Corresponding methods for K, KT and KT4 exist, with greater complexity due to the need 
to consider various worlds simultaneously. For KT45 however, because of the nature of 
the accessibility relation as an equivalence relation, a relatively straightforward 
technique exists, based on a prior reduction of a wff to modal conjunctive normal form 
(see [HC72 p.117) for details).
7. Modal predicate calculus
We now turn our attention briefly to the modal variants of standard first order logics. 
The basic strategy is to associate a domain of individuals, functions and relations with 
each world. This gives rise to the following problems.
What is the connection between the domains of individuals in different worlds ? Are they 
the same, are they allowed to differ in controlled ways or in arbitrary ways ?
If the domains are constrained to be the same in all possible worlds, then there is the 
problem of how the same individual in different possible worlds is to be identified as 
being the same. Notions such as "standard names" have been proposed as possible 
solutions.
If the domains are allowed to be different, then there are problems with quantifiers, 
particularly the so-called "quantifying-in" problem, in which a quantifier has a modal 
operator in its scope, and therefore instances of the bound variable are to be evaluated at 
other worlds than the current one. What happens if an individual doesn't exist at a world 
where evaluation is called for ? A related problem is that of existential generalisation, 
in which one wishes to infer an existential formula which may have a modal operator in 
its scope.
Since this is not a treatise on modal logic in general, these problems will not be 
considered further here. They are further discussed in section 2.2 which examines 
Robert Moore's logic for knowledge and action.
Note: material for this section was mainly drawn from [Che80], [HC72] and [HC84].
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4.3: EPISTEMIC AND DOXASTIC LOGICS
1. In troduction
Epistemic logics deal with knowledge and belief (the latter is sometimes referred to as 
doxastic logic). The necessity operator Q of the standard alethic logics of necessity and 
possibility is interpreted as "knows" (written K) or "believes" (written B).
In the simple treatment considered here, there is only one knower (believer) and 
therefore the agent argument place can be elided. I will first discuss epistemic 
propositional logic, then doxastic propositional logic, and finally make some remarks 
about generalisations.
2. Epistemic propositional logic
Formally we define the primitive symbols thus:
1. An enumerable set of sentence letters p. q,
2. monadic operators K,
3. dyadic operators a , v ,  <-»,
4. punctuation symbols (, ).
From these we can produce the well-formed formulae (wff) thus:
1. Any sentence letter is a wff.
2. If A Is a wff, then so are -A t KA.
3. If A, B are wff, then so are AaB, AvB, A->B, A<->B.
The axioms are all the propositional tautologies plus the following axiom schema (where 
A, B, C are w ff).
K. (KA a  K(A -> C)] KC.
K is the consequential closure axiom. An agent knows the consequences of its knowledge.
T. KA-» A.
T is the knowledge axiom: only true facts can be known.
4. KA -» KKA.
4 is the positive introspection axiom: an agent knows that it knows something.
5 . -K A  -> K(-KA).
5 Is the negative introspection axiom: an agent knows that it doesn’t know something.
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There are two rules of inference:
R1: |- A j- A-> C
  Modus Ponens.
l -C
R2: |- A
  Necessitation.
|- KA
R2 means that all valid formulas are known. This property of "logical omniscience" is 
sometimes considered counter-intuitive.
3. Semantics
Unlike in the previous section, the Kripke semantics is here presented via the 
satisfaction relation |=,
Define a structure M *  (W, R, V) where
1. W is a set of indices, whose elements are called "worlds".
2. R is an accessibility relation over W. Different properties of R correspond
to choices amongst the axioms mentioned above, as discussed in the previous
section.
3. V is an interpretation function taking formulas and worlds to denotations.
We can now define the notion of a formula being true at a world w with respect to a 
structure M via the satisfaction relation |=. For any sentence letters p, and formulae A,
C:
1 . M,w |= P iff
2 . M,w j* -nA iff
3. M,w |= > > o iff
4. M.w |= KA iff
This last clause captures the intuition that A is known if it holds in all the worlds 
accessible to the knower via the accessibility relation R.
If WFF is the set of all wffs in the logic, we can define a function k : WFF -> W-set taking 
a wff to the worlds in which it is true. In this case we can write:
5 M,w |= A iff w e ic(A).
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Note that for any formula A:
Vw e jc(A). V A w *  1.
Hence (V A) is the characteristic function for the set n(A). This set is sometimes called 
the proposition denoted by A.
A formula A is valid iff for all M, and for all worlds w e Wf M,w |« A.
A formula A is satisfiable iff 3M, 3w e W | M,w |- A.
4. Belief
If something is believed, it is not required to be true. Thus axiom T above has to be 
dropped. However, it is conventionally assumed that beliefs are consistent, so that a 
proposition and its contrary cannot both be believed. Hence writing B as the belief 
operator, we axiomatise the resulting logics like this:
All propositional tautologies.
K. [BA a  B(A->C)] -> BC.
D. BA —> —.B—A.
4. BA -» BBA.
5. -.BA -> B(-iBA).
There remains the problem of finding a class of models for these axioms. In fact we need 
to alter the properties of the accessibility relation R. Note that a relation R is
1. serial iff Vw e W. 3u e W . wRu;
2. euclidean when Vu, v, w e W. (uRv a uRw) vRw.
Consider the semantics of B given by the statement:
M,w |-B A  i f f  Vu | wRu. M,u J* A.
Since A is not required to be true in world w, it follows that R should not be reflexive.
Since what is believed must be consistent (D), then in any world w there must be at 
least one accessible world. This means that R must be serial. The resulting logic is called 
KD, or "weak-T".
If you believe what you believe as required by axiom 4, it turns out that R must be 
serial and transitive. The resulting logic is called KD4, or "weak-S4".
If when you don't believe something, you also believe that you don't believe it, as 
required by axiom 5, then R must additionally be euclidean. The resulting logic is called 
KD45, or "weak-S5".
It follows from R being euclidean that R is an equivalence relation over the worlds
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accessible from (but not including) w.
5. Generalisations to many agents
The above treatment can be easily generalised to the many knower, or many believer 
case, by adding a second "agent" parameter to the K or B operators. In these cases 
questions of mutual and common knowledge come up (mutual knowledge is just what 
"everybody knows", while common knowledge is knowledge that "everybody knows", and 
that "everybody knows everybody knows" and .... , modelled by an infinitary operator). A 
treatment can be found in [HM85j; some of the hidden depths are outlined in [Bar88].
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4.4: TEMPORAL LOGIC
1. In troduction
Temporal reasoning has been historically coextensive with the mathematical modelling 
of physical phenomena. This approach, with time as an "independent variable", leads 
typically to a first-order temporal formalism (quantification over time-point 
individuals).
In contrast, the analysis of temporal features of natural language, which abound with 
operators such as "before", "since", "sometimes", and which exhibits structural 
features such as tense, suggests the need for sentential operators to capture temporal 
aspect. This tends to lead to a modal logic approach (historically initiated by Prior 
[P r i6 7 ]) .
It is possible to take intermediate positions using "reified logics", in which special 
temporal predicates take both "time" and "propositional" arguments: there is then 
further scope for debate as what the denotation of such "propositional" arguments might 
be - 'concepts', sentences, possible-worlds, intervals etc.
2. The structure of time
Van Benthem, in his classic book "The Logic of Time" [Ben83] classifies possible models 
of time into three categories, depending upon whether the assumed temporal primitives 
are points, intervals or events. To get a feel for the complexities of such structural 
analysis, take as an example a point ontology, and let T be the set of time elements.
2.1. A point ontology
We have an initial choice: is T to be discrete, like N o rZ  (and then: finite or infinite ?); 
dense, like Q; or complete, like R ?
All our intuitions of time include notions or earlier and later, pointing to an order 
relation over T. But does this relation induce a smallest/largest member of T, 
(corresponding to a beginning/end of time) ? Is the order partial, admitting branching 
structures (forwards ? backwards ?), or total, admitting a unique time-line ? We can 
ask questions about the connectivity of time, and about the possible existence of a metric 
over T.
2.2. Interval and event ontologies
Taking intervals as primitive is achieved by postulating a set I of intervals, with two 
relations over it, an order relation and an inclusion relation. Again, there are many 
possible properties of I and its relations which are open to choice. Taking events as 
primitive seems at present to be more problematic.
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2.3. Logics characterising semantic choices
Corresponding to such choices in the model-theoretic domain, conditions are imposed 
over the structure of logics which may be interpreted by them. In the case of modal 
treatments of course, the by-p!ay between axiom schemes and the characterising model 
classes is well-known (cf section 4.2).
3. Al approaches
The usual work in Ai which is reviewed is that of McDermott [McD82] and Alien 
[AII84]. The remarks below are based upon [Gal87] and [Sho87] as well as on the 
original sources.
McDermott is interested in modelling events, on the assumptions that time is continuous 
while the future is indeterminate. His semantic structures are therefore forward 
branching trees, with paths through a tree being copies of R. Events are then identified 
with the intervals in such a tree in which the event takes place.
Allen adopts an interval semantics, axiomatising the order and inclusion relations over 
them. His interval structures are linear, and he is interested in using them to model 
events, properties and processes. Predicates such as OCCURS(e,i), HOLDS(p,i) and 
OCCURRING(p.i) are introduced to show how events, properties and processes are 
anchored to intervals i.
A good discussion of the above work can be found in [Sho87].
The Al approach seems "philosophically-driven", in that the work is concerned to model 
naturalistic, unformalised phenomena such as painting houses, running around tracks 
etc. There seems an emphasis on keeping metrical information explicit (ie accepting a 
requirement to be able to name individual times and durations within an 'arithmetic' 
paradigm), while at the same time wishing to preserve a special syntactic place for 
temporality. These two requirements iead to a selection of "reified logics" being 
developed ([Sho87] exhibits a relatively 'pure' form of this).
If one merely wishes to discuss the order-theoretic properties of time, with little 
concern for metrical attributes, then one can employ the sophisticated apparatus of 
modal logic. This situation basically applies in software engineering, where the concerns 
are idealised program behaviour, and in this thesis, where we are interested in the 
properties of entirely formalised computational sequences.
4. Concerns of this thesis
The basic computational structure studied in this thesis is the forward-infinite sequence 
of environment states called (eg in section 3.5) an SRS-world. At first sight, this would 
appear to naturally interpret a linear discrete-time logic, and indeed this is the 
approach taken in that section.
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There are complexities however, if we consider an object a in a particular environment 
state e|, which is totally informed about the objects in its environment, then we can 
consider the tree of possible future environment states, rooted at 6| , and indexed by 
possible action sequences of a. This is a kind of "games tree", and could conveniently 
interpret some of the branching-time logics developed in software engineering. 
Similarly, if an object a reviews its finite experience on the interval [e0 ... eM ], then 
the question of an interval semantics is raised.
These concerns prompt the following discussion of these two, perhaps slightly 
unfamiliar, styles of temporal logic.
5. Branching Time Logic
An intensive research programme has been under way during the last decade to 
investigate and formalise branching-time logics. These are the major milestones.
5.1. CTF • Computation Tree Formulae
This language was introduced in [EC80] to specify properties of the traces of non- 
deterministic programs. CTF formulae consisted of path quantifiers V, 3; node
quantifiers V (forail), 3 (there exists), V°° (for all but a finite number - "almost
everywhere") and 3°° (there exist infinitely many), prefixing state or program 
formulae.
5.2. UB - Unified system of Branching Time
UB was introduced in [BMP81] as a system which can represent both linear and 
branching time logic.
Linear time, it is argued, is the correct model when studying properties of 
computational behaviour which are to hold for all execution sequences. Even a non- 
deterministic program, when actually executing, generates a linear execution sequence. 
Hence linear-time logic is appropriate for universal properties, such as total 
correctness.
Branching time logic, on the other hand considers the execution tree of all traces which 
could possibly be generated by a non-deterministic program. This is a suitable logic for 
analysing existential properties, such as correct termination for at least one possible 
computation, or the property that there is at least one computation realising some goal.
Note that branching time logic is implicit in the structures of dynamic logic (see the 
next section).
UB is the standard propositional calculus together with six temporal modal operators, 
formed by combining path quantifiers V (forail), 3 (there exists) with state 
quantifiers G (always), F (sometimes) and X (next).
I will write U for G. 0 for F and 0  for X, in accordance with the preferred notation of 
this thesis.
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5.3. Semantics for UB
A model T for UB is a triple T « (S, R, n) where S is a set of states (nodes), R is a 
binary relation over S, and n is a function which takes states, and returns the set of 
proposition letters true in that state.
R is total, hence time is never-ending. An s-branch is an infinite path
b -  (Sq, s-j , S2.-*»)
where Sj R Sj+-j for Sj e b, i £ 0.
Let p, q be propositional formulae, and let a be a sentence letter, then the semantics for 
UB can be presented using the satisfaction relation j-  as follows. Note that the 
quantification "Vb" applies over all the paths b e  T which originate at s, ie b *  (s ,...).
s |* a iff a e 7t(s).
s j*  p v q iff s |= p or s |= q.
S |= V []p  iff Vb, Vt, te  b —> t |= p.
s |= VOp iff Vb, 3 te  b | 11= p.
s |= VOp iff Vb, 3t e b | sRt -» t j= p.
S |-= 3[]P ^  ab, Vt, te b t |= p.
s I-  30p iff 3b, at e b | 1 1= p.
s I-  a o p  iff ab, at e b | sRt 11- p.
We could add in here the various logical axioms and inference rules of UB: note in 
particular:
R3: (Generalisation): if |- p then j- V []p .
5.4. CTL - Computation Tree Logic
CTL was introduced in [CE82], based upon CTF, but using the notation of UB. Note that 
in [CE82], UB is characterised as being CTF without infinitary quantifiers and program 
(arc) expressions, but with a "next instant" operator.
CTL (in the basic form in the paper) is UB plus an "until" operator U, where pUq is 
satisfied by a sequence of states with a prefix in which p is true (in every state), 
followed by a state in which q is true.
The paper also considers an extension to CTL in which the infinitary operators V°°,
3°° (over nodes) of CTF are added, although this enhanced logic is not named. The main 
point of the paper is to develop a model-checker for temporal logic formulae in CTL, 
which given a formula and a finite structure, checks whether the structure satisfies the 
formula. The algorithm given generalises to the case of infinitary quantifiers.
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5.5. CTL+
CTL+ was introduced in [EH82] to extend CTL by allowing a path quantifier to prefix a 
boolean combination of state quantifiers.
Thus the formula "3 (0p a [Jq)" is inexpressible in CTL, but is legal in CTL+. This 
paper is also the first to distinguish clearly between state formulae and path formulae. 
Thus:
1. Every primitive formula p, q is a state formula.
2. If p and q are state formulae, so are -p , p a  q.
3. If p is a state formula, then Qp, Op, Op are path formulae.
4. If p is a path formula, then 3p, Vp are state formula.
5. If p, q are state formulae, then pUq (p until q) is a path formula.
6 . If p, q are path formula, then so are ->p, p a  q.
The rest of the paper defines a semantics for CTL+, and then presents a decision 
procedure for satisfiability in the logic, and a completeness result.
5.6. CTL*
CTL* was introduced in [EH83] as a vehicle for comparing linear and branching time 
formalisms for modelling properties of concurrent and non-deterministic programs. It 
is CTL+, augmented with the infinitary quantifiers of CTF mentioned above, it may be 
noted that this paper has a very detailed and thorough treatment of semantic issues.
A further discussion of CTL*, together with a decision procedure for the logic, is given 
in [ES84].
6. Moszkowski’s interval temporal logic (ITL) fo r Tempura
Ben Moszkowski was interested in computing in temporal logic, and to this end designed 
a temporal logic programming language called Tempura. The computational model is 
based upon interpreting Tem pura  programs over intervals, hence an interval 
semantics for Tempura expressions seemed appropriate. The formalism underlying 
Tem pura is called Interval Temporal Logic (full details in [Mos86]).
6.1. ITL Syntax
The syntax has the usual connectives, and the temporal operators 0 ,0 ,  Q. It also 
includes function and predicate symbols and equality. The operator O can be applied to 
terms giving a term, as well as to formulae.
6.2. ITL Semantics
A model is a triple (D, S, M) where
D is a data domain (taken to be the integers),
S is a set of states (functions m^>mg variables to integers),
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M is a valuation function over intervals and language elements.
Note that M does not take an interval argument when applied to function or predicate 
symbols. This means that function and predicate symbols have meanings independent of 
interval details.
Intervals (of time) are non-empty finite sequences drawn from S+.
If i is an interval, then |i| is the length, the number of state-transitions in it. Individual
states in i are written i0, ii,...,ijj|, ie we can write
i *  <Iq, i-j#...,i|jj >.
We define tail(i) to be i-j ..i|j| when |i[ > 0 .
M i [e] is the value in D of the expression e on the interval i. Likewise M i [w] is the
truth-value of formula w on interval i.
6.3. Expressions
1. M i [V] *  \q (V). a variable's value on an interval is its value
on the first state.
2 . M i [f(e.j ,..,ek)] *  M [f] (M i [e ^ .- .M  i [ek]).
3. M i [Oej *  M (tail i) [e]. Its "next" value is undefined if |ij=0.
4. M i Ip(e1 f..tek)] -  M [p] (M i [e ^  M i [ek]).
5. M i [e1«e2] = true iff M i [e-j] = M i [e2].
6.4. Formulae
1. M i l-iw] = true iff M i [w] ■ false.
2. M i [w-j a  w2l *  true iff M i [w-j] = true and
3. M i [Ow] = true iff |i| > 0 and M tail(i)
4. M i [[]w] = true iff Vr < |i|, M <ir ..i|ji>
rather strange definition ensures that w is true on all suffixes of i, ensuring that 
state in i becomes the first at some point.
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As pointed out in [Hal87], We can define the semantics in a more traditional style by 
letting R be an accessibility relation, so that:
IR j iff j is a terminal subsequence of i, thus
IR] iff 3 re  0 ..|i|, j *  <ir..i|j| >.
On this basis, we can say
M I [[]w] *  true iff V j 1 iRj, M j [w] » true.
Since R is reflexive and transitive, the logic is at least S4. Likewise,
M i [Ow] « true iff 3j | iRj and M j [w] « true.
6.5. S a tis fiab ility  and Valid ity.
A formula w is satisfiable on an interval i iff M i [w] -  true, we write i |« w. If all 
intervals satisfy w, then w is valid: we write |= w.
7. Discussion: the u tility  of branching-time logics
Although branching-time logics seem attractive at first sight as logics which elegantly 
combine temporal and epistemic properties, there are some problems for a general 
treatment of agent intentionality.
1. The tree structure implies that the agent is always fully informed about 
the past and the present; it is only the future which is unclear. In reality, 
an agent is often uninformed about both the present and the past: this 
implies both sideways and backwards branching, which destroys the tree 
structure, and therefore the logics.
2. The branching of the tree is normally taken to be derived from the 
indeterminacy of what the agent might do. But for an agent, there are 
many reasons for indeterminacy, based upon ignorance of environmental 
behaviour as well as an abstention from deciding yet what the agent itself 
might wish to do. This tends to create very complex vectors of possible 
environmental actions which label possible future (and past) states.
3. The tree structure directly models successor/ancestor relationships, 
which are essentially temporal, but does not explicitly model the sibling 
relationships, which capture epistemic or conative uncertainty.
4. In the kind of computational, generated model discussed in this thesis (ie 
the SRS-worlds of section 3.5 and 3.6), it is extraordinarily 
cumbersome to generate branching structures1: the computational
________ model of SRS-worlds is inherently deterministic.
1 See [See86] for a convincing demonstration i The problem arises because each branch 
corresponds to the agent being the sort of agent which would take that branch. Hence it becomes 
impossible to model the state of the agent in a worldstate with more than one successor state.
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For restricted problems, such as game-piaying, where a tree-search model has already 
been shown to be appropriate, formalising the game-player in a branching-time logic 
might well be a very interesting exercise. In a more general setting it seems more 
appropriate to factor out the temporal dimension by considering linear worlds, and then 
add in epistemic and conative concerns by considering spaces of such worlds. This was 
the approach taken by Cohen and Levesque (see footnote 10, p. 305 in [CL87a]), and in 
sections 3.5, 3.6 of this thesis.
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4.5: DYNAMIC LOGIC
Dynamic logic is a modal logic with many modalities. Its intended purpose is to mode! 
computer programs, conceived of as descriptions of state-changing actions. In Al, it was 
used to good effect by Robert Moore, in his thesis work developing a 'Logic for Knowledge 
and Action’ [M008OJ.
The treatment here follows that of David Harel's thesis work, reported in [Har78], We 
start by reviewing the propositional version of dynamic logic, initially in the very 
simple case of elementary propositional dynamic logic.
1. Elementary propositional dynamic logic (EPDL)
1.1. Syntax
We have a set of symbols AF -  {P,Q,...} which stand for atomic formulae, and a set of 
symbols AP -  {a,b,...} which stand for atomic programs. Intuitively atomic formulae 
are true or false in states (corresponding to "possible worlds" in the semantics), and 
atomic programs correspond to state-state transitions.
The set of well-formed formulae (wff) of EPDL are defined as follows.
1. All members of AF are wff.
2. If a e AP is an atomic program, and P, Q are wffs, then: PvQ, -P  and <a>P are wffs.
3. If P,Q are wffs, P a Q, P->Q, P**Q, [a]P are introduced by the usual definitions (eg
[a]P is -i<a>-.P).
4. Nothing else is a wff.
1.2. Semantics
We introduce a non-empty set of states W *  {s, t,...}. The meaning of a wff P is defined 
to be the subset of W which are the states which satisfy it.
Atomic programs, (ie members of AP) are defined to be (accessibility) relations over 
W. To be precise, the meaning of a program "a" in AP is a binary relation, so that (s, t) 
is in the relation iff "a" can start in state s, and then can terminate in state t. Programs 
are non-deterministic, and thus may terminate in several different states from a given 
initial state.
Formally, we define a structure S to be a triple (W, x, m), where
1. W is a non-empty set of possible states,
2 . je: AF -> W-set1 is a meaning function for atomic formulae,
1 If X is a set, then X-set is the powerset of X.
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3. m: AP -> (W x W)-set is a meaning function for atomic programs.
We can think of m as a family of accessibility relations indexed by atomic programs.
We extend it to wffs by the following definitions:
1. It (P V Q) *  7t(P) U 7C(Q)
2. it (-.P) *  W - n(P).
3. n (<a>P) -  {s | 3t. (s,t) e m{a) a  t e ir(P)}
That is, <a>P denotes the set of states in which program "a" can start, terminating (at
least in one way) in a state in which P holds.
Let us write:
s |* P ("s satisfies P”) iff s e it (P);
s-a->t i f f  (s,t) e m(a).
Then for a given structure S, we can write:
s |« <a>P i f f  3t. s-a->t a t j= P.
This says that "s satisfies 'a-possibiy P' if there is at least one state reachable from s 
through program a, in which P holds".
Likewise we have:
s |= [a]P i f f  Vt. s-a->t -> 11= P.
This says that "s satisfies 'a-necessarily P' iff every state reachable from s by program
a satisfies P. Note that this can hold even if there are no a-accessible states from s.
1.3. Valid ity and sa tis fiab ility
For a given S=(W, it, m), we say a wff P is S-satisfiable if for some s e W, s |= P. P is 
satisfiable if it is S-satisfiable for some S.
A wff P is S-valid if for every s in W, s j= P. P is valid if it is S-valid for all structures
S. If P is valid, we write |= P.
Here are some examples of valid wffs:
| *  <a>(P a Q)-> (<a>P a <a>Q)
| « ([a]P a  <a> true) -> <a>P (true is Q v -,Q).
The last example says that if wherever you go, P holds, and if you can go somewhere, 
then you can go somewhere where P holds.
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We now consider a more expressive language for describing programs, that of regular 
expressions.
2. Propositional dynamic logic (PDL)
In PDL, the set of programs is taken to be the set of regular expressions over AP.
2.1. Syntax
We have the sets AF, of atomic formulae, and AP, of atomic programs as before, together 
with the proviso that a special symbol "0" (the empty program) belongs to AP.
The set R of regular programs is defined thus.
1. All members of AP, the atomic programs, are in R.
2. If A and B are in R, then so are: A;B, A u B  and A*.
The sym bolcorresponds to sequence, "u" to alternation (we rely upon context and the 
reader to distinguish this use of the symbol from set union) and to iteration - the 
three constructs of "structured programs".
The set of wff of PDL is defined exactly analogously to EPDL The following are wffs:
1. All members of AF, the atomic formulae, are wff's .
2. If A is a regular program in R, and P, Q are wffs, then P vQ , -»P, <A>P are wffs.
3. Definitions of a , «-», [J  are added as for EPDL.
4. Nothing else is a wff.
2.2. Semantics
As In EPDL, we have the notion of a structure S = (W, n, m). We now however need to 
generalise m to regular programs.
1. m (0) « {}
The empty program corresponds to the empty accessibility relation.
2. m (A;B) « {(s,t) j 3u. s -A-> u a  u *B-> t)
The meaning of A followed by B is that A takes the start state to an
intermediate state, which is then taken by B to a final state.
3. m (A u  B) -  {(s,t) j s -A-> t v s -B-> t}
The meaning of A or B is the (even more) indeterminate program that
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can behave either like A or B.
4. m (A*) « {(s,t) | 3i£0, | for some sequence of states s0-sjf 
where s0*s and Sj=t, s0 -A-> s1 -A->.... -A-> Sj}
The meaning of the iteration operator is to do A any finite number of 
times. If A is done zero times, then its meaning is the relation 
{(s,s) | s e W}, namely the identity relation on W.
The definitions of it are carried through unchanged from EPDL.
A number of theorems exploring the connections between the operators "u" and 
are discussed in [Har78] pages 10, 11. Note that PDL is decidabie, and has complete 
axiomatisations (page 11).
3. Regular firs t-o rder dynamic logic (DL)
DL is a first-order logic capable of describing "real programs", real in the sense that 
the value of expressions may be tested, and that there is a notion of assignable variable. 
In particular, it is possible to write down algorithms in DL, although the results look 
fairly odd compared with conventional programming notation.
3.1. Syntax
We assume a set of function symbols f, g,..., each with an associated arity. Zeroary 
function symbols are called variables, and written x, y, z,.„ (rather than x() etc).
We assume a set of predicate symbols p,q each with an associated arity. The equality
symbol is included, with its usual interpretation.
A term is a k-ary function symbol followed by a k-tuple of terms, (terms are finite 
objects, so there are no infinitely nested expressions).
An atomic formula is a k-ary predicate symbol followed by a k-tuple of terms.
We can now define the set RG of first-order regular programs, and the set of wffs in DL 
as follows:
1. If x is a variable and e a term, x <- e is in RG.
2. If P is a program-free wff (see below), P? is in RG.
3. If A and B are in RG, so are (A;B), (A u  B), A*.
4. Any atomic formula is a wff.
5. If x is a variable, P and Q are wffs and A is in RG, -.P, P vQ , 3x. P, and <A>P are 
wffs.
6. The symbols a ,  <-», [A] are introduced as previously.
7. Vx. P is defined as ->3x. -.P.
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3.2. Program -freeness
A wff which contains no occurrence of an RG program is called program-free, or a 
"first-order” formula. An expression such as x <- e is called an assignment, an 
expression such as P? is called a test.
3.3. Semantics
We introduce the notion of state (playing the role of a possible world in modal first- 
order predicate calculus). A state I is a pair (D, V) where D is a non-empty domain, and
V assigns total functions and predicates to function and predicate symbols. In particular
V assigns elements of D to variables and the truth values "true" or "false" to sentences.
The class of all possible states will be called r  (the "grand universe"). We are, 
however, interested in subcollections of r ,  called universes. Universes will be 
characterised by a fixed value for the domain D (across all the states in the universe), 
and a restriction on V so that function and predicate symbols are rigid designators. We 
get to the notion via the auxiliary notion of pseudo-universe.
First we consider a set of states sharing a common domain D (thus the interpretation 
function V is allowed to vary between states). This is called a pseudo-universe U.
Suppose there is a function symbol f which in state I is interpreted as the function F. 
Then if we can always find a state J (in U), which is just the same as I except perhaps 
that the symbol f gets assigned a different function, then f is called uninterpreted. A 
similar argument holds for predicate symbols. Conversely, a symbol is called fixed in U 
if it is bound to the same function or relation in each of the states of U. in standard 
possible-worlds semantics, such a symbol is called a "rigid designator".
A universe is a pseudo-universe in which every function and predicate symbol is fixed; 
a universe is called simple if the only uninterpreted symbols are a designated set of 
variables. The fixed variables can then be called constants.
In programming terms, a simple universe is one in which as the program executes, the 
meanings of functions, predicates and constants doesn't change, only the variables get 
bound to different individuals.
In a state I -  (D, V), the value of a term e -  f(e^t...(e|() is defined thus 
V e *  (V f)(V e i  V ek).
We now define the program meaning relation m over elements of RG, together with the 
meaning of DL wffs, which we shall define via the satisfaction relation |*. Recall that 
m associates a program with a relation between initial and terminal states, while a wff 
may be satisfied by states.
1. If x is a variable, and e a term
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m (x <- e) « {(l,J) | J -  l[x->V(e)]} .
Note that the notation f[x->a] denotes a function just like f except that when applied to x, 
it yields a. By abuse of notation, l[x -> V(e)] is a state just like I (* (D, V)) except 
that its interpretation function is V[x-> V(e)j.
2. For any program-free wff P, 
m (P?) *  {(1,1) | I |-  P}
These are just the identity transitions over states satisfying P.
3. For any A, B in RG,
m (A;B), m (A u  B), m (A*) are defined as for PDL, above.
4. If P(e<|,...fek) is an atomic formula,
I |* P(ei,...,6|() just when (V P)(V e^.-.V e^) = true.
5. If x is a variable, P and Q are wff and A is a program in RG, then:
( I ) I j= —.P i f f  it is not the case that 1|= P
( i i )  11= P v Q if f  either I hP or I hQ
( i i i )  I |= 3x. P i f f  Bd e D so that l[x->d] |- P.
(iv) I j= <A>P i f f  3J so that I -A-> J and J |= P.
Notice that the only kinds of formulae which depend upon states other than I for their 
truth conditions contain modal operators.
Usually the states used in the above definitions will be restricted to a simple universe U. 
We say that a wff P is U-va!id (|« P) if for every I in U, I |= P.
We say P is valid (|=P) if P is valid in all universes. There is a minor technical point 
that variables used in assignment or bound in quantification must be uninterpreted, see 
[Har78] page 15 for details.
3.4. Examples
Suppose we choose the domain D to be the natural numbers N with +,.,0 having their 
usual values. The following wff is valid.
j*  <(x <•• x-1)*>(x=0)
since for any x, there is always one way of subtracting sufficient one's to reach zero.
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For a presentation of the "greatest common divisor" program written in DL, see [Har78] 
page 16.
Notions such as partial and total correctness are straightforward to express in DL. Thus 
the partial correctness of A wrt P and Q, which in Hoare’s logic is written P{A}Q, can be 
written in DL as
l - j  P -*  [A]Q.
The notion of total correctness (when A is deterministic) can be written
I* P -><A>Q.
1 u
4. Deterministic dynamic logic (DDL)
DDL is a deterministic version of DL, so that programs appearing in the scope of modal 
operators are deterministic. This is achieved by restricting the wffs of DDL to be those 
wffs of DL in which the program-building constructs "u" and appear only in these 
forms:
( i ) (P?; A) u  H 3?; B) ie If P then A else B.
( i i ) (P?; A)*; -.P? ie while P do A.
This restricted set of programs is called DRG. The semantics of DDL is just the same as
DL. The characteristic property of DDL is given by Lemma 2.6 in (Har78] page 21,
which states:
For any universe U, state I in U and program A in DRG, there is at most one state J so 
that I -A-> J.
Note that in DDL:
j -  <A>P [A]P a  <A> true
|«  <A>(P a Q) <-> <A>Pa <A>Q
These are not valid in DL, (there are obvious counter examples).
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CHAPTER 5: DOCUMENTED CODE 
5.1: LIBRARY FUNCTIONS: COMMON LISP
The following functions are part of my Lisp library, and were used in the definitions in 
the following sections.
Choose; chooses an element at random from a non-empty lis t
(defun choose (I)
(if (null I) nil (nth (random (length I)) I)))
Return the sublist for which p is true
(defun filter (p I)
(cond ((null I) nil)
((funcall p (car I)) (cons (car I) (filter p (cdr I))))
(t (filter p (cdr I)))
))
Tuples
(defun pair (e1 e2) (list e1 e2))
(defun triple (e1 e2 e3) (list e1 e2 e3))
(defun quad (e1 e2 e3 e4) (list et e2 e3 e4))
Mappings
(defun applymap (m a) (cadr (assoc a m :test 'equal)))
(defun apm (m a) (cadr (assoc a m :test 'equal)))
(defun dom (m) (mapcar 'fst m))
(defun mg (m) (mapcar 'snd m))
mapovr: m = (a b), M' = M - {(a _)} U {(a b)}
(defun mapovr (M m)
(cond ((null M) nil)
((equal (caar M) (car m)) (cons m (cdr M)))
(t (cons (car M) (mapovr (cdr M) m)))
) )
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5.2: THE OBJECT INTERPRETER
Objects are 4-tuples: (name fun internal-value external-value) (for no very good 
reason, the component order here is different from that mentioned in chapter 3).
The nextstate function fun takes as arguments its own object's internal and external 
values, and the names and external values of all other objects. It returns a list of its new 
internal and external values. We start by abstracting away from accidental ordering 
properties of an object state, by defining access functions.
(defun nam (obj) (first obj))
(defun fun (obj) (second obj))
(defun ivl (obj) (third obj))
(defun xvl (obj) (fourth obj))
An external environment is a mapping: NAME -> EXTERNAL-VALUE. This makes it easy to 
define the "get" function of chapter 3, here renamed "see".
(defun see (name xenv) (applymap xenv name))
(defun mkxenv (objlist)
(mapcar '(lambda (I) (list (nam I) (xvl I))) objlist))
The function "next" maps a worldstate into its subsequent version; the function "ego" 
successively applies "next", while printing a trace of woridstates on the output device. 
Currently it terminates after 16 iterations.
(defun next (objlist)
(nextl objlist (mkxenv objlist)))
(defun nextl (objlist xenv)
(if (null objlist) nil
(let ((obj (car objlist)))
(let ((n (nam obj))
(iv (ivl obj))
(xv (xvl obj))
(f (fun obj))
(xl (removel (list (nam obj) (xvl obj)) xenv) ) )
(cons (cons n (cons f (funcall f iv xv xl)))
(nextl (cdr objlist) xenv))
)) 
) )
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(setq ‘ SHOW t)
(defun ego (objiist)
(prog (i)
(setq i 0)
(setq *H nil) 
loop (terpri)
(if ‘ SHOW (showobjlist objiist)) 
(setq *H (cons objiist ‘ H))
(setq objiist (next objiist))
(setq i (add1 i))
(if (< i 16) (go loop))
) )
The function "remove!" is just the "remove" of common lisp, with :test 'equal. The 
function "showobjlist" is a straightforward display function. *H accummulates the world 
generated by "next".
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5.3: SIMULATION OF THE SCP GAME IN COMMON LISP 
In tro d u c tio n
In this section I present the LISP code which was used to implement the SCP players and 
board, discussed in section 3.3. The code, which is essentially an executable 
specification, follows the definitions in section 3.3 very closely.
Definition of players and board
U tility  functions
The following low level functions set up the apparatus needed to model players.
(setq *DOM '(S P R))
(setq ‘ DISP ’((S SCISSORS) (P PAPER) (R ROCK)))
(setq ‘ STAT ’(((P S) up) ((R P) up) ((S R) up)
((S P) down) ((P R) down) ((R S) down)
«P P) same) ((S S) same) ((R R) same)))
; score is with respect to the first argument 
; (this is a relabelling of ‘ STAT)
(setq ‘ WIN *(((P S) lose) ((R P) lose) ((S R) lose)
((S P) win) ((P R) win) ((R S) win)
((P P) draw) ((S S) draw) ((R R) draw)))
(setq ‘ UP '<(P S) (R P) (S R)) )
(setq ‘ DOWN '((S P) (P R) (R S)) )
(setq ‘SAME '((P P) (S S) (R R)) )
(setq ‘ COMP '( ((same same) same) ((same up) up) ((same down) down)
((up same) up) ((up up) down) ((up down) same)
((down same) down) ((down up) same) ((down down) up)))
(defun comp (f g) (applymap ‘ COMP (list f g)))
(defun up (tok) (applymap ‘ UP tok))
(defun down (tok) (applymap ‘ DOWN tok))
(defun same (tok) (applymap ‘ SAME tok))
(defun classify (x y) (applymap ‘ WIN (pair x y)))
(defun cfun (x y) (applymap *STAT (pair x y)))
(defun iswin (x y) (equal (classify x y) 'win))
(defun islose (x y) (equal (classify x y) 'lose))
(defun isdraw (x y) (equal (classify x y) 'draw))
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(defun get-players (x!)
(fiiter '(lambda (I) (member (second I) *DOM :test ’equal)) xl))
(defun get-tok (xl)
(cadar (filter ’(lambda (I) (member (second I) *DOM :test 'equal)) xl)))
Defining the players and board 
Board
The "board" object is called BRD, and is a 4-tuple of
cname, nextstate-function, internal state, external state>
as are all objects. The board's internal state is a count of how many games were won by 
each player. The board only exists for the convenience of the outside observer (me!), so 
that in the trace of the successive environments generated by "next" (see below), I know 
what's going on.
(setq BRD '(BRD brd-con ((namel 0) (name2 0)) nil) )
(defun brd-con (i x xl)
(prog (namel name2 p namelmovel name2move2 movel move2 a b i1)
(setq a (second (first i)) b (second (second I)))
(setq p (get-players x!)
namel movel (first p) name2move2 (second p)
namel (first namel movel) movel (second namel movel) 
name2 (first name2move2) move2 (second name2move2))
(setq 11 (cond ((iswin movel move2)
(pair (pair namel (add1 a)) (pair name2 b)))
((islose movel move2)
(pair (pair namel a) (pair name2 (add1 b))))
( t
(pair (pair namel a) (pair name2 b)))))
(return (pair i1 x))
))
177
Agent Theories and Architectures Section 5.3/3
user
This is the human user, a special object with a nextstate function which by side-effect, 
can talk to the terminal.
(setq HUMAN '(HUMAN human-con (0 0) S) )
(defun human-con (i x xl)
(prog (ans y i1 u v)
(setq u (first i) v (second i))
(setq y (get-tok xl))
(setq i1 (cond ((iswin x y) (pair (add1 u) v))
((islose x y) (pair u (add1 v)))
(t 0))
(setq u (first i1) v (second i1))
(princ "last game: YOU = *)
(princ (apm "DISP x))
(princ", OPP = ")
(princ (apm *DISP y))
(terpri)
(terpri)
(princ "That was a ")
(princ (classify x y))
(princ" for you")
(princ". Score")
(princ u)
(princ"-")
(princ v)
(princ" to you so far.")
(terpri)
loop
(terpri)
(princ "type in your move now, from ")
(princ *DOM)
(terpri)
(princ "«>")
(setq ans (read))
(terpri)
(cond ((member ans "DOM :test 'equal)
(return (list i1 ans))))
(terpri)
(princ "this is not a legal move, please try again")
(go loop))
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Random player.
The random player makes use of the internal lisp random function to make a random 
move.
(setq RAN '(RAN rand-nsf nil S) )
(defun rand-nsf (i x xl) (list i (choose $DOM}))
Definition of a level-n player
Following the analysis in section 3.3, we now define a general player taking the level as 
a parameter. This player assumes the opponent is a level-(n-t) player.
Its internal state is: (n MY-MAP MY-LAST-MOVE YOUR-LAST-MOVE).
(defun ABASIC (M x y) (funcall (applymap M (classify x y)) x) )
(defun G-con (i x xl)
(prog (M Ml xp yp y)
(setq n (first i) M (second i) xp (third i) yp (fourth i) 
y (get-tok xl))
(setq M1 (Gupdate-map n M xp yp x y))
(return (pair (quad n M1 x y) (ABASIC M1 x y)))
) )
(defun Gupdate-map (n M xp yp x y)
(prog (c M1 h g g l)
(setq c (classify xp yp))
(setq g (cfun xp x))
(setq h (cfun xp y))
(setq g1 (newg n g h))
(return (mapovr M (pair c g1)))
) )
(defun newg (n g h)
(cond ((equal n 0) (comp 'same g))
((equal n 1) (comp 'up h))
((equal n 2) (comp 'down g))
((equal n 3) (comp 'same h))
((equal n 4) (comp 'up g))
((equal n 5) (comp 'down h))
) )
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E xperim ents
The following sets up a number of experiments in which various level players are pitted 
against one another, and against human players.
; level 0 vs human
(setq M000 '((win down) (draw same) (lose down)) ) 
(setq L000 ‘ (L000 G-con (0 ,M000 nil nil) S))
(setq EO (list BRD L000 HUMAN) )
; level 1 vs level 0 and human
(setq M010 ’((win down) (draw down) (lose down)) ) 
(setq L010 '(L010 G-con (1 ,M010 nil nil) S))
(setq E1 (list BRD LOOO L010) )
(setq E1H (list BRD L010 HUMAN) )
; level 2 vs level 1 and human
(setq M020 '((win down) (draw same) (lose down)) ) 
(setq L020 ’ (L020 G-con (2 ,M020 nil nil) S))
(setq E2 (list BRD L010 L020) )
(setq E2H (list BRD L020 HUMAN) )
; level 3 vs level 2 and human
(setq M030 ’((win down) (draw same) (lose up)) ) 
(setq L030 ‘ (L030 G-con (3 ,M030 nil nil) S))
(setq E3 (list BRD L020 L030) )
(setq E3H (list BRD L030 HUMAN) )
; level 4 vs level 3 and human
(setq M040 '((win down) (draw same) (lose up)) ) 
(setq L040 ’ (L040 G-con (4 ,M040 nil nil) S))
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(setq E4 (list BRD L030 L040) )
(setq E4H (list BRD L040 HUMAN) )
; level 4 vs level 2
f .................................
(setq E42 (list BRD L020 L040) )
; level 5 vs level 4 and human
9  * ............ • • • -
(setq M050 ‘((win down) (draw same) (lose up)) ) 
(setq L050 '(L050 G-con (5 ,M050 nil nil) S))
(setq E5 (list BRD L040 L050) )
(setq E5H (list BRD L050 HUMAN) )
; level 6 (ie level 0) against level 5
(setq E6 (list BRD L050 L000))
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Printout pf a typical rnn.of the SCP . simgigtign
These are the first eight environment states of an SCP simulation between a level-1 
player L010 and a level-0 player L000. The environment consists of three objects, the 
board BRD, the player L000 and the player L010. The second component of each object is 
Its nextstate function.
The third component of the board is its table of how many wins each player has 
accomplished; note how it retrieves the names of the players in game 1 and subsequently. 
The board has a nil fourth component, because it is just an observer here, and other 
object need take no account of it.
The third component of the players is their strategy map plus record of the previous 
game, while their fourth component is the move they make.
(ego E1) ; this is the E1 of above.
(BRD BRD-CON ((NAME1 0)(NAME2 0)) NIL) ;Game1
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) NIL NIL) S) 
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW DOWN)(LOSE DOWN)) NIL NIL) S)
(BRD BRD-CON ((L000 0)(L010 0)) NIL) ; Game 2
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) S S) S) 
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW DOWN)(LOSE DOWN)) S S) P)
(BRD BRD-CON ((L000 1)(L010 0)) NIL) ; Game 3
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) S P) P)
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW UP)(LOSE DOWN)) P S) R)
Notice above how game 1 was a draw, subsequent to which L000 played "same". L010 
has therefore adjusted its "draw" component to play "up" in this eventuality, from its 
previous value of "down".
(BRD BRD-CON ((L000 2)(L010 0)) NIL) ; Game 4
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) P R) R)
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW UP)(LOSE UP)) R P) P)
L010 lost game 2, playing 'rock* to its opponent's paper. L000 subsequently played 
"down*, hence LOW has now adjusted its "lose" response so it will not lose again. Game 
3 was a loss for LOW, but it had adjusted its lo s s " play from "DOWN" to "UP" 
ensuring that it would win game 4.
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(BRD BRD-CON ({L000 2)(L010 1)) NIL) ; Game 5
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) R P) S)
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW UP)(LOSE UP)) P R) R)
LOW won game 4, and then did the right thing against LOOO's reaction to its loss, so 
that it won again in game 5. Hence from here on, LOW never loses again.
(BRD BRD-CON ((L000 2)(L010 2)) NIL) ; Game 6
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) S R) P)
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW UP)(LOSE UP)) R S) S)
(BRD BRD-CON ((L000 2)(L010 3)) NIL) ; Game 7
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) P S) R) 
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW UP)(LOSE UP)) S P) P)
(BRD BRD-CON ((L000 2)(L010 4)) NIL) ; Game 8
(L000 G-CON (0 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW SAME)(LOSE DOWN)) R P) S) 
(L010 G-CON (1 ((WIN DOWN)(DRAW UP)(LOSE UP)) P R) R)
and so on....
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5.4: THE SKINNER BOX SIMULATION IN COMMON LISP 
In tro d u c tio n
This section is in two parts. Firstly I present the LISP code which implements the light, 
agent and rewarder of the SRS-model introduced in section 3.5 (the code here is similar, 
but not identical to the pseudo-code of that section); secondly I present some examples 
of running simulations under two different rewarder regimes.
The library code and object-interpreter are included in sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Definition of light, rewarder and agent
: LIGHT
(setq b ’(LIGHT l-nsf 0 ON))
(defun i-nsf (i x xl)
(if (« i 2) (pair 0 ’ON) (pair (+ i 1) ’OFF)))
LBEWARDER
*SR is the table which controls the rewarder regime. Each entry is of the form: 
((previous-light subsequent-agent-action) rewarder-output)
(setq *SR ’(((ON P) S) ((ON NP) N) ((OFF P) R) ((OFF NP) N)))
(setq c ’(REWARDER r-nsf OFF N))
(defun r-nsf (i x xl)
(let* ((a (see 'AGENT xl)) (new-x (apm *SR (list i a))))
(pair (see 'LIGHT xl) new-x)
))
The rewarder stores the previous light, and uses *SR to control its output.
; AGENT
The first agent merely produces a random response. This is of some use in calibrating 
the other objects in the environment.
(setq ar '(AGENT ran-nsf nil NP))
(defun ran-nsf (i x xl)
(pair nil (choose '(P NP))))
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This agent on the other hand produces a sensible response. It manipulates the table of 
possible response to light events (here just called "table"), so as to banish shock- 
inducing actions, and prioritise reward-inducing actions.
The code of agent-nsf shows clearly how this is done (it is explained in more detail in 
section 3.5). P is press, NP is not-press.
(setq table ’((ON P) (ON NP) (OFF P) (OFF NP)))
Since the agent needs prior evidence to evaluate observations of the rewarder, it has a 
boundary problem at start-up time. The solution adopted here is to simulate prior 
observations of proceeding light states and agent actions (L3, L2, A2) by a random 
choice, which is then overtaken by observations. This introduces the required 
randomness into the early exploratory activities of the agent.
(setq L3 (choose ’(ON OFF)) L2 (choose '(ON OFF)) A2 (choose ’(P NP)))
(setq aok '(AGENT agent-nsf (,table ,L3 ,L2 ,A2) NP))
(defun agent-nsf (i x xl)
(let* ((R1 (see ’REWARDER xl))
(L1 (see ’LIGHT xl))
(table (first i))
(L3 (second i))
(L2 (third i))
(A2 (fourth i))
(ante (list L3 A2))
(smalltable (removel ante table))
(newtable (case R1
('R (cons ante smalltable))
('S smalltable)
(’N (append smalltable (list ante)))))
(next-move (apm newtable L1)))
) )
(pair (list newtable L2 L1 x) next-move)
; ENVIRONMENT
(setq SB1 (list b c ar)) ; random agent 
(setq SB2 (list b c aok)) ; sensible agent
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Experiment 1
(setq *SR (((ON P) N)((ON NP) R)((OFF P) S)((OFF NP) R)))
This is a rewarder regime which can be summarised as follows:
ON, PRESS -> NOTHING 
ON, NOT-PRESS -> REWARD 
OFF, PRESS -> SHOCK 
OFF, NOT-PRESS -> REWARD
Since it is possible to get a reward in both ON and OFF situations of the light, we might 
expect that SHOCK-inducing behaviour would be extinguished, while NOTHING-inducing 
behaviour would be deprioritised, in fact, the shock-inducing behaviour never occurs, 
since the "OFF-NP" in states 1 and 2 lead to a REWARD in state 3, which ever after 
masks it.
(EGO SB2)
(LIGHT L-NSF 0 ON) ; state 0
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON P)(ON NP)(OFF P)(OFF NP)) QEE ON £) NP)
(LIGHT L-NSF 1 OFF) ; state 1
(REWARDER R-NSF ON R)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON P)(ON NP)(OFF NPUOFF P)) QM ON HE) P)
The agent has noticed that the sequence "OFF - P" led to NOTHING in state-0, hence has 
put this sequence at the back above. Notice that mOFF-Pm was a fortuitous choice of 
initial assumptions resulting from use of the mchoosem functions.
(LIGHT L-NSF 2 OFF) ; state 2
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON NP)(ON P)(OFF NP)(OFF P))_£M OFF £) NP)
The agent has noticed that the sequence "ON - NP" led to a reward in state-1, hence has 
prioritised this sequence above.
(LIGHT L-NSF 0 ON) ; state 3
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF R)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON NP)(OFF NP)(OFF PUQN PA) OFF OFF NP) NP)
Since mON - P" in states 0 and 1 led to NOTHING in state 2, it has been put at the back of 
the table.
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(LIGHT L-NSF 1 OFF) ; state 4
(REWARDER R-NSF ON R)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF NPHON NP)(OFF P)(ON P)) OFF ON NP) NP)
Since "OFF - NP" in states 1 and 2 led to a reward in state 3, this has been prioritised.
(LIGHT L-NSF 2 OFF) ; state 5
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF R)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF NP)(ON NP)(OFF P)(ON P)) ON OFF NP) NP)
In fact, all subsequent states have the rewarder outputting a reward. 
Experiment 2
(setq *SR (((ON P) S)((ON NP) N)((OFF P) R)((OFF NP) N)))
This is a new rewarder regime with rules which can be summarised thus
ON, PRESS -> SHOCK 
ON, NOT-PRESS-> NOTHING 
OFF, PRESS -> REWARD 
OFF, NOT-PRESS -> NOTHING
(ego sb2)
(UGHT L-NSF 0 ON) ; state 0
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON P)(ON NP)(OFF P)(OFF NP)) OFF ON P) NP)
(LIGHT L-NSF 1 OFF) ; state 1
(REWARDER R-NSF ON N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON P)(ON NP)(OFF NP)(OFF P)) ON ON NP) P)
(LIGHT L-NSF 2 OFF) ; state 2
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF S)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((ON P)(OFF NP)(OFF P)(ON NP)) ON OFF P) NP)
(LIGHT L-NSF 0 ON) ; state 3
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF NP)(OFF P)(ON NP)) OFF OFF NP) NP)
Ignoring previous boundary value induced changes, we have mON-PRESS" in states 0 
and 1 which have resulted in SHOCK in state 2. Hence the pair (ON P) has been deleted 
from the table.
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(LIGHT L-NSF 1 OFF) ; state 4
(REWARDER R-NSF ON N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF P)(ON NP)(OFF NP)) OFF ON NP) NP)
(OFF NP) was demoted to last because it brought about NOTHING in state 3.
(LIGHT L-NSF 2 OFF) ; state 5
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF N)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF P)(ON NP)(OFF NP)) ON OFF NP) P)
(LIGHT L-NSF 0 ON) ; state 6
(REWARDER R-NSF OFF R)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF P)(OFF NP)(ON NP)) OFF OFF P) P)
(UGHT L-NSF 1 OFF) ; state 7
(REWARDER R-NSF ON R)
(AGENT AGENT-NSF (((OFF P)(OFF NP)(ON NP)) OFF ON P) NP)
The pattern of choosing PRESS when OFF, and NOT-PRESS when ON now persists 
indefinitely.
Conclusion
As these examples show, the agent can produce optimal behaviour in a variety of 
re warder regimes, after some initial exploration. A number of optimisations and 
extensions of this work would be possible.
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Addendum : A Formal Definition of SR S-W orlds
In the formal definitions which follow, "x" is cartesian product; if X, V are sets, then X-list is 
the set of infinite lists whose constituent members are drawn from X; X -> Y is the set of 
recursive functions from X to Y (recursive since we will wish the next state of an object to be 
computable). The constructor binds weaker than V ,  so that X x Y -> Y is the same as (X x 
Y) -> Y. The notation Xj, i e I, denotes a family of sets indexed by members of I. In Table 1
below, I will give the names of some sets, an indication of notation for variables and 
parameters over the set, and an informal description of their members. If p is a variable or 
parameter over a set X, then so is p\ p0, p.j, etc. The set of natural numbers {0,1,2,...} will
be written as N. Lists will be written in a square brackets notation thus: [a,b,c]. The first
element of a list is numbered "0", and lists may be applied to natural numbers to project their 
elements, eg [a,b,c](0) = a.
Table 1: sets
Name Var iables Descr ip t ions
1. NAME n symbols (eg strings) naming objects
2. ASj r, s, t assigned states (indexed by object)
3. XSj x, y, z external states (indexed by object)
4. NSFj f, g. h nextstate functions (indexed by object)
5. OBJSTATEj a, b, c the 4-tupies of object states (see below)
6. WORLDSTATE ws collections of object states
7. XWSTATE xws (name, external state) lists
8. WORLD u, v, w infinite seq. of worldstates, generated by
We need to introduce the idea of an external worldstate (XWSTATE) to describe what an object 
sees of the environment around it. We will say that an object sees the projection: (name, 
external state) of every object state in the worldstate containing it, including its own. The sets 
numbered 1-4 above can be defined with relation to the problem being considered: these will be 
called basic sets. The sets numbered 5-8 above are defined in terms of the basic sets. We are 
dealing with exactly m objects, indexed by I = {i-(,..,im}. The variable i e I.
Table 2: set definitions
1. NSFj = NAME x ASj x XSj x XWSTATE -> ASj x XSj.
The nextstate function of the ith object looks at its own data (the triple: name, assigned and 
external states), plus the named observable states in the rest of the worldstate, and returns 
its own object's next assigned and external states. The nextstate function itself is unchanged.
2. OBJSTATEj = NAME x ASj x XSj x NSFj
3. WORLDSTATE = OBJSTATE: x ... x OBJSTATE;'1 *m
A tuple of exactly m object states, which we will freely interpret as a list with m elements.
4. XWSTATE = (NAME x XS: ) x ... x (NAME x XS: )
'1 'm
A tuple of exactly m (name, external state) pairs.
5. SRS-WORLD = WORLDSTATE-list
Where the list is generated from its initial worldstate by "next".
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